VIDYARATNA

THE
SREEGOPAL
BASU
MALLICK
FELLOWSHIP
LECTURES
FOR 1930-31



181.48 SAR

IGNCA

SKC 181.48 SAR Presented 45 M. Semit bewar chille.

pastry.

THE with our best bushicueurs

Sreegopal Basu Mallick Basa Mallick

Malina

Fellowship Lectures

FOR 1930-31.

(A Realistic Interpretation of Sankara-Vedanta.)

BY

Kokileswar Sastri Vidyaratna, M. A.

Lecturer in Sanskrit and Philosophy, Calcutta
University, and author of The Introduction
to Adwaita Philosophy, The Upanishader
Upadesh in three big returnes, The
Adwaita Vada, The Outlines of
Vedanta Philosophy, The
Bhagavad Gita &c. &c.

AND _ -

Sava-Pandit of the "Cooch-Behar Durbar."

-:0::0:-

PUBLISHED BY

THE

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

1931.



PRINTED BY Rajendralal Sircar,

AT THE

KATYAYANI MACHINE PRESS. 39/1, Shibnarayan Dass Lane, Calcutta.





CONTENTS.

I	ect.			Page.
I.	Introductory	•••		-1
	The Absolute Reality and God	•••		. 8
II.	What is Māyā and			
	why is it Anirvachaniya	•••	-3 A 31	30
III &	& IV. One End works in Nature			
	and in Finite Self			50
v.	The Vedantic Präna:			
	—Its character	•••		70
V1.	The Vedantic Prāna:			
	—Its two-fold manifestations	•••		83
VII.	The Vedantic Prāna:			
1	—Its Objectivity	***	•	93
VIII	. Why is Māyā called so	•••		105
IX.	Sankara-Vedanta is not Pantheism	•••		123
X.	The Subject and its true character	•••		143
XI.	Jiva's State of Samsāra or False			
	Predication and How to get rid of	it		167
XII.	The Source of Adwaita-Vada:	•••		191
	Conclusion			

AUTHORITIES QUOTEDO

ABBREVIATIONS:

ऋग्बे द-Rg. Veda.

वै॰ भा॰, व्र॰ सू॰ भा॰, व्र॰।।।, ब्र॰—Brahma-Sutra-bhāsya.

ह॰ भा॰, ह॰—Brihadāranyaka-bhāsya.

म्॰ भा॰, म॰--Mundaka-bhāsya.

तै॰ भा॰, तै॰—Taittiriya-bhāsya.

नठ॰ भा•—Katha-bhāsya.

पाक-वोध-Atma-bodha-a poem by Sankara.

खे॰ भा॰, खे॰—Swetāswatara-bhāsya.

यतस्रोकी—Sata-Sloki—a poem by Sankara.

हा॰ भा॰, हा॰-Chhāndogya-bhāsya.

रा॰ ती॰, रामतीर्ध-Rāma-tirtha's Gloss on Vedānta Sāra.

खप॰ सा॰—Upadesha-Sāhasri of Sankara.

प्र॰ भा॰, प्र॰ ड॰—Prasna-bhāsya.

शिश्रपालवध-Sisupālabadha of Poet Māgha.

मा॰ गौड का॰ भाष्य, भेरू ऋा॰ भा॰—Sankara's bhāsya on Goudapāda-Kárikā and Māndukya-upanishad.

अनुभूतिप्रकाश—Vidyāranya's Anubhuti-Prakāsha.

वे॰ सा॰—Vedānta-Sāra.

केन॰ वा॰ भा॰-Kena-bākya-bhāsya of Sankara.

रतः प्र॰—Ratna-Pravā—Gloss on Ved. bhā.

वि॰ भि॰-Vijnāna-bhikshu.

आ॰ गि॰—Ananda-Giri.

देशा॰ भा॰—Isa-bhāsya.

स्रामिक्ष्य —A Poem by Sankara.



PREFACE.

Most of the writers on Sankara-Vedanta have dwelt almost exclusively upon the traditional illusory aspect and have tended to relegate its realistic aspect to the back-ground. I have found it necessary to refuse to accept the traditional ascetic interpretation alone to the entire neglect and inexcusable exclusion of the realistic; because it seems to me that the realistic side was very prominent in Sankara's own mind and I have conceived it to be my duty to try and present a concise account of his philosophy in its realistic and objective truthfulness with constant reference to the original sources. Even if this side is at a discount in the general esteem at the present moment, yet the realistic interpretation cannot be ignored nor evaded, and it is one of great and growing urgency. This neglect increases my gratitude to the great founder of this Fellowship whose impartial and enlightened generosity has rendered possible the publication of my studies on the realistic and practical aspect of the Vedanta and I trust that nothing of first-class importance has escaped my attention in re-emphasising this most neglected side of Sankara.

I cannot conclude without mentioning with deep gratitude the names of Brahmachāri Jnāna chaitanya (who has now become Paramahansa) and Brahmachāri Purna chaitanya—two most learned editors of that excellent Monthly Magazine—the Vedunta-Keshari—the renowned organ of the Rama-Krisna Matha at Mylapore in Madras, who, by their sympathy and encouragement, almost from the very beginning, helped me a great deal, by opening out the columns of their great Journal for some of these Lectures they so kindly published therein. The present learned editor Brahmachāri Furna chaitanya has placed me under a deep obligation by his kind appreciation of the merits of my Lectures and furnishing me with his valuable opinion on my interpretation which 1 reproduce below:—

"It is perhaps superfluous on our part to express our admiration for the scholarship and originality you have displayed so abundantly in your interpretation of Adwaita Vedānta. In India, especially, (perhaps it may be due to the adverse condition of our social and political life) men have ceased to think originally. To move even a bit from the old groove of thought is considered the climax of heterodoxy, and men have seldom shown that courage of conviction and intellectual vitality so essentially needed to set at naught such conservative forces at work and chalk out new paths of thought. We have profound regard for the strength of your intellectual conviction and originality of mind that have enabled you to give this new interpretation of Sankara's System. Some of our readers, who have taken interest in Vedānta all through their life, also told us that they are gathering many new ideas from your lectures.

We feel that of your lectures, those dealing with Māyā and Prāna are the best. You have clearly brought out that Māyā does not simply mean a magical power causing some sort of illusion, but that it is the Lord's creative power, which is always there either in a manifested or unmanifested condition,

and that it is unreal or illusory only to the ignorant man who views was separate from and unconnected with its substratum Brahman, while to the vision of the knowing one it appears in its proper relation to Brahman and therefore ceases to be unreal. Mayavada thus interpreted can form a philosophy of life providing an intellectual basis and a kind of sustaining power to man in his daily avocations of life. Your interpretation has shown that Adwaita is not simply a philosophy of asceticism but a gospel of life that can form the basis of dynamic activism. This of course is not stated in your lectures in so many words, but is what seems to us to be clearly implied in them. We do not know whether we have grasped you correctly, but we feel certain that if the implication that we have pointed out is correct, Adwaita, as interpreted by you, can again become a living force in our national life, and form not only a matter for the intellectual satisfaction of the Pandits; but a gospel of life that can inspire and sustain the youth of the land in the various fields of life that are open to them. In many respects this is also the trend of the interpretation given to the Adwaita Vedanta by the late Swāmi Vivekānanda.

Your lecture on 'Prāna' gives some clear and definite ideas about a much misunderstood subject. Many regard Prāna as some sort of air and others as some sort of energy that is neither spiritual nor material. Your interpretation of it has shown the absurdity of all such ideas that view the Prāna apart from its metaphysical significance that you have so ably expounded. In the light of the wide and comprehensive view you have taken of Prāna, it is possible to understand in a clear and correct perspective the whole world of meaning underlying this difficult concept in Indian philosophy.

While expressing our appreciation of the view you have taken of Adwaita, we would however like to say that the traditional interpretation of it also has a substantial basis to stand upon. But the point is that Adwaita has in the past been interpreted in an one-sided manner. Since most of the thinkers

of this school in the past have been ascetics, whose one object in life was to transcend all consciousness of relative existence, it is no wonder that this school of thought conceived the Absolute as free from any kind of change either of condition or of entity, and insisted on regarding the world as a totally non-existent phantasm. That such an experience is however possible is evident from the lives of some of our saints and such scriptural passages as the following Mantra from the Mandukya Upanishad:—

"नानःप्रज्ञ'न विहःप्रज्ञ° नोभयतःप्रज्ञ'न प्रज्ञानघनं न प्रज्ञं नाप्रज्ञ'। अहष्टमञ्चवहार्थ्यमगाञ्चमलचयमचिन्यमञ्चपदेश्यमेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपञ्चीपश्मं शानां शिवनहैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः॥"

But this does not mean that the ascetic's view alone is the correct one. The stand-point you have adopted is equally tenable, being supported both by reason and authority as you have proved by your elaborate arguments and quotations. The difference is that the traditional interpretation is that of the ascetic who tries to identify himself with the Absolute by obliterating the consciousness of relative existence, whereas yours is the view of the practical man of the world who tries to transcend the limitation of the world by regarding it as non-different from Brahman, its stuff and substratum". &c. &c.

I wish also to thank Prof. Narendra Chandra Vedāntatirtha, m. A., for the great pains he has taken in seeing the book through the press.

Senate House.

Calcutta University.

August, 1931.

Kokileswar Bhattacharyya.



For 1930—1931.

(On Sankara-Vedanta.)

I.

(a) Introductory.

Among the Six main Schools of Vedānta, the School represented by Sankarāchāryya holds a very unique position. It is not only very popular in India, but in the Western world also it has found a number of brilliant and lucid exponents, some of whom have thrown enthusiastic labour into the study of his System and succeeded to correctly seize his main principles. But critics are not wanting both in India and in Europe who have adversely criticised him and are unable, they assure us, to accept his method. But the objections raised by them seems, however, to have been founded on misapprehension of his ideas. These critics have understood Sankara's—""—"as an all-inclusive whole em-

bracing within it, and entirely immanent in, the in-

dividual selves (विषयो) and the objects (विषय), and that these, they have thought, are mere reproductions of, or parts constituting, the whole. This, in fact, is an identification of the Absolute with the process of the Actual. In a different way, Brahma of Sankara has been taken by some in the sense of an abstract empty unity in which, "like a lion's den" to use Hegel's phrase,-everything is lost and from which nothing can come out; and Sankara has been credited with the impossible task of deducing the differences of nama-rupa from such a blank, barren, empty unity. Another consequence naturally follows. As there is nothing but Brahma, the world must be an illusion, a kind of hallucination, a creation of the mind of man. It is simply the mental ideas with which the finite man-the knowing subject-conceives the true Reality-Brahma. The apparent world exists in the mind of man and when the mind of man is abolished, the world ceases to exist. In this way, Sankara's doctrine has been reduced by some of these scholars to a sort of Subjective Idealism.

In the all-comprehensive view noticed above the finite souls which are mere phases of one inclusive unity, appear and vanish with no aim or purpose and are drifted along as the countless waves or bubbles on the bosom of the ocean. The individuals, these authors maintain, have no freedom of action, no responsibility,—and the sole responsibility, if any, is attributed only to the whole which is the only individuality. The personality of the Jivas has no place, they say, in this System.

It is forgotten that the finite soul also participates in the Absolute Self-the Infinite-which is eternally present in him and which is his true self, without which his finititude itself vanishes. The fact is not noted that the finite self, in Sankara-Vedanta, is both the same (अनन्य), and not the same (अन्य) with God. The cultivation of moral virtues, they would assure us, has been denied by Sankara and a sort of inertia preached. The union with Brahma which is sought for in Sankara System is, according to these critics, only an absorption in which all contents and differences are entirely lost and, contrary to the assurance given in the Gita-"तस्याइं न प्रण्यामि, स च मे न प्रण्यति" (i. e. 'I-the Supreme Self-will not be lost to him, nor hethe finite self-will be lost to me'); -the emancipated Jiva, these critics tell us, becomes a total void and an empty abstraction. Even Paul Deusson, the most learned and sympathetic interpretor of Sankara's System has explained the great āchāryya's theory from the point of view of Subjective Idealism, following the theory of Kant and Schopenhaur as understood by him.

It has also been held by some that the Māyāvāda as is found in the Sankara System was the creation of his own fertile brain and it has no sanction and support in the most ancient Upanishads and in the Brahma-Sutras.

We all of us remember the notorious Sanskrit couplet, particularly its last line—"मायावादमस्कास्त्रं प्रकृतं वीदमेव तत्"—and you know how Sankara was

> Indira Gandhi Nationa Centre for the Arts

held to ridicule by some of our own countrymen who represented his great Māyā-vādā as an अस्टाइन (Asat-Sāstra) and stigmatised him as a प्रश्न के कि —a crypto Buddhist. Evidently, the composer of the lines had in his mind Sunya-vāda of a certain sect of the Buddhists. But the man was counting without his host. He knew not what he was about. He not only misunderstood and misinterpreted Sankara, but also signally failed to grasp the true sense of the Sunya-vāda too, which he was led to ascribe to Sankara. The great Pali authority gives the following correct idea of the Sūnya-Vāda—

"सिच भिक्ख इमं नारं, सित्ता ते लडु मैस्सित केता रागच देवच, ततो 'निव्वाय'मेडिसि"।

The text shows that the Nirvana is not an empty vacuum; it is a state where love and hatred, passion and aversion by which all of us are swayed will never distract our mind; where all strife and quarrel will cease to exist and perfect tranquillity will come to our possession. Sankara himself has used the term Nirvana, but he understood it in quite a different sense than what the versifier tells us- "अभितो ब्रह्म-निळीषमत्यन्तं सुखमयुते" (Vide. Sankara-bhāsya on it). When the Nirvāna is attained, we would not, he assures us, reach a vacuum but — अत्यन्तं सुखम्—complete bliss and happiness. No suffering will meet us anymore.—"तव को मोइ:, कः शोक: एक्लमनुपछत:" (quoted in ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 3. 4. 22.) -But we shall see more elaborately if Sankara really deserves such stigma at all.

Thick accretions of such misapprehension and hasty opinions have gathered round and have almost chocked the spirit of this great philosophy, this glorious Metaphysical System of India.

But if any honest and earnest seeker of truth, purging off from his mind preconceived ideas, tries to find out the true meaning of this philosophy, his success is sure to come. Let him carefully collect the materials from the *original sources* which he will find scattered broad-cast in the writings of Sankara himself and he will experience no difficulty to establish the correct position set forth there-in.

In the course of these Lectures, it will be my earnest endeavour to present before my learned audience the correct views of Sankara-Vedānta as appear from his own writings and to show the untenability of the opinions formed by some of the Western as well- as Indian critics of this great and celebrated Māyā-vāda. An attempt will be made to discover the source of this Adwaitavada which I have tried to trace to the Rg-veda itself. An attempt will also be made in the following course of Lectures to show, here and there, the merits of Vedanta as compared with the Western Schools of thought which would, I hope, also throw some light on the place this School of philosophy occupies in the philosophical world, but our success would, I feel sure, only be partial, if we fail to disperse even to a partial extent, the mist which threatens to throw its brilliancy into the shade. I have, therefore, thrown my main labour in this direction with a view to draw your special attention to it. It is needless to add that the task is very difficult, but I crave your kind indulgence and sympathetic appreciation.

In bringing these preliminary observations to a close, it is my pleasant duty to invite your kind attention to a most essential fact which I cannot too earnestly impress upon you. To present before you the main features of the Doctrine of Sankara in its various aspects my reliance would, as I have hinted above, be placed mainly upon the Sanskrit texts. To arrive at the correct conclusion, especially in the face of adverse views entertained in some quarters, much attentive and single-minded study of Sankara's own writings is needed. Unlike the great Buddha, Sankara did not make use of the current language of the country. Whatever he wrote, he wrote, as you know, in Sanskrit, and that again in a diffuse and dispersed manner. His doctrine may be collected from the various commentaries written by him on the ten Upanishads, on the Brahma-Sūtra and the Gita, as also from the metrical works of his own composition which have never been excelled in the exquisite beauty and charm of the beautiful verses and the perspecuity of the ideas embodied there-in. Many of you with the exception of very few, who are so kind as to take the trouble to attend here—which shows how great an interest you take in, and the love you cherish for, the Vedanta, are not, I venture to presume, very well acquainted with the first-hand Sanskrit texts. This imperfect and superficial know-

ledge of the original texts-I mean the commentaries of Sankara as also his Prakarana books, is, to my view, responsible for the inaccurate modern interpretation, both in Europe and in India, of the great Māyā-vāda. To correctly understand Sankara and to reach his inner heart, it is absolutely necessary that we must all of us acquire the firsthand original knowledge of Sankara's own writings. But I see around me some of your faces which are naturally so bright with the illumination of intelligence and learning growing somewhat darkened at the mention of Sanskrit texts. But, believe me, you have no reason to feel disheartened. Whenever quoting texts from Sankara's writings, it would be my pleasant duty to put before you a faithful and literal English translation. To keep close to the original is what mainly concerns us and I shall try my best to represent the texts as faithfully as in me lies. If you follow this procedure, you will yourself have no difficulty in finding out the true view of this great Indian philosopher.

Another point I should like to impress upon your kind attention is this. Too many abstruse things given at a time may prove confusing and you may grow impatient. I have thought it advisable to distribute the whole theory, specially its metaphysical portion, into some broad heads, and to deal with each of the topics under those heads successively one after the other, but not at the same time losing the thread of connection running through them.

(b)—The Absolute Reality (निगु[°]ग-ब्रह्म) And God (ईश्वर)

(1) Brahma is absolute and perfect in its nature. Brahma does not undergo any mutation in time, hence it is made up of absolute Being or Reality. There were critics of the Hegelian type who thought Brahma to be a sort of "negative Infinite",—"a not-finite"—an empty, contentless abstraction. There were others who took it as a "void—without consciousness, without activity, a characterless vacuum". But Nirguna Brahma in Vedānta is not nothing—

"प्रतिविधानुपपत्ते:.....पत्तीत्वेवीपलस्वते" (त्र० स्० भा०,०३. २. २२.)

[Its,negation is not possible.....it is felt as an existence.]

The word Nirguna is a technical term. The term you is employed to denote what is phenomenal

and hence Nirguna means that anything phenomenal does not constitutively belong to Brahma—

''सत्त्वरजसमां सि गुणाः, तैर्विर्ज्जितं निर्गुणम्' (गी० भा०, 13, 14.)

Brahma is all-illuminating, all-pervading Reality without change, process or progress. It is the essence of all conscious souls (विषयो) and unconscious appearances (विषय) and it abides independently of, and transcends, the relation of subject and object—

''चिवचिवज्ञो थेन ज्ञानेन विषयीकियेते, तत् ज्ञानं सम्यक् ज्ञानम्'' (गी॰ भा॰, 13. 2.)

''परस्परोपकार्य्योपकारकलात् एकस्य.....चात्मनः संस्थानविशेषौ''

(इ॰ भा॰, 5. 5. 2.)

[That knowledge by which the subject and the object are known i.e. which transcends their cor-relativity—is considered by me to be the true knowledge.]

[They are correlative; and there is thus a higher Principle which makes their correlativity possible.]

Brahma is one Reality consisting of being, thought and bliss (पिंचरानर). Eternal being, consciousness and bliss are not attributes of Brahma, but Vedānta regards them, in their inseparable identity, as Brahma itself. They are so inseparably united that we cannot think of the one without thinking of the other. There can be no separation of these in Brahma, no parting off; for, if there were, they would fall outside of the Divine Essence. The Being cannot be denied. We may think away anything, but we cannot think away Being or Existence. It is—unu united that way Being of Existence.

realities,—Being of all beings. It is presupposed in all forms or existence; as Plato argues in his Dialogue, "the existence of one means the existence of others which share in its being." We ourselves * are immediately conscious not merely of our own existence, but as an existence that is conscious. Being is thus identical with consciousness. If one is different from the other, a dualism would arise—two absolute existences would co-exist, which is absurd.—

"नहि सज्जवणमेव ब्रह्म, न वीधलचणमिति यक्यं वकुम्।... कयं वा नित्यचैतन्यं ब्रह्म चैतनस्य जीवस्य धात्मले न उपदिख्येत ? नापि वीधलचणमेव ब्रह्म, न सज्जचणमिति यक्यं वकुम्— 'बस्तीत्ये वीपलक्षव्यः' इत्यादिश्वृतिवैद्यर्थप्रसङ्कात्। कयं वा निरस्तसक्ताकं वीधोऽस्युपगक्तव्यः 2"

(ब्र॰ स्० भा०, 3. 2, 21).

The sense of the above is clear: "Brahma can not be defined merely as being, but not as consciousness. How otherwise Brahma could have been instructed as the 'self' of the finite souls? Nor can its definition be as consciousness alone, but not being; for, such *Srutis* as 'it is to be felt as existence'—would then become useless. Consciousness which has no existence cannot be admitted."

While we distinguish these three, we must also see that the whole unity is present and active in each

(Ho Mo, 2, 2, 10.)

We can know the nature of Brahma from the nature of our own self—''बालाबिद: तद विदु:, 'बालाप्रत्यशानुसारिय:'—

of them. These, therefore, do not destroy the unity of the one Divine Essence. These constitute the nature of Brahma; they are its— भावसन्त and cannot be parted off.

These three are not separable from one another but together constitute the nature of Brahma—

''निह स्राभाविकस्य उच्छित्तिः कदाचिद्रप-पद्यते, स्वतित्रिव श्रीसा-प्रकाशयोः''--- (इ॰ भा॰, 4. 3. 20.)

["A thing cannot be deprived of its own nature, as the heat and light of the sun."]

We have seen that consciousness or knowledge is not separable from Being. Bliss (आवस्) is also not separable from knowledge. For, Sankara says, —"As Bliss constitutes the nature of Brahma, it must be eternally present; it cannot be absent or separate from knowledge. If it be separated or absent from knowledge, it would become non-eternal or अनित्य; for, knowledge does not illumine it, being separate or absent from it. And what is non-eternal (अनित्य) cannot constitute the nature of the Eternal Self and would be dependent on some stimulating cause for its production."—

''तस बात्मभूतमेव तदिति, उपलक्षियवधानानुपपत्तेः, निसामियक्कतात्। षय कदाचिद्भियवयते?—उपलक्षियवधानात् बनात्मभूतं तदिति, अन्यतोऽभियक्तिप्रसङ्गः'। (इ॰ भा॰, 4. 4. 6.)

Then, again, says Sankara-"when both have the same identical substratum, one cannot remain

separated or absent from the other; either both must be present or both must be absent."—

"उपलब्धि-समानात्रये तु, व्यवधानकत्पनानुपपत्ते: ; सर्वेदाऽभिव्यक्तिः, भनभिव्यक्तिर्गं ।

Again he says-

"न च 'समाना यथाषा' मेकस्यात्मभूतानां धर्म्याणामितरेतर-विषय-विषयित्वं सम्मवति' —

"There cannot be a subject-object relation among the essential properties which constitute a thing." Hence, knowledge and Bliss can be immediately felt, without one of them being the object of the other. For, an object (विषय) cannot constitute the essential property (धर्म or स्वरूप) of the subject. *

In this manner Sankara has proved that know-ledge (चित्), Being (सत्) and Bliss (आनन्द)—are eternally present and inseparable from one another, and they together constitute the nature or स्त्रभाव of the Absolute ('आसम्तानाम्').

Thus, it will be seen that the Absolute Brahma, as pointed out by Sankara has a nature, a स्वभाव of its own and it is not a vacuum—

"न सभावाभिप्रायम्" (त्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 3. 2, 22).

[•] For, the object being a partial expression of its subject, there is subordination i. e. dependence, not co-ordination or समानात्रविल,

And this nature—

सन्
सन्
सन्
सन्
सन्
सन्
we find continuously present (

सन्गत) behind the differences of names

and forms (

नाम
सन्

प

) in the world —

''ब्रह्मचोऽपि 'सत्तीलचयाः' खभावः श्राकाशादिषु श्रनुवर्त्तमानी दृश्यते''। (ब्र० स्० भा०, 2. 1. 6).

["The ether and the like are accompanied by the being of Brahma which is its characteristic nature."]

" 'चिन्मावा'नुगमात् सर्व्वव चित्खह्पता गस्यते"

(इ० भा०, 2. 4. 7).

["As knowledge is an accompaniment of all objects everywhere, everything has knowledge as its Swarupa (nature).]

" 'श्रामन्देन' व्याहत्तविषयदुद्धिगस्य श्रामन्दः अनुगन्तु श्रकाते'' (तै० भा०, 2. 7).

["The Bliss Divine is present behind all the joys connected with the mutually exclusive objects of the world."]

(2) Brahma is the cause-

Far from reducing Brahma to a negation or nonentity, Vedānta makes Brahma—Sacchidānanda in essence—the first cause. To strengthen the idea I would quote Rāmatirtha.

> ''ज़बदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलयकारणं सिवदननानिक्स्लानिकरसं ब्रह्म' । (Gloss on Ved. Sara),

["Therefore, it is stated that Brahma-truth, knowledge, infinite, bliss, -one in essence-is the cause of production of the world." 7

About the causality of Brahma—सचिदानन्ह in essence, the Vedantic idea may be stated as follows:-

The differences of names and forms (नाम-द्व) prior to their actualisation existed in Brahma in an undeveloped and undifferentiated state (अव्यक्तावस्थायाम्, अनिभित्रको नाम-रूपे) indistinguishably blended in its nature ("चिदेकात्मना निसोनत्वात्"—उप॰ सा॰). It exists as a whole (सर्ज्ज) in which the differences are merged, but not obliterated.*

Sankara himself describes this as-

''बपरित्यतान्यतमविशेषवदेवं तदव्याक्रतं'' (इ॰ आ॰, 1. 4. 7). In मा॰ का॰, 5 also "खनीय-सर्व्वविसार महितं कारणापत्रं युक्तं (सुष्ठिप्रलययो:)"

As in our own consciousness, our ideas, before being expressed in words, exist in avyakta formundifferentiated, unmanifested, submerged,-which has been beautifully expressed by the late Upadhyāya Gouragovinda in his Gitā-Samanvayabhāsya, P. 232.—

"ज्ञानात् ज्ञेयान्तरे खीक्षते सर्व्वकारणस ज्ञानस अन्यापेचित्वप्रसंगः, अतो न सिध्यति ज्ञानसद्भावं ब्रह्मण इति विप्रतिपत्तिः आत्मज्ञाने सर्वेषां ज्ञे यानाम् अन्तर्भावित्वात् निर्मः ्वा। अत्यक्तानां ज्ञे यतां तिस्मन् चाने चिमन्नभावेन स्थितिनां नुमूतिविबद्धां "-इत्यादि-

[&]quot;बाकाशादयः उपरमनी ऽस्मिन् ऽति 'सब्बीपरमः' ताहग्भावात् मङासुष्पिः प्रस्यः इति चस्न 'सर्वेत्नम्'--(रामतीर्थं).

—["Without object there can be no knowledge. Knowledge of Brahma will have then to depend on an object. But as it is independent of all, how can there be consciousness of Brahma? The reply is—"In the knowledge of our Self all objects remain included. We are ourselves conscious of the presence of our own objects in our own consciousness before their manifestation, identically blended with it."]

Here I would call your pointed attention to a misunderstanding of Sankara's position. You must carefully note his idea about Nirguna Brahma. His idea is found very explicitly recorded in the Kathabhāsya. There are many by whom Sankara has been supposed to deduce the world of differences from an abstract, empty, barren unity and they have compared his System in this respect to that of Parmenides. From the Eleatic abstract one, there can be no passage to the actual world of many. Sankara is credited with the performance of an impossible feat! He does not deduce the world from the unity. His object is not to deduce; he takes the world as it is. he only shows that it is the manifestation of Brahma and it has no reality apart from Brahma. Brahma is its presupposition, Brahma is its end-

> "अहमादिश...भूतानामन्त एव च"— (गी० ७.२०.)

Take the passage.—

 —["The Sruti takes the world as it is (वयाप्राप्त)—the world presented by Avidyá and consisting of agent, action and result. Sruti begins with the world."]

Sankara thus begins with the objective world as he has found it; he only shows its unity with Brahma.—

''उत्पत्तिस्थितित्वयवाक्यानि 'परमेश्वरैकलप्रत्यय'—द्रद्धिने , न सावयवांशांशिलकत्पना परमार्थतः।''—

["The statement given in the Sruti about the creation, etc. of the world is not with a view to show Brahma as assuming parts or as an aggregate of नाम-इन but to strengthen the unity of the world with Brahma."]

But how does Sankara show this unity? Take this illustration.—

"विक्कु लिंगस प्रागग्ने ध्वें सात् अग्नेत्रकलदर्भनात्...अग्नेहि विक्कु लिंगः अग्निरेवैकलप्रत्यसार्हः।"—

[*The scintillation (spark) before it came out of fire, was nothing but fire; after it comes out of fire it is the same with the fire, and so is the world."]

Thus we find, as Brahma is the source of the world and Brahma is the end, so the world is one with Brahma, not separate from Brahma, it cannot be taken apart from Brahma.

We see, then, he does not deduce the world of many from the unity. He begins with the world, as he finds it. And then he arrived at the idea of Brahma through the कार्य-जगत, then through the कार्य (cause) which is intimately connected with the कार्य (effect), he reached the idea of Brahma which is

A

beyond कार्या-कारण (effect and cause). We would quote him here—

"पूर्वम्, बसीत्वे वोपलक्षस्य बात्मनः सत्कार्य्योपधिक्षतास्तित्वप्रत्ययेन उपलक्षस्य इत्यर्थः। पद्मात्, प्रत्यस्तितसर्व्योपधिद्धप बात्मनसत्त्वभावः...नित निति श्रुति-निर्द्धिः प्रसीदति...पूर्वमस्तीत उपलक्षवतः"— (कठ० भा० ६-३).

—["Atma should be known as existing, as producing effectsthen the true nature of the 'Atma' unconditioned, devoid of indicative marks.....and indicated by Srutis 'not this' faces him who had previously realised it as existent."]

"सर्वोपाधिविश्रेषरहितोऽपि जगतो सूलमित्यवगतत्वात् श्रन्त्येव, कार्यंप्रविलापनस्य श्रम्तिल-निष्ठत्वात्, कार्यं स्त्रातारतस्यपारस्यय्ये श्रमुगस्यमानं सद्वृह्विनिष्ठामिव श्रमुगम्यति । बुद्धिहिं .न: प्रमाणं सदसतीर्याधार्थावगमे''—(कठ). "कार्यं-कार्यस्यत्वावधारयदारेष सत्यस्य सत्यं ब्रह्म श्रवधार्यते"।— (ह० भा० २-२-१).

—["Though devoid of attributes, he certainly exists; for that into which effects are absorbed must certainly exist. For, the effects traced back in ascending series of subtlety leads only to the conviction of something as existent. Intellect even in the ultimate analysis...is still pregnant with a belief in the existence of something"—($\pi 3$). "After ascertaining the truth of effect and its cause, we ascertain Brahma which is truth of all truths."]

Sankara, it should be noted carefully, never separated the world from Brahma, both after and before its manifestation; he never separated many from the unity. He repeatedly observed that the world of TIH-TY (name and form) had no existence apart from Brahma. He never made the infinite a mere correlative of the finite. The true Infinite is such which finds expression in the finite.

The theory of unantuals is a well-known tenet of Vedanta. There must be a positive substratum

(अधिष्ठान) of the emergent effects, in which the latter existed in potential form (कारणाबना)—

—[It cannot be said that Brahma does not exist; for, ether, etc., of which the cause is Brahma is perceived by the senses. That from which something proceeds exists...He knows Brahma as existing, that Brahma who is the source of all energy and in whom all determinations cease to exist; i.e., which excludes all determinations which would only make it finite].

In his Atma-Bodha, Sankara observes that it is Brahma which must be regarded as the cause of the world, otherwise the absurd hypothesis, viz., from pure negation (भात) comes something positive (भात) would have to be admitted. For, says he, an energy to produce something must have a positive substratum for its operation. Energy apart from the substratum is a figment of imagination.—

''कारणमसदिति केचित्, कथयन्यसतो भवेत्र कारणतां। षङ्गुरजननी शक्तः, सति खलु बीजे समीत्त्र्यते सक्तेः। कारणमसदिति कथयन्, वन्यापुत्रेण निर्वेहत् कार्थ्यम्॥''

-[Some say that the cause is a non-entity. But the non-existence cannot be a cause. The power to generate a sprout is visible to all only if the seed exists. He who declares the cause to be a non-entity, can manage affairs with the son of a barren woman].

Prior to their manifestation, Nāma-Rupas existed in Brahma in Avyakta form, undeveloped form "जगत् …प्रागवस्थायां 'वीजग्रत्रावस्थम्' (ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 1.4.2)"; it has,

therefore, been called in several places as Atma, since it existed indistinguishable from Brahma.—"आवस्ति क्वा, 'श्रावस्ति ते कथो ते"—(तै॰ भा॰)

Nāma-rupa could not be separated from Brahma in that stage and hence it was that Brahma's unity was not destroyed.—

''निष्ठ चात्मनीऽनात्मभूतं तत्-प्रविभक्तदेशकालं सूच्चं व्यविष्ठतं भूतं भविष्यदा वस्तु विद्यते ; चतो, नामक्षे सर्वावस्थे ब्रह्मचैव चात्मवती''— (तै॰ भा० २-६).

-["There is nothing which is divided from it, either in space or in time, which is subtle, distant, different, that was past, that is to be. Therefore, name and form, under all circumstances, are possessed of Atma only, by Brahma."]

"As the spider produces its thread from its own stores, so Brahma produces the world from its own stores." When the नाम-रूपs (names and forms) came out, there is some differentiation; they could be distinguished, but can never be separated from Brahma.

''यदा चात्मस्थे ऽनिभयक्ते नामरूपे व्याक्रियेते, तदा नामरूपे चात्मस्ररूपापरित्यागे-नैव ब्रह्मणा चप्रविभक्तदेशकाले सर्वावस्थासु व्याक्रियेते''— (तै॰ आ॰ र-६).

—["Because they were in the Atma with their names and forms unmanifested, and are unfolded by the Atma, and when so unfolded became the object of the designation 'Shaped' and 'Shapeless' and still they are inseparable from the Atma, both in space and time."]

Sankara never made Brahma a logical abstraction, a homogeneous unity. It transcends all, but is not utterly unrelated to the world. Nature presupposes unity of which it is the manifestation; differences have no meaning apart from the unity. The differ-

ences of नाम-रूप are not to be taken in Vedānta as separate from Brahma, existing outside of Brahma, as mere correlative. In that case, Brahma would be limited by them, would be finite itself.—

''न ब्रह्मणः परं वस्तन्तरमसीति गस्यते। अन्यप्रतिषेधेऽसति वस्तु वस्तन्तरात् व्यावर्त्तते इति परिच्छेद एव आत्मनः प्रसन्धेत''— (व्र० स्० भा० ३-२-३०).

Brahma includes नाम-रूप, does not exclude them.—

''यस्य च यस्मादात्मलाभ: च तेन चप्रविभक्तो हष्ट: यथा घढादीनां खदा।न तत एव निर्भिदा गृहीतुं शकाते'— (व॰ भा॰)

-["What is produced from something, remains undivided from it. It cannot be separated from it."]

The नाम-इप्ड (names and forms), though they cannot be separated from Brahma, do exist in Him, not as His elements or चर्म or essential properties. For, in that case, Brahma would be qualified by them and He would become composite (चप्रपच) or with parts, i.e., sum-total of these would be Brahma in that case; His transcendence would be violated. The differences of नाम-इप, as soon as they were produced, were produced as the objects of His consciousness, and His consciousness thus stands distinguished from them. How can they be then the essential properties or चर्म of Brahma?

"श्रात्मन: सक्षं ज्ञिष्ठः.......श्रतो नित्येव।.....तयापि........ये श्रन्दादाकाराव-भासा: ते श्रात्मविज्ञानस्य 'विषयभूता' उत्पदामाना एव श्रात्मविज्ञानेन व्याप्ता उत्पदाने।...श्रात्मन एव 'धर्माः' विक्रियाद्वरा इत्यविवेकिभिः परिकल्पान्ते"—

- [The essence of Atma is intelligence; it cannot exist in separation from it, therefore, it is permanent...The sense-impressions of sound and form though presented as knowable objects,

are already comprehended and included in the intelligence. Some ignorant people construe them as the modifications of the Atma, as the essential qualities of the Atma].

They cannot be His धर्म or विकार. Why? Be-

"न हि चौरस्य सर्वोपमहें न दिधभावापित्तवत्, विराट् सर्वोपमहें न एतावान् भास । किं तिर्हे ? भाव्यना व्यवस्थितस्ये व हि.....भाव्यव्यतिरिक्तंशरीरान्तरं वभूव"— (व० भा० १-४-४).

-[As the milk becomes entirely transformed into the curd when it takes the latter form, so the *Virat* did not. Atma remaining unaffected in its own nature changed into a different form.]

We thus see that the immanence of God must not be taken in the sense of Divine *identification* with the process of the world, and the transcendency also ought not to be taken in the sense of *absolutely sepa*rating Brahma from the world.

It is the immanence of transcendence. Sankara's remarks must be carefully noted.—

"धरापि ब्रह्म" प्रपंचासंस्थ स्वतन्तं च, तथापि प्रपंची न स्वतन्तः, भिषति तस्मिनेव ब्रह्मण वयं प्रतिष्ठितम्—भीका, भीग्यं, प्रीरितारिनित वस्त्यमाणं...विकारा-अथले ऽपि भविनाणि एव कृढस्थं ब्रह्म भवितष्ठते।"

[Although Brahma is untouched by and separate from the world, the world is not separate from Brahma; in Him as a substratum the three—the enjoyer (finite self), the nature and God (the controller)—exist. All through, the sustaining ground, Brahma, exists as unchangeable and imperishable as ever].

If Brahma is absolutely separated from the world, if He is not admitted to be the ground (अधिष्ठान) of

it, the world would be utterly unreal; for, Sankara himself has laid down the proposition that—

"भग महदा यदिस विश्वित्, तत् भाकाना विनिर्धं क्रमसत् सन्यदाते"—

(कड॰ भा॰)

--[Whatever object exists in the world, the infinitely minute or infinitely great, would become unreal as soon as it is removed from its connection with Atma.]

Hence, Brahma cannot be absolutely separated from the world. In that case, Sankara's repeated instructions that the differences of changing नामरूप, the world, ought lead us to the knowledge of Brahma (विकार-दारेण ब्रह्माधिगम: कर्मच्य:) would be quite contradictory and purposeless. Though Brahma is निगुंष, it is not unrelated to the world.—

"न प्रथमनुभवः, किन्तु तत्-साइचर्यात्।" (मतस्रोकौ)

—[The world of नाम-इव is to be looked upon in connection with Brahma, and not cut off from Him].

For these reasons, Brahma in Vedanta is declared to be both the efficient and material cause of the world. For, if He is not the material cause, some other independent material cause would have to be admitted; but in that case, the world would be quite independent of, and separate from, Brahma and his repeated observation—uclassification under the series of the world would be quite inconsistent.

We find from all these discussions that Sankara's idea was that there are indeed statements in the Sruti about the *creation* no doubt, but its object is not to describe creation or deduction of the world from unity so much as to show that Brahma is

present (अनुगत) in the world which is its revelation, and to show its unity with Brahma and its non-separability from Brahma.

- (a) How can the world be absolutely separate () from Brahma? For, if it be absolutely separated, Brahma's knowledge of Himself would be a complete knowledge, and the knowledge of the world would fall beyond it. That is to say, the knowledge of the world would be something beyond the sum-total of Reality, which adds nothing to that knowledge—being complete in itself. Thus a world would be a superfluity and inexplicable, and acosmism would be the result. In that case, the world is not the expression of the nature of Brahma. But Sankara everywhere insists on the fact that the world of नाम-इन् is to be taken as the revelation of Brahma.
- (b) If, again, Brahma be entirely separated from the world, 'He would be like a human artist fashioning independent and self-existing matter. But Brahma being regarded in Vedānta as also the material cause (उपादानकारण), He is not like an external cause, but He expresses His nature as it is in the world.
- (c) We find in the Upanishads that the नाम-रूप
- (i) in Brahma or with Brahma—"ते (नामरूपे) यदन्तरा तद् ब्रह्में and "ब्राह्मच्चोतिः प्राणेषु"।

Also the नामरूप is-

(ii) identified with Brahma.—"बात्मभूते दव नामरूपे" and "बनन्याः.....कामाः।" Thus, we find the नाम-इप i. e. the world is distinguished from (अन्य) and yet identified with (अन्य) Brahma. It means His nature is expressed in नाम इप. It does not mean that the नाम इप is the product of any external energy—as the scientific antecedent. It means—the नाम इप is the expression—the counterpart of His nature, i. e, He became His own object, not something separate. (This is material cause, the objective Māyā).

- (d) The world, according to Vedānta, is declared as neither सन्, nor असन्. It means, if it is absolutely असन्, i. e. negative—privation of Reality—less being,—then the world would be a mere illusion; for, all reality belongs to Brahma and not to the world. To avoid this, the world has some sort of reality (भना) given to it which is dependent on Him. Hence Brahma is called in Vedānta as मनापर. But, nor can the world be absolutely सन्; for, in that case, it would be independent of, separate from, Brahma, which would destory His unity.
- (e) We see, therefore, that Brahma has invested the content of His Will (महन्य) with a being (मता): He is the unconditioned source and back-ground of the world conditioned by Him. He is for this reason called the सत्ताप्रद of the world. As Brahma is transcendent, His being does not swallow up the being of the world. As He is the unconditioned source of the world conditioned by Him, and as it is constantly sustained by His activity, He is also called the स्विति-प्रद of the world.

We quote here what Nilakantha, that faithful

follower of Sankara has stated in his gloss on the section of the $Git\bar{a}$ —

"भारतसास्य (विकारस्य) सत्ता-स्मुर्णे एव 'मरीये' प्रयच्छानि ; न तु भारतात्मको भवानि"।

"There are two portions in the world: the visible. changes (विकारs) of Nāma-rūpa belong to the world; and the being and energy—सत्ता-स्क्रिके—(lying hidden behind the Vikāras) belong to Brahma which He has given to them, upon which the Vikāras stand. For this reason Brahma is called "सत्ता-स्मित्रियर." If you disconnect the changing Nāma-rūpas i. e. the Vikāras from the Being and Energy lying behind them, they would immediately become unreal; for there would be nothing upon which those changes could stand. Hence we find it stated—"त्रण महदा यदस्ति किञ्चित्, तत् श्रात्मना विनिर्भुक्त-'मसत्' सम्पदाते" (कड॰ भा॰); i. e. "If the underlying ātmā be removed from the things of the world, however minute or great they may be, they would at once be unreal." Also for this reason it is said everywhere-"If there is no intelligent principle as controller, behind this unintelligent world of Differences, there would be no action at all"—"श्रचेतनप्रवृत्ति: चेतनाधिष्ठान-निवस्थनी, अचेतनलात् रथादिवत्।"

So, Brahma is described in Vedānta as सत्ता-स्मृत्तिप्रद.

(f) The *object* of His will is not outside Himself and He is not limited by anything outside Himself. As He is beyond the spatial and temporal order of the world, it cannot enter into the essence

18148 SAR 5-4606

of His being. He is not, therefore, identical with the totality of things,—His immanent activity directing and controlling the process of the world. And this view does not lend support to the idea of an external designer isolated and standing outside, who arranges things according to his plan. The principle of unity is present in the whole system of the series of 'many' and is immanent in each part—

"समल विकारजातं अधिदैवतादिभेद्रभित्रम् अन्तिस्तिष्टन् यमयति ।"—

(ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰ १-२-१८).

But this system of parts has its source aboveand beyond the system itself.—

—''निं नामरुपाथाम् 'चर्यान्तरं' ब्रह्मकोऽन्यत्'' (ब्र० स्० भा० १-३-४१).

["It is Brahma which is always to be distinguished from the Nāma-rūpa".]

All the elements of the world are related to a single source and sustained by it, also are directed to a single end.—

''बदैतज्ञानावसानलात्...हैतभेदस्य''—

(व० भा० ५-१-१).

If you ignore this Supreme Principle of the world, the evolution of the world will be a dream.—

'खप्र-माया-मरीचुदकवत् बसारम्'।

(3) There are critics of Sankara-Vedānta, who suppose the Vedantic Iswara (God) as an unreality, because Sankara has sometimes used such terms as Avidyātmaka (মবিয়ানক), Avidyā-kalpita (মবিয়াকবিবে)—in connection with Iswara. But this seems to me to be a hasty conclusion drawn from imperfect data. That this is clearly a mis-

conception will appear from the following considera-

What Sankara has really done is that he has used the term $Avidy\bar{a}$ in connection with Nāmarūpa—

"अविद्याकत्यत-नामरूपोपाध्यनुरोधी देखरी भवति।"

We have seen above that Brahma, of its own motion, has manifested its nature in the form of the universe of Nāma-rūpas. This is its immanent aspect. Ordinarily, people take this aspect of Brahma as Iswara. In our practical concerns of life, in our everyday Vyavahāra, we are quite satisfied with taking the world as a manifested form of God; as it is the cause itself which transforms itself into various forms—

"सर्वेकारपतात् तु विकारधर्मे राप 'विश्रष्टः' परमेश्वरः"-

(ब्र॰ स्॰ सा॰, 1. 1. 20.)

["As God is the cause of all modifications (fames), he takes upon himself the modifications and becomes thereby modified, and thus he appears in specific form".]

So, God is taken by ordinary people as an allinclusive whole—usina: usin: &c. &c. But to take Iswara (God) in this way is but the effect of avidyā. For, it is our avidyā which imagines the Nāma-rūpas in the self as its essential property or usi. That is to say, the ordinary people, as soon as the Nāma-rūpas appear, imagine them to be the essential property of the Self (Brahma)—

''बात्मन एव 'धर्मा' विक्रियाद्या इत्यविविक्रितः परिकल्पाने " (तैं॰ भा॰).

It is assumed that because the world of Nama-

rūpas is manifested from Brahma, Brahma actually becomes the world—

"विविक्तस्वरूपानभिच्यत्या, तदुपरत्रस्वरूपलं, स्त्रीमयी जाख इतिवत्"।

(ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2. 3. 17.)

["That the Self is really distinct from, and not affected by, the Nàma-rùpa is forgotten, and it is taken as deeply tinged with Nàma-rùpas, as we say 'this fellow is deeply affected by the woman'].

In this way, Iswara is looked upon as something other (पान) than Brahma; as if Brahma, as soon as Nāma-rūpas appear, becomes restricted to them, and thus in their connection is made something quite different (पान) (from Brahma itself). But this is a wrong view. He is indeed the world, but yet He is something more;—this fact is quite forgotten by people under the influence of avidyā—

"एतावानेव भाव्या परनेश्वरो वा, नात:परमस्तीति, ईट्टर्श ज्ञानं (तामसानानेव भवति)".— (गी० भा०, 18. 22.)

["i. e. The finite Self or God (Iswara) is this much i. e. restricted to particular effects,—and there is nothing beyond it, higher than it;—such a view is fit for the ignorant people."

The fact is, although, we admit, this view of Iswara is sufficient for ordinary purposes of life, still the other side of the question ought not to be forgotten or ignored. As Brahma is transcendent and perfect, no one of its determinations or forms can exhaust it; no one of its actualisations can fix it in a final or rigid form. The true view of the thing is that Iswara, though the cause of the world of Nāmarūpa, does not thereby become restricted or entirely

reduced to the effects created;—but as it has also a transcendental nature which remains unaffected by these, it is no other than Brahma itself—

''सर्व्वात्मकलात्...'तदान्' भवति । किंच ततीऽपि 'चिषकतरम्' एतहवति' (तै॰ भा॰, 1.6.)

["As he has become all.....He is composed of the Nāma-rūpas of all. But still He is more than these Nāma-rūpas."]

If, then, we restrict Iswara to the Nāma-rūpas, and thereby take Iswara as something quite different—wa—from Brahma itself, such a view of Iswara must be declared as unreal. That is to say, the immanence of God should not be taken in the sense of Divine identification with the world.

We thus see now that Iswara is not really something different (अस्) from Brahma itself. Though He has assumed the form of the world, He is the same Brahma in reality (परमार्थेत:). This is the correct view, according to Sankara-Vedanta.



WHAT IS MĀYĀ

AND

Why is it Anirvachaniya—चनिर्द्धवनीय ?

(1) Māyā is the 'Seed'* of the world of differences-

The universe, prior to its modifications or differentiations into names and forms (नाम-रूप) was in an undeveloped, undifferentiated (अविक्रत) condition. This Avyakta state of the world is called Māyā (माया) by Sankara who defines it as—

"बव्यक्ता हि सा 'माया', तत्त्वान्यत्वस्य निरुपणाशक्यतात्.....जगतः प्रागवस्था परमेश्वराधीना''। (त्र॰ स्० भा०, 1. 4. 3.)

["This undeveloped prior state of the world which is inexplicable because it is the same and also not the same, is called Màyà, and it is dependent on God (Iswara)."]

The Panchadashi repeats the same idea in its own way thus—

"अधिन्वगतिर्मायैषा, त्रझस्यन्याकृताभिधा । अविक्रियत्रझनिष्ठा" ॥

(13.63.65.)

^{*} In calling it to be 'seed', it is not to be understood that the original entity is completely exhausted when it assumes the form of the world. It is not like an organic development, but a manifestation of the Reality without affecting its integrety.

["The 'unmanifested' refers to the indescribable force of Máyà inherent in Brahma which transcends all modifications."]

This Māyā has been identified in the Vedānta with Prāna and Prāna being a sort of energy, it cannot exist and operate independently; it must have Brahma for its substratum. An energy apart from its substratum (সাম্ম) is a figment of imagination. Sankara has not made the mistake of our Scientific teachers who have, like Herbert spencer, reduced things and qualities and every object to particles with perpetual motion. Sankara makes it -परमेखराधीना, dependent on Brahma. This prior undifferentiated state of changing नामरूपs we now perseive, is sometimes called in Sruti non-being or असत्. But non-being does not imply anything unreal, but it really means the undifferentiated prior state of this world. An earlier world had been withdrawn into that condition out of which it sprang and the latter world was not yet proceeding into being-

"न हि चत्यनासत्त्वाभिप्रायेष प्राग्नत्पत्ते: कार्यस्य चसहापदेश:। किं तिर्हे ? व्याक्तत-नामक्पत्वात् धर्मात् प्रव्याक्ततनामक्पत्वः 'धर्मान्तरम्' (व॰ स्॰ भा॰ 2.1.17.) "चसदिति व्याक्षतनामक्पिविशेष-'विपरीत'मिवक्रतं ब्रह्म उच्चते.....न हि चसतः सज्जन्म पत्तिः । (तै॰ भा॰, 2.7.)

["The employment of the term Asat does not signify that there was absolute non-existence—negation—of the effects previous to their production. What then? The difference lies only in two conditions. In the prior state the नामस्य was non-developed (स्मनारवाद), whereas in the present state it is developed."]

["The term Asat means Brahma as non-differentiated which is opposite to—different from—the particular differentiated () condition of Nama-rupa. From pure negative something positive cannot be born."]

The commentary on the Chhandogya is more explicit in its:description of this condition—

"तदसच्छद्यवाचं प्रागृत्पत्ते: स्तिनितमिनस्यन्दमसदिव, स्वत्-कार्याभिसुसं इंयदुपजात-प्रवृत्ति ("एतेन वौजस उच्चूनतावत् कारयस्य 'सिस्चावस्यां' दर्भयति'' — भा० गि०) सदासीत्। ततोऽपि सम्यपिस्यन्दं तत् समभवत्. भन्न दीभूत-निव वौजं; ततोऽपि क्रमेथ स्व बौभवत्'। (हा० भा०, 3. 19. 1.)

['That which, prior to its appearance, was called 'non-existence'—being dormant and inert—as if non-existent, became turned towards an existent effect, having its activity (प्रवृत्ति) aroused a little, and thus became 'existent' i. e. mobile. It grew by means of a slight manifestation of name and form just like a sprouting seed. It then became further materialised &c. &c."]

(a) Brahma is behind this seed (ৰীল), not affected (লিজিকাৰ) by it, and it has no reality apart from Brahma.—

This prior undeveloped state is the seed (वोज) of the world-tree. This undifferentiated condition is the sum-total of the powers of organs and organisms—an aggregate of the possibilities or potentialities of all material existences.—

"जगती वीजभूतमव्याक्षतनामद्यं सर्व्यकार्य्यकरणशक्तिसमाहारद्वपमव्यक्तं परमात्मनि भोतप्रीतभावन समात्रितं वटक्विकायामिव वटक्चशक्तिः"। (कद्र० भा०, 3. 11.)

["The Avyakta is the seed of all the universe, the unmodified state of name and form, the aggregate of the potentialities of all powers of organs and organisms, entering or woven into the Self, as warf and woof,—as the potentiality of a fig-tree in a fig-seed."]

It is, in fact, the undifferentiated seed of the world. This is Māyā. And in this state, the Māyā is not a non-entity; for, the world cannot emanate from a sheer non-existence—unq or unia. At the time of

the dissolution of the world, the modifications of the Nāma-rūpas (Vikāras) became undifferentiated, submerged in it.—

''अव्याक्षताष्टां.....तिद्व परमं व्योम.....गुहा, तत निमग्नाः सर्व्ये पदार्थाः विद्यु कालेष, कारणलात्'। (तै० भा०, 2. 1.) ''प्रागवस्थायां परित्यक्तव्याक्षतनामरूपं वीजशक्त्यवस्थम् अव्यक्तशब्दयोग्यं दर्शयति'' (त्र० स्० भा०, 1. 4. 2.)

["This is the highest Akasa and it must be Avyakrita—because the highest Akasa has been used elsewhere in connection with Akshara. We may take Guha—the Cavity—in apposition to Akasa and construe "the cavity of the Avyakrita Akasa". In this cavity are hidden—exist submerged—all the substances in all time, because it is the Cause and it is exceedingly subtle."]

["The prior state is known as 'Avyakta'. The modifications of नामक्ष disappeared and they took the form of 'Seed' (वीज) or Potency or seminal form."]

This undifferentiated seed has Brahma for its substratum (प्रमेश्वराश्वरा). Brahma is, therefore, called through this seed of the world, itself a seed—

"बीजं मां सर्व्वभूतानां सनातनम्" (गी॰ भा॰, 7. 10.) and Sankara explains the term सनातन as—'बीजान्तरा-दनुत्पदम्'—as an ultimate Cause. Both the Nirguna Brahma and Máyá, being undifferentiated (निर्व्धियेष), are indistinguishably blended ('चिदेनात्मना निलीनलात्'— उप॰ सा॰); and we find the illustration of "honey and its flavour inseparably mixed, the butter and its sweetness, the Ganges falling into, and remaining inseparably mixed with, the ocean, with its name and form dropped."—

"मधन रसवत्, छते माधुर्यवत्, ससुद्रप्रविष्ट-नद्यादिवत् (भिद्यते तासां नाम-रूपे, तासामस्रंगतानां......'तदभेदीन' ससुद्रइत्ये वं प्रोच्यते—प्र० 6. 5) विवेका-नर्छाः सङ्गताः संप्रतिष्ठिताः भवन्ति.....एकीभवन्ति...... प्रविशेषतां मच्छन्ति'

(प्र॰ भा॰, 4. 1-2.)

This Máyà, Sankara points out, is not negative (असत् or "अभावग्रस्त") but is positive (अरुपनत्)—
ज॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2. 2. 26. But as there is, between the Māyā and Brahma, a Swarupa or Tādātmya relation ("त्रह्मवादिन: कथमिति चेत्? तस्य 'तादाक्मा'-जचणसम्बस्धेण पत्ते:—ज॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2.2.38)", the Māyā has no reality or Swarupa apart from Brahma. Although inseparably blended, Brahma still remains untouched, unaffected by Māyā.

''अव्याकतात् तु यत् परं परत्रात्मास्य ' , , , , , , भनामरूपक्षमीत्मकं 'निति' 'निति' (ह॰ भा॰, 1.3.2.)

''नामरूपविखचणं नामरूपाम्थामस्पृष्ट', तथापि तयीर्निवींदृ एवंखचणं ब्रह्म'' र (का॰ भा॰, 8, 14, 1.)

["What stands beyond this 'Avyākrita'—this undifferentiated seed, is the highest Self..... distinguished from nama, rupa and karma and stated in Sruti as 'not so' 'not so' &c."]

["It is different from name and form, is not touched by the name and form, yet it unfolds both; such is the character of Brahma."]

This seed of the differentiated Namā-rupa is itself changeless, as it is the cause of all changes. The substratum of this causal seed of the world—this Avyakta, is Brahma who is the Cause of all causes, the Ultimate Cause; and being the Ultimate Cause, He must be devoid of modification—changeless.—

''तस्रादयक्षात् प्रः.....सर्वकारण-कारणलात्'। (कठ० भा०, 3. 11.) ''न च ब्रह्मणोऽपि विकारलं भवितुमईति,.....मूलप्रक्रत्यनस्थुपगमी धनवस्था-प्रसङ्गत'। (व० सू० भा०, 2. 3. 9.)

["Brahma is beyond this Avyakta (seed).....as Brahma is the Cause of all other causes."]

["Brahma must be devoid of change, is not subject to modification; for, in this unbroken line of causal series, your reason cannot find satisfaction until and unless you hit upon a Cause which is Itself an uncaused Cause and hence not modifiable by any antecedent. To avoid this regress, Brahma must be held to be the changeless ultimate ground of the Avyakta seed of the THEG."]

''श्रचरमव्याक्षतं नाम-रूप-वीजशिक्षपं......ईश्वराश्ययं। सर्व्वसात् विकारात् परः योऽविकारः, तस्मात् पर इति मेदेन व्यपदेशात् परमात्मानं (श्रचरश्रव्देन) दर्शयति'। (ब्र॰ स्॰ सा॰, 1. 2. 21-22.)

["This power or energy of the seed of names and forms is itself changeless, as it is the cause of all (phenomenal) changes. Its substratum is God. As the cause of the differences of नाम-एन, it is itself undifferenced and hence it is known as Akshara. But the Ultimate Reality behind it is also called Akshara. This is the true Cause, not subject to change, and it lies beyond the Akshara—the causal seed or Māyā."]

As the Māyā has no Swarūpa or reality of its own apart from Brahma, it is not an independent principle like the Pradhāna of the Sānkhyas. It is not really different from Brahma. For, it is Brahma as सन्तार्थाभिमुख (का, 3. 19.1), as सर्गीनुख (र॰ प्र॰, 1. 1. 5.), that is to say, it is Brahma about to manifest itself. It is Brahma as व्याचिकोधिनावस्थ (सु, 1. 1. 8) i. e. as desiring to differentiate itself. It is Brahma as 'जायमानप्रकृतिक्षेत्र निर्देश:' (स्न, 1. 2. 21),

as "प्रकृतिसङ्ग्रमामानं" (इति 8. 14. 1); i. e. it is Brahma only looked upon as the material cause of the world. It is Brahma as उपचोयते, as उच्छूनतां गच्छति (सु॰ 1.1.8); that is to say, it is no other than Brahma about to show itself as growing or somewhat inflated—as a-seed appears inflated when about to produce its sprout. It is Brahma inclining to act or with its impulse aroused (इयद्यजात-प्रवृत्ति—का॰, 3. 19. 1).

This state is very beautifully described in the Mundaka Upanishad * thus—

''ब्रह्म उपचीयते चत्पिपादियवदिदं जगत् चड्डु रिमव बीज़सुक्कूनतां गक्किति....... व्याचिकीर्षितावस्थारूपेण जायते''। (सु॰ भा॰, 1.1.8.)

This is Māyā. It is Brahma itself under a particular state. Hence how can it be different from Brahma? Because a slight distinction arose, a separate name—Māyā—was given. But a change of state cannot effect a real change to the nature of the Absolute. For, it was not a complete expression of the Absolute. The Absolute Brahma distinguished itself as its object from itself as a Subject. This object is known by the designation of Māyā in the Vedānta.

Sankara asks-

"निं पुनस्तत् 'कर्सः', यत् प्रागुत्पत्तेरीश्वर-ज्ञानस्य विषयो भवतीतिः" ?

^{*} cf. also खेताखतर Text—''यत: प्रवृत्ति: प्रस्ताि पुराणी''।—''The innate and ancient Spiritual fervour energizing a little,"

[†] It is to be noted as Brahma appeared in subject-object relation, it stood at the same time beyond this cor-related subject-object form,

He thus replies-

''तत्त्वात्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्व्यचनीय नाम-इपे चव्याक्तते व्याचिकीर्धित इति ब्रूमः"।

(त्र० स्० भा०, 1. 1. 5.)

That is to say,—The undifferentiated causal seed of the world of differences was what constituted the object of Divine knowledge. How can it, then, be something absolutely different from Brahma? It is Brahma finding expression gradually in the differences of नाम-रूप in the world.

At the present moment also, when that undeveloped seed has actually differentiated into the modifications of nāma-rūpas, they still remain in Brahma—

"'न हि इदानीमपीदं कार्या कारणात्मानमन्तरेण 'खतन्त्र'मेवासि । कारणात्मना

तु सत्तं प्रागुत्पत्तेरविशिष्ट्म्"।

सत्तानिषेधात् स्वात्वमपिः)"

(त्र० स्० भा०, 2. 1. 7.)

["Even now, the effects—the नाम-इन्पड—do not exist severed from their cause. Both before and after, the effects always stand related to the Self."]

''बात्मसद्पापरित्यमीनैव सर्व्यावस्थासु (नामद्पे) व्याक्रियेते''।

''बात्म-तादात्मेरनैव...,बात्मनोऽहितीयल' न विबध्यते"।

["They unfold, in all their conditions and stages, without being separated from Brahma."]

["As they have no reality apart from Atma,.....the unity of the Atma is not affected."]

(b) Brahma desired or willed (संकल्प) to be many, and then प्रवृत्ति (action) arose in Him. Sankara describes it as "working of Divine knowledge ("यस्य ज्ञानविकारमेव तपः"—

We quote him fully :-

"विज्ञानं ब्रह्म......प्रथमजलात्, सर्व्वप्रवत्तीनां वा तत्-पूर्व्वकलात् प्रथमजं विज्ञानं ।.....सच्व विज्ञानानां महत्तत्व कारणम्" । (ते॰ भा॰, 2, 4-5.)

["All impulse, all activity is preceded by knowledge: Divine knowledge first arose; it is the source of all knowledge."]

This fact can also be proved from what Sankara has remarked in the Brahma-sūtra-bhāsya, 2. 2. 28—

''बभावात् भावीत्पत्ती अनीहमानानामि अभिप्रे तसिद्धिः खात''।

Sankara's idea is-

["Unless you desire something and exert yourself, you can not obtain a desired result or object. Hence, a non-entity can not produce an entity."]

Here, to support this idea, we may quote what Ananda-giri said in his gloss on the Māndukya-Kārikā-bhāsya—

["The potter, when he wants to produce an earthen pot, must first have the *idea* of the pot in his mind, then he puts that idea into practice, and when the pot is produced, it is the mental *idea* (संवित्) which is converted into action (विश्वेतया जनवित). It is the ordinary people to whom only the action appears as real and as separate from the idea of the potter." (4.54)]

This involves the idea that it is Brahma which sets in motion— सत्ता-स्कृति -प्रद—this existent but not yet differentiated germ of the world, though unaffected by it.

[&]quot;नामरूपयोरपि निर्व्व हर्णं न ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत सन्भवति"। (ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2.3. 41)

[&]quot;न निरध्यचस जगतो व्यातरणं कियते, जमत् साध्यचं व्याक्रियते"।

^{&#}x27;'अविकास्य ब्रह्म...,.सब्ब विकारहेतुलात्''। (तै॰ भा॰, 2. 7.)

["None but Brahma can cause the unfolding of the Nāma-rúpa—the seed of the world."]

["Unless there is an intelligent principle to control, how can there be brought about the unfolding of the world in Nāmarùpas? And this intelligent principle which sets the world in motion, being the cause of all modifications, is itself beyond modification."

Thus, the underlying inner Self which contains within it the undifferentiated seed of names and forms, unfolded it by its own Power. The Māyā is, therefore, the creative Power of Brahma. For this reason, Sankara in Taittiriya remarks—

""बात्मस्य अव्याततनामरूपे, अन्तर्गतेन बात्मना व्याक्रियेते" (2.6.)

["The Náma-rúpa which is contained in the Atma in undeveloped state (implicit), the Atmā which is behind it makes it differentiated (explicit)."]

(2) The Māyā, considered from two view-points—Pāramārthic and Vyāvahāric.—

It is the universal (सामान्य) which assumes a particular (चित्रोष) form. The universal is the cause and its particular transformed state is its effect.—

"अपास्तविशेषे सामान्यात्मकं कारणमेव विशेषवदवस्थान्तरमापद्यमानं कार्य्यसं जां लमते"। (व० भा०, 2. 2. 5.)

and

"मर्खं स विकारजातस नाम-इपाधामेव व्याक्षतत्वात्"। (व॰ म्॰ 1.3. 41)

The universal remains identical with itself in and through its transformed states and all changes or modifications involve differentiations into names and forms. In this way, what is the true cause underlies its effects which may be regarded as its expressions.

The Māyā is two-fold. In its undifferentiated causal condition, it exists undivided (अविभन्त) in, and indistinguishable from, Brahma. It is real-सत्-in this state; for it is not then looked upon as separated (अन्य) from Brahma. This is its सामाना-वसा, its universal aspect. But when it appears differentiated in the form of effect or famit, it is unreal-unq-in this state; for, it is now viewed by us as different or separated (अन्य) from the Universal or Brahma. This is its— विशेषावस्था, its particular aspect; and this is the ordinary Vyāvahāric view of the world of नाम-रूपड. In its सामान्यावस्था, the world is identical with Brahma and indistinguishable from it. But when the modifications of nāma-rūpas (विकार) appeared, it is its विश्रेषावसा; -the world of Nāma-rūpas is now taken as something—Separate (अन्योऽयं भिन्न इति—न्न॰ 2. 1. 19) from the underlying, hidden universal, i. e. from Brahma, and is regarded as a self-sufficient entity. After the manifestation of the changes or the unfolding of the differences of nāma-rūpas, some distinction or वैसच्चा or विशेषावस्था. i.e. some particular modification (Vikāra) appeared which was not present prior to its manifestation. With this fact in view the Mundaka-bhasya observes-

"विलचणं सलचणञ्च...... अचरात् सम्भवति जगत्"। (1.1.7.) The Brahma-sutra also speaks of this वैलचण in the Aphorism 2.1.4—

"न विलचणतादस्य, तथातव शब्दात्"।

For, all finites are divided (विभन्न) like a waterpot, piece of cloth, pillar and the like. Modification (বিকাৰ) is the characteristic (ব্ৰমাৰ) of the divided (or finite) things, and it is this characteristic which separates one finite thing from another. This characteristic was absent prior to manifestation.* Brahma, as well as the world-seed, was devoid of modification (বিকাৰ) in that stage, and therefore it (the world) is called as its বামানাৰ্থা. As soon as there is manifestation, the changes or বিকাৰেs involving nāma-rūpas appear: But prior to manifestation, they were in বামান্য or unmodified, universal form.

"सर्व्य विकारजातस्य नाम-रूपाभ्यामेव व्याक्ततत्वात्" (ब्र॰ भा॰, 1.3.41),

i.e. "All modifications are differentiations into names and forms."

In the Taittiriya, we find it stated that before its differentiations (विकार) appeared, the unmanifested or undeveloped world of nāma-rūpa may be designated as Atmā; for, it was indistinguishable from, and identical with, Atmā in that condition. But as soon as it was differentiated, as soon as it manifested in visible form and modifications of nāma-rūpas appeared, it was now called as—मूबामूर्ड, shaped and shapeless. That is to say, previously the nāma-rūpa in seed-form was identical with (अन्य) Brahma and therefore it was Sat (अन्), because unseparated, indistinguishable, from Brahma. But as soon as it came out of Brahma in the shape of modifications (विकार), as there was some distinction—some विवास, we began to look upon it as something quite

This fact is brought out in 30 40, 2.1.7. "alafamint famic.",

Anya (মন্ত্র) and unrelated to Brahma,—as if self-sufficient and independent.* The modification or বিকাৰ is distinguished from its cause or মক্তবি, but it cannot be separated from it; for, Prakriti lies hidden behind the Vikāras always—

''प्रक्रति-विकारयो भेंदेन व्यपदेशात्''। ''श्रमति श्रतिशये प्रक्रति-विकारोक्से द-प्रमञ्जः''।

["There must be distinction between Prakriti and its Vikara; between the cause, and its effect; otherwise both would become synonymous."]

There must, no doubt, be some difference between the cause, and its modification in the form of its effects. But there cannot be absolute difference between them. Yet, we, in our Avidyā-vasthā—valauavi, under the influence of Avidyā in whose grip we always are, look upon the particulars of nāma-rūpa, the avidya,—as absolutely separate from the underlying universal or the valauav. This is our vyāvahāric view of the world.—

"बविद्यया.....बच्चदिव,....वस्तन्तरिमव प्रत्युपस्थापितं भवति"। (हु० भा०, 4. 3. 31.)

["It is our Avidya which (falsely) presents the world as something quite different, as a separate thing, an independent entity."]

But even in our Vyāvahāric view, the changes really stand connected with their Sāmānya—the underlying hidden Reality—

^{*} येनेव 'विशिषेष' (characteristic of modifications) पृथिव्यादिषी व्यतिरिच्यमानं (Divided) नभः खरूपवत्, स एव विशेषः प्रागृत्पत्तेनांसीत्। एवन पाकाशादिक्यभीवेन न स्वभाववत् ब्रह्मा' (Sankara).

''सामान्यमात्मखरूपप्रदानेन विशेषान् विभक्तिं..... सळे विशेषाः सामान्ये उप्ताः''

(इ॰ भा॰, 1. 6. 1.)

["It is the Universal which sustains the particulars by giving them its own nature or reality......All Particulars are woven into or comprehended in the Universal."]

It is not possible, therefore, to separate the nāmarūpas from Brahma which is their sustaining ground, without which they cannot stand even for a minute. This is Sankara's Pāramārthic view. By this, vikāras as such, do not become unreal; only they are not to be conceived as something separated (प्राच) from the Reality, as self-existing and independent—

'ज इ स्थितावपि कार्थं कारणात्मानमन्तरेण स्वतन्त्रमस्ति'।

(ब्र॰ स्॰ सा॰, 2. 1. 7.)

["The effects do not even now exist severed from the essence of the cause, independently."]

Sankara remarks in the concluding portion of his elaborate discussion about the relation between the cause and its effects thus—

"त्वकारोऽपि 'परमार्थाभिप्रायेष' 'तदनन्यत्व'माइ" (व॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 14.)

["The author of the Sutras declared the effects as non-separate, non-different from their cause, from the Pāramārthic stand-point."]

To declare the world of ALAG as unreal is to make it separated from Brahma, to make it was or different, or to put it outside of Brahma. In this view, the Infinite would become simply as not-finite. But such an Infinite is a false infinite. For, in this case the opposition between the world in time and space and the Eternal Brahma would be absolute and the Infinite would itself become finite (A. 40)

भा॰, 3.2.37). To guard against this difficulty, Sankara has established the position that Brahma does not exclude but include within Him the world of nāma-rūpa—

"ते (नाम-रूपे) यदन्तरा तद् ब्रह्म" (हा॰)

i.e. Brahma has within Him the nāma-rūpa i.e. the principle of multiplicity, limitation — माया.

Again-

"वस्तुमात्रसदिपेष हि.....विशेषित्रयाजनितानि विशेषणानि व्याप्नीति"।

(इ० भा०, 1, 4, 1.)

["It is the nature of the thing which permeates and compreshends within it all its adjectival differences i. e. predicates."]

(3) The Māyā is अनिर्द्धचनीय (Anirvachaniya)—

Now, in this connection, I should like to invite your attention to a very important observation made by Sankara in connection with the Māyā. He has everywhere called the Māyā or nāma-rūpa as মনিজ্বনীয় (inexplicable)—

''तत्त्वान्यलाभ्यामनिर्ध्यं चनीये नामकृषे...मायाश्वति: प्रक्रतिरिति...क्य्येते'' (त्र० स्० भा०, 2. 1. 14 and 2. 1. 27.)

This Māyā which is manifested into the differences of nāma-rūpa is known in Sankara-Vedānta as परिणामि-निन्छ, because it is liable to change. And Brahma is described as कूटस्थ-निन्छ, because it transcends all, it is subject to no change or transformation.

Parināmi-Nitya (परिणामि-नित्य) has been thus described—

"विक्रियमाण्यमपि तत्-प्रत्ययानितृत्ते नित्यः। द्रत्यस्य श्वत्यवान्ययान्यतिरेतेण विक्रियानुप्रपत्तः"। (त॰ भा॰, 1. 4. 7.) [Also, Vide—इ॰ स्॰ भा॰, 1.1.4.] [i. e. "Unless one part or state of a thing becomes another, the change of the thing cannot be conceived and that is called Parinami-Nitya which through its changes of states or parts retains its identity."]

Sankara describes Kutastha-Nitya (क्ट्रस्थ-नित्य)

''इदन्तु (ब्राम) पारमार्थिकं क्टब्बनित्यं..... सम्बेविकियारहितं...निरवयवम्''। (ब्र॰ भा॰, 1. 1. 4.)

["Brahma is Kutastha-Nitya, the highest reality, free from all changes having no parts &c." *

Keeping these two kinds of Nitya in view, Vedānta makes Māyā as the direct material cause (उपादान) of the world, and Brahma is indirectly the substratum of the world. There is the transcendent Brahma behind the Māyā which constitutes the material cause of this changing world of nāma-rūpa.

When the Māyā came out of Brahma, when the Avyakta stage grew into Vyakta stage, it came out as universally pervading *Prāna-spandana—"परिस्व*ः कतं प्रायस्य"—which gradually developed into three forms of energy—

"कार्य-करपर्वतीनां प्राणैकदेवताभेदानाम् अध्यात्माधिभूताधिदैवतभेदकोटि-विकल्पानाम् अध्यचतामावे च नियन्तीश्वरः"। (छा०, 5. 1. 15.)

[i. e. "All the causes and effects, the external and in ernal organs, &c.—are only different manifestations of the single deity of *Prana* differentiating into the cosmic (ম্বিইৰ), physical (ম্বিম্ব) and Psychic (ম্বেম্ব) energies, and God supervises over these".]

In Vedantic nomenclature, the first manifestation of Māyā as प्राय-स्वन्दन is known as Hiranya-

^{*} We shall treat these points more elaborately subsequently.

garbha (हिरख्यभें). In कठ-भाष, it is described as— "हैरख्यभेतस्व' वोधावोधाक्षकं (i. e. विज्ञान-क्रियाणिकामत्) महानाका" (3.10). For, it contains all the subsequently evolved external and internal senses and five elements. The finite selves derive all their elements of comprehension and action from this universal Prāna or the world—

"सदात्मनः प्राण-सम्बन्धमावसेव ..., जीवलभेदकारणं,.....न च प्राणैर्वियुक्तस्य जीवलसुपपदाते"। (का॰ भा॰, 5. 10. 2.)

This Māyā or Prāna is not simply material or physical, but something more. It is with a view to present this important fact before our view that Sankara has described it to be—

"तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्व्वचनीये"—

That is to say, "the Māyā is neither तत् nor म-तत्;" or in other words,—it is itself (तत्) and also not-itself (म-तत्).

The true significance of this has been very beautifully brought out by the great poet Māgha in his immortal work "Sishupāla-badha", by an illustration. We quote here the last two lines—

"तिरोहिताका शिष्णपाल-संज्ञया, प्रतीयते सम्पृति—"सोऽप्यसः" परैः"।

Take the words—"सोऽपि, श्र-सः"—

"He is the same man, yet he is not the same".

The story of Sishupāla is well known to you all. The same man took three successive forms and names in three successive births. The poet is describing Sishupāla in his last birth, who in his immediately

preceding birth appeared as Rāvana, and this Rāvana was no other than Hiranya-Kashipu of his former birth. The poet says that this Sishupāla is the same Rāvana, although to the ordinary people, he, in his present guise of Sishupāla under which form and name he has now appeared, seems to be not the same. Sishupāla is the same man known as Rāvana, but he seems not the same man because he has now concealed himself (विरोडिताका) under his present form of Sishupāla.

This is exactly the Vedantic idea as propounded by Sankara. Poet Māgha seems to have been very well acquainted with the Doctrine of Māya-Vāda.*

The world of nama-rupa is always changing, always developing, from one stage to another—

"ज्ञानैश्वर्थाद्यभिव्यक्तिरिप.....परेण परेण भ्यसी भवति.....ऐश्वर्थंशक्तिविश्रेषै:" (व्र० भा०, 1, 1. 11.)

["In successively higher and higher forms, the wealth of wisdom, power &c. is manifesting itself...by God's ऐवर्ष्याति." This ऐवर्ष्याति js God's Máyà, as Sankara himself states elsewhere in his sentence—"परमेवरावया तदेवर्ष्य भृता".]

Now, the world of nāma-rūpa is constantly changing; but what does the 'change' signify? The world of nāma-rūpa is finite, i.e. incomplete; hence it is always changing to complete itself; it is moving towards something beyond it which would make it complete,—to make it what it really is. The world

^{*} The poet even uses the term क्लना in his Stanza, which represents साया. The poet also employs the illustration of भेलूष वन-as an actor, just as Sankara himself uses the term नटवत् in 'मूलकारणमेन, या—अन्यात् कार्यात्, तेन तेन कार्याकारिण, नटवत् &c. &c. (त॰ 2. 1. 18.)

of nāma-rūpa is, therefore, not merely physical but something more; it is itself, no doubt, but it is also not itself: not itself i. e. it is self-transcendent—going out of itself towards self-completion. It is because behind the world, a transcendent element is present. Hence, self-transcendence is the characteristic of every change, every stage, through which the world is passing. Therefore, every stage is what it is and also something other than what it is. Apart from this co-existent transcendent factor, the world is nothing. This self-transcendence implies the presence of a transcendental element. Behind Prāna, there is the inexhaustible (अवस्थ) Nirguna Brahma.—

"प्राणयन्दितं वीजमञ्चातं ब्रह्म सङ्गचणं तदात्मनिति यावत् । तदेवमचेतनं सन्धः जगत् प्रागुत्पत्ते: वीजात्मना स्थितं, प्राणी वीजात्मां जनयतीति वास्त्रभेषः"—

(मा॰ का॰ भाष्य, -- गिरि's gloss.)

["The term Prāna is the world-seed, and the unknown Brahma is defined as 'Sad-Brahma' (মত্ত-সন্ম) in relation to, in identification with, this Prāna. This non-intelligent world of differences existed in the form of this seed (ৰীসাম্বা) out of which it is produced. It is this seed of Prāna which developed or became manifested as this non-intelligent world."]

''मया चपक्रष्टं परित्यक्तं निरात्मकं ग्रन्थं (चसत्) तत् स्थात्...सर्ब्धभूतानां 'वीजं' तदइसर्ज्युं न''। (गी॰ भा॰, 10.39.)

["Anything into which 'I' have not entered would be without self (could not exist) and would be void (यूच). Therefore, everything is of My nature i. e. 'I' am the 'Seed' (Essence) of everything".]

The appearance of life and consciousness at the last stage of the development would indicate the source of the whole process of development. The

lower cannot create the higher out of its own जड़ीय resources; in that case, the Naiyáyika Asat-vāda (असत्-काश्चवाद) would arise. Hence, the life and finally consciousness must have been present from the very beginning. For this reason, the Vedānta has placed Nirguna Brahma-chaitanya behind Māyā or Prāna-seed.

We see, therefore, that the Prāna controlled by चिदाला (Chidātmá) contained within it life and consciousness which subsequently appeared. The world, in its continuous transformations, remains as it is; for, its content is always the same (i. e. the प्राप-वोज). "विज्ञियमाणमपि तत्-प्रत्ययानिहासः" *. For this reason, it is called as परिणामि-नित्यः But as there is a transcendent element behind it, it is also other than what it is; for, it contains within itself the condition of all else which is to be in every succeeding stage; and this transcendent element is—जूटए-नित्य (Vidê. ब्र॰ स॰ भा॰, 1.1.4)—

"तम किञ्चित् परिणामि-नित्यं...तदेवीत बुिंब विष्टन्यते।...इदञ्च क्टस्य-नित्यंसळेविकिथरिंडतम &c. &c.

—And this element is moving the world continuously to newer and newer stage—

''वहु सां.....प्रजायेयं...'प्रकाषीं नाम—पूर्व्वव्यादाधिकाम्' ''—विद्यारका in the Anubhuti-Prakash. †

Ultimately, this Prāna is, therefore, nothing but Brahma itself at the source and is nothing but Brahma in the end-

^{*} विकियमाणमपि &c. &c.—It means, in and through its changing states it preserves its identity of content.

रं बहु स्वां &c. &c.—It means, the particle 'म' in मजावेंगं is significant. It brings out the fact of inexhaustible 'new additions', i.e. novelty and creation not present in the earlier stage.

III & IV.

One End works in Nature

AND

in Finite Self.

Sankara has drawn out distinction between the respective characteristics of the Intelligent Self (रेतन) and the non-intelligent elements of Nature (अचेतन). you are particularly requested to bear in mind this point that Sankara has characterised the Intelligent Principle (चेत्न) as Swartha (खार्च); that is to say, it exists for itself and it has the reason or purpose of its existence in itself. Chetana is described as ear: fee, i. e. it is self-sufficient and does not depend for its existence on any other thing. In contrast with this characteristic marks of chetana, the achetana (अचेतन) material elements are described everywhere as Parārtha (परार्थ), i. e. 'existing and working for something else which is other than their own nature, or in other words-which exist and work for the 'purpose' (End) of something other than these elements. Sankara points out the fact that achetana (श्रचेतन) has no purpose of its own-

^{&#}x27;'बचतने खार्थानुपपत्ते: &c.'' (ह० आ० 4. 3. 7). ''एवं तिर्ह खार्थक्त ' चितिम खात्...न परेच प्रयुज्यसे'' (उप० सा० गर्यांग)'

["The non-intelligent (matter) can serve no purpose of its own &c."]

["You, being intelligent, constitute an end or purpose in yourself...you are not impelled by others".]

(1) Sankara has thus described the nature of Purpose' inherent in Brahma—

'खात्मनोऽनन्याः कामाः...नहि कामिबत भचेतनमित्तां' (तै • भा • .) *

["The Atmā is identical with its Purpose or काम; i.e. its purpose is non-separate from its own nature. Non-intelligent things cannot desire, cannot have any purpose in themselves".]

Divine desires (जामा:) are prompted by no extraneous stimulating causes or motives, nor is Brahma influenced by them. For, its purposes are not separable and different (अनन्या:) from it.

Sankara thus observes in the Brahma-Sutra (1.4.14):—

"All the passages setting forth creation and so on subserve the purpose of teaching Brahma...... Creation is described, merely for the purpose of teaching us.....as a means for the cognition of the Absolute Brahma but does not bring about an independent result."

The manifested nāma-rūpas are to be taken as a means for the realisation of the Purposes (संजल्प) of God. God is best known by our mind through His

^{* &}quot;सीऽकामयत' द्रत्यादियु तिभि: ब्रह्मणि जगत्कारणे कामधिटलादि'रज्ञान'कार्यस्य यूयमाणलात्...विना तस्य 'अज्ञानात्रयल' कूटस्थस्य न कामधिटलादि" (ब्रह्मणि जगत्कारणलादिनिन्बीहकमज्ञानं 'मायाश्रन्दवाच्य'...अङ्गीकर्त्तव्यं। न च विन्नावस्य प्रकाशलात् अञ्चलाययलविरोधः, अन्तःकरणपरिणामोपिहतस्य व च तनस्य अज्ञानविरोधिलात्।" (राम-तौर्ष),

self-manifestations—through the manifestation and expression of His will (अंकस्प) in the created world. These Samkalpas (अंकस्प) are but Divine Ideas existing as potential powers in Brahma—but they realise themselves in the particular individual objects which they evolve and sustain. The phenomenal objects are the expressions in time of the Ideas which are not in time and the Ideas can express themselves freely in time—

''नामप्रकाशवगा हि इपाणां विक्रियान्यवस्था'' (ह० भा० 2. 4. 10).

''स्ति च रूप-व्याकरणे, विषय-प्रतिलक्षात्, नाम व्याक्रियते''

(ब्र॰ भा॰, 2. 4. 20).

["When general 'Names' or Ideas express themselves, the changing particular 'forms' follow."]

["As the particular forms are manifested, the general names or Ideas also finding them as their dwelling place, express themselves."]

And again-

"व्यक्तिषु उत्पद्यमानासु अपि बाकतीनां निवालात्" (ब्र॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 28). ["On the production of the particulars, the universal Akritics or Ideas are constantly present."]

These creative Ideas are a plurality of causes and they are the constituent elements of one Supreme Reality, and these are behind phenomena. All particular changes are but the modes of action by means of which the causes realise themselves and thus the particulars cannot serve any independent purpose of their own.

Similarly, all the particular elements of human organism work together for the realisation of the purposes (মুখ্) of the Self which controls and directs them.—

''सर्खा हि कार्यो-करणविकिया * नित्यचैतन्यात्म-खरूपे.....सत्ये व भवति। तच 'एकार्यहत्तिले न' संहननम् धन्तरेण चैतनमसंहतं न भवति।'' (तै॰, 2.7).

["The functions of the senses and the organism are seen when there is a combination of physical and psychical elements together. Such co-operation or combination for the purpose of a common object (uৰাঘুৱলি) is not possible without an independent intelligent principle not so combined."]

Take the following also-

'दिहिन्द्रियमनी बुद्धीनां संहतानां, चैतन्यात्म-'पारार्थ्येन' निमित्तभूतेन, ... यत् खरूपधारणं तत् चैतन्यात्मकतमेव'' (गी॰ भा॰, 13. 22).

["The body, the senses, the mind, the intellect which are combined or organised together to serve the purpose of an intelligent Self, and which are what they are, only as made by that intelligent Self."]

You are to note here that it is not a passive adaptation of inert matter which submits to the influence of its environment merely.

Sankara elsewhere remarks—

"The Director is inferred by a logical necessity from the activity manifested by the ear and others combined, inured for the benefit of something distinct from them all (i.e. the Self). As things combined or organised for a common end (प्राधिवास्त्र) exist for the use of another thing not so combined, we argue, therefore, there is a director of the ear &c, and for whose use the whole lot exists and has been combined."

^{*} About the नाथ and नरण, they would form the subjectmatter of our next day's Lecture.

Each of these fulfils a purpose, a function, and in fulfilling it, each contributes to the realisation of the purpose (সুষ্ট্ৰ) of the cause within.

In the Madhu-vidyā (Hyfazī, zo, 2.5.1—19), the great truth is emphasised, viz., there is a reciprocal relation among all the elements of the world. Sankara shows here that the world is a whole of interconnected parts and their reciprocal Hya consists in the fact that there is not only an intimate relation amongst phenomenal things themselves but they mutually determine each other—

''भूतानां शरीरारश्वकले न उपकारात् मधुल', तदन्तर्गतानां तेजीमया-दीनां करणले न उपकारात् मधुलम् &c. &c. & \hat{c} .''

There is mutual determination between the external elements (भूतमण) and the body, and between the physical and the psychical elements. The activities characteristic of a particular species (जाति) are, Sankara suggests, what determine and dispose (प्रकृता:) the particular way of working of the elements of the animal organisms—

''धर्मा': चित्रयादीनां नियन्ता। धर्मा-सत्याभ्यां 'प्रयुक्तः' कृष्यां-करण-संघातः,...स येन जातिविशेषोग (Species) संयुक्तो भवति... शरीरिभि: संवध्यमानः...मधुलेन उपकरोति'' & c. &c.

We find from the above remarks that the elements are mutually determined in the interest of Species (जाति); that is to say, the whole working has a reference to the racial ends. We may conclude, therefore, that the development of organic forms in a body is purposive to the interest of the typical result (जाति).

This is the truth we find everywhere inculcated. In the Katha-bhāsya, the following important sentence occurs—

''न ह्ये षां 'परार्थानां' मं इत्यकारित्वात् जीवनहेतृत्वसुपपदाते । 'खार्थे'न' असं इतेन परेण केनचित् अप्रयुक्तं सं इतानामवस्थानं न दृष्टं, यथा रहादीनां लोके । तथा प्राणादीनामि सं इतत्वात् भिवतुमर्हति । अतः इत्रेणेव सं इत-प्राणादिविलच्चणेन तु सब्वे सं इताः सन्तो जीवन्ति प्राणान् धारयन्ति ।... यिसन् आत्मनि सित, एतौ प्राणापानौ चचुरादिभिः संहतौ उपायितौ ; यस्यासं इतस्य 'अर्थे' प्राणापानादिः सब्वे व्यापारं कुर्वन् वर्णते सं इतः सन्, स ततोऽन्यः स्मृतः इत्यभिप्रायः" (कठ० भा०, 5. 2).

"It may be urged that 'the body becomes destroyed only by the exit of Prāna, apāna &c. and not by the exit of the Atma distinct from these.' This is not so. These acting jointly for the benefit of some other cannot be the source of life. The existence of houses &c. composite in their nature, has not been seen to be undirected by some other not connected with them, for whose benefit they exist; so also it should be in the case of the combination of Prāna and the rest. Therefore, it is by some other alone dissimilar to the combination of Prāna and the rest, all these combined maintain their life. On which 'Atma', dissimilar to those combined, these two Prāna and apāna combined with the eyes and the rest depend and for the benefit of whom (not so combined), prāna, apāna and the rest perform their functions in combination, he is established to be other than they."

We find, therefore, that there is an End or purpose present in nature and within the organism, which works.

(2) Non-intelligent blind Energy is incapable of producing order and adaptation (रचनानुषपत्तेश्व नानुमानम्, ब्र॰ स्॰, 2.2.1). It is supposed, for this very reason, that the natural world is adapted to the ends of the

Spirit. The forces if unarranged, uncombined unutilised by a presiding consciousness or mind can not give rise to a single orderly system (रचना) of the universe. In the adaptation of the organism (रेड) to the external circumstances, animal life makes the best use of the external environments, throws off disadvantages and utilises the conveniences and thus builds up the organisms. There is, therefore, present in nature the End which nature has to reach. It is operative through the whole field of nature forcing it to particular forms-a selfrealising idea. Such an end, such an idea,-must be at the beginning. We are obliged to refer this 'idea' to an infinite mind which as its subject must be distinguished from the object in which it works. "An idea busy in the world, but present to no subject is a contradiction", as Martineau observes.

The Sānkhya idea of Prakriti is different. According to Sānkhya, Prakriti is the "condition of equilibrium consisting in a uniform diffusion of three tendencies—power of doing work counter-balanced by resistance (of mass)." The world in this view is something given in its complete form and is self-existent and independent. It is a complete whole given in its totality; it is eternally complete—unchangeable. Development within it discloses no new property which is not to be found in the pre-existing elements. The manifestation of effect is, therefore, only its passage from potentiality to actuality. Evolution is the development of the differentiated within the undifferentiated—"liberation of energy stored up in a collocation, by overthrowing the arrest

which goes on to a fresh collocation." Hence, only the collocations change.

> "यदधा यत्-प्रयुक्तास्त...चे ष्टाः सः स्रन्यः सिद्धः।" "संहतानां पुरार्थतः दृष्टम्"। (तै॰, 2. 7.)

["For whose purpose and by whom urged or moved..... these activities work, he must be other than these."]

["It is seen that those which are combined together serve the purpose of some other for whose sake they are combined."]

Prakriti, from the Vedantic position, is not, therefore, an irrational power independently working out effects (परिणाम—विकार), but it is a rational creative power of Brahma—''जगत: उत्पत्तिप्राकाले ब्रह्मातिरिक्तं वस्तु नास्तीति दर्भितं; भविद्यायास (मायाया:) ब्रह्ममितले न तत: पार्थगर्थायोगात्'—रामतीर्थं in वे॰ सार॰. ["Since माया is a power of the Spirit, it cannot be an entity

[ै] निह अचे तनं चे तनानिधिष्ठितं किञ्चित् कुर्व्याद्यते" (वे॰ सा॰—रामतीर्य)। cf. ''तद्भिध्यानादेव तिज्ञङ्गात् सः'' (ब्र॰ स्०)।

distinct therefrom."] We can, therefore, never understand the universe "as becoming merely, but as being that is becoming." Vikūras (famis) are not mere changes, but movements to a definite End or goal, a progress.—

"एकद्रपसापि..., उत्तरोत्तरमाविष्कृतस्य तारतस्यम् ऐश्वर्यं शक्तिविशेषे: श्रूषते" (व॰ स्॰ सा॰, 1. 1. 11).

["Although identical in its nature.....there are degrees of its progressively higher and higher manifestations—by the splendour of His glorious power." [This 'glorious power'— ऐत्रयोगित—is Maya, as Sankara himself explains in another place "तदात्रया तदेत्रयोग्न्ता."]

''आदित्यादिषु हि सत्त्वमत्यनप्रकार्य... अतस्तवीव आविसारं न्योति: ...न तु तवीव तदिधकमिति। यथा तुल्खेऽपि सुखसं स्थाने..... आदर्शादी तु सच्छे खच्छतरे च 'तारतस्येन' आविभावित तहत्'' (गी॰ भा॰, 15. 12).

["The better manifestation of consciousness in the sun &c. is due to a higher proportion of Satwa.....To illustrate, the same face of man is reflected in a mirror in a greater or less legree of clearness, according as the mirror is more or less transparent."]

' 'उत्तरीत्तरिविश्वरतिव ब्रह्माकाशानान् लोकान्...परं परं वरीयो विश्विष्टतरं नीवनं हास्र विदुषी भवति" (का० भा०, 1, 9, 1).

["He wins gradually higher and higher worlds up to Brahmakasa (সমানাম) in order of merit—which is the highest and best supreme.....he gains gradually higher and higher forms of life progressively."]

''इदमस्मात् परम् इदमस्मात् परं—इति पुरुष एवैस्थः सर्व्वेश्यः परः प्रतिपद्मते इति युक्तं ।...पुरुष-प्रतिपत्त्ववे व 'पूर्व्वं -पर-प्रवाहोक्तिः''—

(ब॰ स्॰ भा॰, 3. 3. 14).

In this quotation the phrase 'पूर्ज-पर-प्रवाह' is significant :—

["'It is higher and better than this', 'it is higher and better than the former'—in this way, the Supreme Self is the Highest of all, the best. In this unbroken series of the degrees of higher and higher orders, the Highest Self is to be gradually realised in the higher and higher forms of objects''.]

(3) Our idea of the conditioned is composed of —(1) some kinds of being(सामान) and (2) the limits or conditions (बिगेष or बिनार) under which they are known. All the definite beings are qualitatively distinct in our consciousness and are all relative realities. These relative realities can be conceived only in connection with an Absolute Reality—'कारण-व्यक्तिक प्रमुपल्के रसत्'—(गी॰ भा॰ 2.16). Successive changes are determinations of a single substance; it follows therefore, that there is a plurality of substances producing series of changes which are the outer expression of those active essences which must be many, though ultimately constituting the nature of One Reality, and the changes cannot be conceived apart from those essences or causes.—

''दिध-घट-वचनादार्थिभि: 'प्रतिनियतानि कारणानि' (Essential causal substances) छपादीयमानानि लोके दृष्यन्ते ।...निह दध्यथिभि: स्तिका छुपादीयते, न घटार्थिभि: चीरम्'

(ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 18.)

''सर्वे स वस्तुन: 'खेन खेन रूपेण' भावात्मनैव उपलब्धमानतात्"

(2.2.26).

["Those who want to produce certain effects such as curd, jars &c. employ for the purpose certain determined (i. e. corresponding) causal realities such as milk, clay &c. He would not employ clay for the production of curd; neither would he employ milk, if he wants to produce a jar".]

["Every object has a positive determined 'nature' of its own". "Each causal substance", Sankara says, "has a certain capacity for some particular effects only and not for other effects; this capacity is a certain power of the cause".]

Sankara, it will be seen, never separated the effects or the manifestations from their causes which contain them within themselves. "The cause", he remarks, "is always found to be larger in extent than the effects, and what is smaller in extent is included within the larger"——

"कारणं हि लोके कार्य्यात् भूयो दृष्टं, यथा घटादिभ्यो सत्।...यत् यस्य चन्तर्व्वे र्ति तदल्यं, भूय इतरत्" (का॰ भा॰, 7. 12. 1).

He brings out this non-separability, this essential fact, in various ways :—

(i) In distinguishing between unreality and reality, he observes in his commentary on the Gitā, that the effects cannot be known apart from their causes; as soon as you separate them from their causes, they would at once be unreal.

''कार्य्य घटादे: खदादिकारणस्य च, तत्-कारणव्यतिरेक्टेण अनुप-लब्धे:,...कारण-व्यतिरेक्तेण अनुपलब्धेरसत्" (गी० भा०, 2, 16).

"The pot is a particular thing; it is one form of clay which is universal, is regarded as a reality. The pot is a mere form or guise under which the universal clay (चत्), is hidden". But clay is sensuous universal; it is again dependent on, and a manifestation of, pure universal behind it. The same universal appears in many different shapes and remains identical with itself in all its forms. The clay is not confined to one particular form—pot (चट)—but goes beyond it to others and hence transcends these.

Thus, each distinguishable object has a nature—a universal—of which it is the expression and which is present in it hidden behind.

(ii) Commenting on a passage in the Chhāndogya-Upanishad, he thus concludes—

''जागिद्विषया अपि मानस-प्रत्ययाभिनिव ता एव ; सदीचाभिनिव ति तेजोऽवन्नमयतात्...सं तत्यमूला हि लोकाः'' (का॰ भा॰, 8, 5, 4).

This is an observation the importance of which cannot be too prominently emphasised.

["All sensible objects (লাখবিষয়া:) are determinations of intelligible principles (of Divine Mind)—নাল্য-মন্ত্রা:—which contain them, As we find in the Sruti that they are embodiments of Fire, Water, Food— কল:—খ্ —খন্ন—the universal constituents—which are again determined by Divine Purposes (খ লভ্য s) i. e. the Universals of Thought." We thus find that behind the plurality of phenomenal objects, Divine Purposes (খ লভ্য s) are present on which the former are grounded"].

The same truth is more pointedly stated elsewhere—

''अम्बादीन् (Phenomenal objects) परमार्थ-सदूपान् वदित, योऽविजानन् वदित । न तु ते इपत्रश्रव्यतिरेक्षेण परमार्थतः सन्ति । तथा तान्यपि इपाणि सदपेच्या नैव सन्ति'' (का॰ भा॰, 7. 17. 1).

["One who speaks without understanding, takes the phenomenal objects, fire &c. as real truths; while as a matter of fact, these objects have no real existence apart from the three universal constituents or forms, viz: Fire, Water, Food—वेज:—अप्—

WH. Even these universal forms have no real existence apart from Sat (अत्) i. e. they are included in Divine Purpose or Thought,"]

Brahma is the Supreme form related to all other forms.

(iii) Again elsewhere-

''सामान्य-विशेषवानर्थों नामव्याकरणवाको विविच्चतः ।......ञ्चनेके हि विलच्चणाः...सामान्य-विशेषाः......तेषां पारम्पर्थ्य गत्या एकस्मिन् महा-सामान्ये चन्तर्भावः प्रज्ञानघने'' (व्र० भा०, 2. 4, 9.)

["In the Sruti describing how the process of the evolution of the differences of nama-rupa took place, objects are described as consisting of universals and particulars. There is a plurality of distinguishable universals with the particulars contained in them. All the plurality of the Universals (with their particulars which they include), in their progressive order (पारपर्या-गला) is included within the Supreme Universal Intelligence."*]

We find from this description of the Evolution that behind the plurality of phenomenal particular objects, there is a plurality of universals (सामान्य) on which they are grounded and of which they are the expressions. All objects have thus a double character—the universal and particular—and they are inseparable.

Elsewhere we find Sankara remarking—
''सामान्यमात्मस्वरूपप्रदानेन विशेषान् विभक्तिं,.....विशेषाः सामान्ये उप्ताः, न
तत एव निभिंद्य ग्रहीतुं शकान्ते'' (इ॰ भा॰, 1. 6. 1).

^{*} cf. ''विशेषाः सामान्य किल्पताः। तथा च द्रव्यलादीनां सामान्यविशेषाणां सामान्य-मानद्वपायां सत्तायामन्तर्भावः। सत्ताया अपि स्नुरणिवरिद्धतायाः कापि अनुपन्तभात् स्मुरणमानलं युक्तं। स्मुरण्य ब्रह्मेव। (सामान्यस्य विचार्ध्यमाणे ब्रह्मस्द्वपानितरेकात् अभीतनलहेतीस्त्रव अप्रवृत्तः)'—रामतीर्थ in वे॰ सा॰. ["All particulars (or individual things) are surmised in the universal. The various universals must be included under existence which contains all universality. As existence is never cognised without Sphurana', it is rightly regarded as consisting only of such 'Sphurana'. (Universality is not different from Brahma and therefore the argument is a unconsciousness does not apply to universality.)" Gough's Trans.

["The Universals are the sustaining principles which contain the particulars...the particulars are interwoven into the universal and they cannot be severed from them."]

The Universals include the particulars in their own being ("विशेषाणां सामान्ये अन्तर्भावात्" 1. 6. 1.) and it is the universals (निविधिष) which give reality to the particulars (विशेष). There is no essential difference of kind between them; the one is the expression of the other. Yet they are arbitrarily separated. Kant separated Thing-in-itself (सामान्य) from the phenomena (विशेष). Rámánuja stated, we had no knowledge of the Nirvisesha (निव्योष).

These Samānyas or universal causes may be looked upon as Secondary causes, ("अवान्तर-प्रकृतिs"—रामतीर्थ in वे॰ सां॰) and Brahma is the Prime Cause including them. This we find from the following passage—

''एवं क्रमेण स्चां स्चातरं, अनन्तरमनन्तरतरं, कारणमपील, सर्वां कार्यजातं —परमकारणं परमस्चाच ब्रह्माप्येति। न हि स्वकारणव्यतिरैकेण, कारण-कारणे कार्याप्ययो न्यायः ''' (ब्र० भा०, 2.3.14.)

["The phenomenal objects or the effects cannot at once directly merge in the Final Cause—Brahma. They must merge successively in their own preceding causes, in reverse order. In their ascending series in the reverse order, the earlier is more and more subtle than the latter into which each successively disappears. Observing this order, the objects will merge in their own subtler and subtler causes, in succession, until at last the most subtle, the most inward Final Cause—Brahma—is reached".

The universals, according to Sankara, are ultimately Divine Purposes (संकल्पड)—"जायदिषया अपि मानसप्रत्ययाभिनिर्देत्ता एव, सदीचाभिनिर्देत्ततेजोऽवन्मयत्वात्

&c. &c." (ऋा॰, 8. 5. 4), * which find expression in phenomenal individual differences upon which the latter are grounded. The Supreme Self includes within itself all the intelligent universal purposes which are behind the phenomena. Being Divine Purposes, they are included in the Divine Thought. They are the constituent elements of one Supreme Being; they constitute the nature of Brahma. Sankara calls them—"कामा:—जवाणेऽनवाः"—not different from Brahma. For this reason the Chhāndogya describes—

"तानि एतानि संकल्पात्मकानि.....संकल्पं क्रतवत्याविव द्यावा-पृथित्यी, समकलेतां वायुष आकाशय.....तथा आपय तेजस्य...संन रूपेण नियलानि लत्त्यन्ते.....संनं जगत् संकल्पमलं...संकल्पातिष्ठितानि...श्चिती, एवसुत्पत्ती,...प्रकथे चं ।

["All these abide in the Divine Will: Heaven and Earth willed, the air and ākāsha willed.....the whole universe willed in its immovable form, abides in the Will during origination, during continuance &c. &c." (7.4.1.)]

As the external world is the expression of the Purposes of the Absolute Self, it conforms to, and serves the purpose (परार्थ) of the Finite Selves—its opposition is only apparent.—

(4) In Lecture II, it was pointed out that the characteristic of the world is Self-transcendence. As the world is grounded on a transcendental Supreme Purpose which is present behind it, it reveals higher and higher purposes i.e. the realisation of more and more, higher and higher, forms implied in it, from the very beginning. It has evolved the five elements, and the higher contains the properties

Quoted and translated at P. 61.

of the lower. Akāsha comes first and has the property of sound, but the last—the earth—contains the five properties of each preceding series (Vide. 40 and 10 and 1

'पूर्व-पूर्व-प्रविनिरीधेन उत्तरीत्तरापूर्व-प्रविजननस्य प्रत्यगाताभिमुख्येन प्रवृत्तात्पादनार्थत्वात्'' (गी॰ भा॰, 18, 66).

''भगवत्-कर्मकारियो व बुक्ततमाः,,,,,,ते उत्तरोत्तरहीन फल-त्यागावसान-साधनाः'' (18, 66).

["By restraining the first natural activities one by one and thereby gradually inducing fresh and higher activities it (Sruti) serves to create an aspiration to reach the innermost Self".]

["Who are most devout, rendering services to the Lord, they will resort to the last path, gradually abandoning the successive lower and lower paths in their descending order."]

But as no stage of mundane development is intrinsically perfect and not vitiated by evil, the human desire or purpose is not being fulfilled or completed in any of these stages under earthly conditions. The goal must, therefore, be supramun-

^{* &#}x27;'विषयस्थै व खात्मगाइकले न संस्थानानारं करणं नान'' &c. &c. Vide: Lect.—"Why is Màyá called so?"

dane transcending the earthly order. For, a principle of goodness (साध्ये) is the presupposition and condition of the manifestation of a good developing in the world.—

''गाधु-शब्द-वाचोऽर्धः ब्रह्म वा सर्व्वधापि लोकारिकार्धे अनुगतं ; यथा घटादि-दृष्टि संदादिदृष्णनुगतैव सा.....'साध्वर्धस्य' लोकादिकार्धे षु कारणस्य अनुगतलात्, यदादिवत् घटादिविकारेषु'' (का॰ भा॰, 2. 2. 1).

["The word "good" signifying the cause, extends to the effects in the shape of the world; just as clay does to its modifications—jar and the rest. Just as wherever we have a notion of the jar, it is always accompanied by the notion of clay, so, in the same manner, the notion of the world is always accompanied by a notion of the "Good".

Man must participate in that Good Purpose ("साम्बर्ध of Sankara)"* which is fulfilling itself in the Universe. As God is acting behind the process of the world, the world is moving perpetually to realise the Divine Purpose. The Gitā calls the working, in the world, of this Divine Purpose as—"मत्-कमे" ("जम कमें च मे दिख") †. The Gitā wants us to participate in this Divine Action or Purpose, so that in our lives we may not be led captive by sensuous desires and forget the Transcendental Purpose or Goal—"मत्कमं परमा भव"—"Participate in my Divine action" (गी॰ भा॰ 12.10). We must embrace the Divine Good as our own good and see that it is fulfilled. The Gitā looks

^{*} cf. ''सर्वेकस्थाणानामतिश्वेन कल्याणं'' (ह॰ भा॰, 5. 15. 1)—''The Highest Good of all other Goods''. Also, कैस्बेपदार्थे ब वरेषु अतिश्वेन वरं'' (सु॰ भा॰, 2. 2. 1)—''Among all other Goods of the world, it is the Supreme Good''.

[†] Vide : Gitá, 4. 9.

upon the Divine Purpose or action as—"इम्रासं खापन"—the establishment of Righteousness in the world. But, there is the other side of the shield. The good cannot be attained unless you overcome evil, oppression and suffering—"विनागाय च दुष्कृतां।" This is the "establishment of the Righteousness." This is the Message of Vedānta.—

''परिचाणाय साधूनां, विनाशाय च दुष्कृतां । धर्मासंस्थापनार्थाय सम्भवासि युगे युगे''॥ (गौ, 4.8.)

["For the protection of the virtuous and the good, for the destruction or overcoming of evil, for the firm establishment of Righteousness or Good, I am born in every age"].

We are all parts of the system of nature, members of the universe. The parts belong to the whole and the whole is in the parts undivided. We do not exist apart from the world and we cannot, therefore, have any good which is separate and isolate from the good revealed in the world, which is not the good of the whole. We are not independent of, separate from, the world or the whole. For, the whole is present in each part ("समोऽहं सर्वेभूतेष") and we must see the fulfilment of every part in the whole. The false view of Anyatwa (प्रनात)—Separateness—must be supplanted by the idea of Ananyatwa-non-separateness. Each of us, we must remember, is the same (अनन्य) and yet is not the same (भन्य) with God or the whole. Our non-separateness is the true idea—the solidarity —the 'लोक-संग्रह' of the Gitā. We must all identify ourselves with the good purpose operating within the world as well as in us.

From what has been stated above, it is clear that

in Vedānta there cannot arise the question of dualism between matter and mind, between particulars and universals, between parts and the whole. They are not two different entities, as in the System of Aristotle and in Kartesians. Nor can our self be an addition, from outside, to matter. The Self is rather the goal which nature had to reach by continuous transformations,—which Bosanque calls "the soul-making business of the world". It has brought about what it had in itself—

"सत्ताचावरस्य" (ब्र॰ स्र॰ 2. 1. 6).

"कारपासनेव कारणे सत्तनवरकालीनस कार्यं स मृथते" (शहर-भाष)।

["What is to be produced subsequently must be present implicitly in the cause".]

The phrase 'waterland' is to be particularly noted here. The sense of the Aphorism is that the higher is contained implicitly in the lower. Nature must have contained life and consciousness in it, otherwise they could not have emerged afterwards from it. There is always a continuous transformation of nature or Prāna and for this reason, it is known in Sankara-Vedānta as—utula-fad—and the consummation of the human form was the End which nature had in view. It is an important tenet in Vedānta that—

''यस यदावाना यह न वर्तते, न तत् तत उत्पदाते, यथा सिकताध्यक्षेतं'' (द्व० स्० आ०, 2. 1. 16).

["What does not exist in 'implicit' form in the cause, can not become 'explicit' in the effect, and what subsequently becomes explicit must have been present in the earlier stages in implicit form (कारणावाना)",]

Thus there is no dualism between matter and mind; both are aspects of a single reality which has taken innumerable forms in the world. This truth has been beautifully brought about in the story of Swetaketů in the Chhandogya Upanishad. What is called as matter in its triplicate forms—(तेजोऽवड) can give rise to the most exquisite manifestations of psychical functions—speech, Prana and mind—ara, प्राण and मन:। The essence of Food (प्रत) &c. taken by us produces thoughts, memory &c. There is no causal relation between the two. There is the one everlasting Principle hidden in everything ("नामक्य-विकारे: इन्ने") having names and forms which manifests itself in manifold forms, as breath, speech thought &c. from the lowest progressively to the highest, as salt is hidden in water. All these are but the functions of a unity which is the fundamental basic principle of all functions-

"परमेश्वर एव तेन तेन चाताना चवितष्ठमानी चिभाष्यायन् तं तं विकारं सजित?" (त्र० भा०, 2, 3, 12,)

["It is the same Iswara—the Fundamental unity—who assuming innumerable changing forms on Himself has manifested Himself".]

This beautiful truth the Chhāndogya has placed before us.

-0-



The Vedantic Prana:

ITS CHARACTER.

Part I.

-:0:-

(1) What is Prána in Vedānta? Let us see how Sankara himself speaks of this Prána. "The term Pràna is the world-seed (वीजायना खितं) and Brahma is defined as Sad-Brahma (अद्या) in relation to and in identification with (तदायना) the Prāna. It is this Prāna which before its manifestation existed as a seed; it became manifested—as this non-intelligent world" (मा॰ का॰ भा॰ 1.2). Prior to its manifestation, this world of Nāma-rūpa is called as Avyakta. Sankara informs us that the Prāna-vija exists in Pralaya—dissolution of this world, and also in Susupta—deep slumber of finite Self, in undeveloped or Avyākrita condition i. e. not yet differentiated in space and time order—

''श्रव्यात्रतस्य देशकालविशेषाभावात्...श्रव्यात्रत एव प्राय: सृष्ते (प्रलये प)
...सर्व्यभावानासुतपत्ते: प्राक प्राय-वीजात्मनैव सत्त्वमः ।

"समस' जगत् कार्यकारणाचणं, सह विज्ञानात्मना, परिवाहचरी समुप्तिकाले संप्रतिष्ठते, सामर्थात् प्रलयेऽपि...तत एव च जत्पदाते इति च सिंडं" (प्र० भा॰, 6. 1). "प्रागवस्थायां परित्यक्त-व्याक्तत-नामक्ष्णं वीजशक्त्यवस्थम् अव्यक्तशब्दयोग्यं दर्भयति" (त्र॰ सा॰, 1. 4. 2).

["In the dreamless sleep (and in the Pralaya) the Prana was non-differentiated. Before their birth (i. e. appearance in developed forms of Nama-rúpa) all objects had their being in the form of potential (অআজন) Prana. It then became gradually developed or manifested in space and time".

["All the universe in the nature of effects and causes, together with the knowing Self, enters into the Supreme, undecaying Self during sleep...and by necessary implication even in Pralaya...and that is produced from thence".

["(The world) in its prior condition was fit to be called as "Avyakta (not manifested), as it was reduced to the state of 'Power of Seed' devoid of differentiated nāma-rúpa".]

This Prāna in Avyakta stage is synonymous with Māyā. The Brahma-Sutra-bhāsva savs—

''वीजशक्तिरव्यक्तशब्दनिर्देश्या...मायामयी महासुष्पिः'' (1. 4. 3.)

["This seed indicated by the term 'Avyakta'....is like deep slumber consisting of $M\bar{a}y\bar{a}$ '.]

The Māndukya-bhāsya states—

''बब्याकृत् एव प्रायः सुषुप्ते , प्रलये च...प्रायाशब्दलमञ्चाकृतस्य"

(না০ কা০ মা০ 1. 2.)

["In the deep slumber and in Pralaya the Prana becomes Avyakta.....the Prana is known by the term Avyakrita"].

Behind this Prāna or Māyā, there is Brahma as its substratum. This Avyākrita (non-manifested) Prāna is not a self-existing entity, but it cannot be explained without referring to the Being of Brahma whose energy it is.—

''मया अपक्रष्ट' परिलक्तं यून्यं तत् स्थात्... सर्व्यभूतानां नीजं तदहमर्ज्यं न'' (गी॰ भा॰ 10, 39,)

["Anything into which 'I' have not entered, from which 'I'

am removed, would be without Self (could not exist) and would be void".]

Again-

''तमीवीजस स्वातन्त्रीय प्रवृत्तिग्रङा स्वात्, तथा सति सांस्वसिद्धानापात इति 'आययं' (Substratum) दर्भवति'' (रामतीर्थं m ७प० सा०, 17. 27).

["Some one might think that this 'Seed of Tamas' i, c. Prāna-vija acts independently and in that case our theory might resemble the Sānkhya Prakriti; to disarm such suspicion the author (Sankara) shows its Substratum (মানুব, মবিষান)"].

This seed of Māyā or Prāna existing in Brahma in undifferentiated state, identically blended in it, distributed itself gradually into three forms,—the gross (खूज), subtle (सूद्धा) and the causal (कार्प) conditions of the Prāna.—

''तदिवैकं विधा जो यं मायाबीजं पुनः क्रमात्। मायाब्यात्माऽविकारोऽपि बहुधैको जलार्कवत्''॥ (उप॰ सा॰, 17. 27.)

["One seed (of Māyā) gradually divided itself into three forms. The intelligent ātmā which is changeless, though one, appeared as many in connection with the three-fold Māyā, like the Sun appearing as many when reflected in the rippling surface of a lake".]

These three forms of the Prāna may be compared with the three states of the finite individual Self in its wakeful, dreaming and slumbering conditions respectively. The differentiations into gross states are the product of their subtler condition. The subtle differentiations are again the product of the causal state which is called as the undifferentiated causal form or seed-form of the Prāna (प्रयासन प्राथम). All these states were merged in Brahma in Avyakta form.

(a) But what is the relation between Prāna and its Substratum Brahma?

The Avyakta Prāna is really the Swarupa (nature) of Brahma itself.—

"मम परमेश्वरख विश्वी: 'खभूता'...माया'' (गी॰ भा॰, 7. 14.)

["This Māyā is inherent in Me, Vishnu, the Lord".]

''नामरूपवीजभूतातृ...स्रविकारापेचया परात् 'श्रचरात्', परं सर्व्वीपाधि-वर्ज्जितम्, 'श्रचरस्वे व' सरूपम्'' (सु० भा०, 2. 1, 2.)

["The Māyā or Prāna, the seed of all names and forms, is termed 'Akshara', and this being the source of all changes does not itself change. The Brahma which is devoid of all determinations and limitations is the real 'Akshara'. The former Akshara—the Māyā-Seed—is, in reality, the Swarupa i. e. the nature of the Akshara Brahma."]

There is thus a Swarūpa or Tādātmya relation between the Avyakta Frāna and Brahma in which it is submerged but not obliterated. What is Tādātmya? Sankara defines this Tādātmya (तादाबा) in his commentary on the Brihadāranyaka thus—

तत्-खरूपव्यतिरेकेण अग्रहणं यस्य, तस्य 'तदात्मलं' दष्टं खोके'' (2. 4. 7).

["Something which cannot have any being or action apart from that of the other is in Tadatmya relation with it".]

Prāna then has no being or activity apart from that of Brahma which is its substratum. In all its successive forms, the Prāna works not apart from but in identity with Brahma.

''(नाम-इपे) 'बात्म-तादात्मे । नैव' ... सर्व्वावस्थासु व्याक्रियेते"

(तै॰ भा॰, 2.,6).

["All its differentiations and developments are, in all conditions, in intimate relation with Brahma, not apart from Brahma."]

"'यदात्मकं' मयि वर्त्तते स्थितिकाली" (व॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 20),

''प्रलये च कलानाम् 'आत्मभावागमनम्'' (प्र॰ भा॰, 6. 5).

''(जगत्) ब्रह्मणि जीयते—'तदात्मतया' श्लिष्मति...तदातिरिकेण अयद्यात् ; तस्मात् 'सर्व्वमिदं ब्रह्म'—(हा० भा०, 3. 14. 1.)''

["The world of Nāma-rùpa exists not apart from Me, but in identity with My Swarupa (নুক্ৰ)".]

["When it disappears, the ten-fold Kala (i. e. all the differences) are merged in My nature and thus existed in identical relation with Me".]

["In an order—reverse of that of birth, all this dissolves into Brahma—becomes identified with it.....thus at all periods of time this universe remains one with Brahma and is never cognised apart from it, consequently this universe is Brahma itself, in reality."]

We find then that the Prāna or Māyā, when existing unmanifested in Brahma has no being or activity * apart from Brahma. "The Prāna had no independent being of its own or activity apart from Brahma and for this reason, the Frāna though existing cannot violate or interfere with the unity—nonduality—of its substratum" †. When the differentiations gradually develop under space and time limitations, they do not arise separated from or independent of or apart from Brahma, and when these differences go on operating (and when these differences go on operating of differences of differences.)

^{*} cf. 'नान्यत् किञ्चन मिषत्''—''न किञ्चदिष व्यापारवत्'' (ऐ॰ भा॰, 1. 1).

^{ं &#}x27;स्वत:-सत्तावस्त्रे स्वयापारे स्वातन्त्रामेव स्वात्,... वत: बात्मनोऽहितीवस्य न विरोष:—बानन्दनिरि in ऐतरिय-भाष्य ।

These differentiations again stand in Tādātmya (বারারা) relation to their cause Prāna, as the latter is related to Brahma—its source, its substratum—in the same Tādātmya relation. They cannot make the causal substances something different (মন্ত্র); because, they are, in reality (ম্বাইব:) not something different but express the nature of Brahma.

(2) To the Sruti, this Prāna, as soon as manifested, is known as Sutra (মূর).—

''तदीतत् हिराधानमं स्य स्वात्मनो जन्म ;—यदव्याक्ततस्य जनती व्याकरणम्' (ह० भा०, 5. 5. 1).

["The differentiation of the undifferentiated world is the birth (or first manifestation) of *Hiranya-garbha* which is Sutra".]

It is called Sutra, because it weaves into itself all the differences of the world. It is this energy which related together all the beings, all the determinations (fanus) in the world. It passes through all, it sustains all, as a piece of thread passes through and contains in it, all the flowers of a garland.

''अन्यया सत्तुमुष्टिवत् विशीयो ते" (ह॰ भा॰, 3.6.1).

["Otherwise, if it did not sustain,—all the differences of the world of nāma-rupa would have been torn to fragments, scattered, like a handful of fried ground grain (सत्तु)"].

But we have seen it cannot act independently; it has Brahma as its Substratum, as its source, as its sustaining ground. With a view to impress this fact upon our mind, the Sruti calls "Brahma as—"waw

मूत्रं, तस्यैव नियन्तारं" and "प्राचस्य प्राचः"——

["Brahma is the thread of all threads, it is the controller—the guide—of this thread". "It is the Prāna of the Prāna"].

"मिय सर्व्वमिदं प्रोतं स्वे मणि-गणा इव" (गी॰, 7. 7).

Nilakantha thus explains-

"सामान्यक्षे मित्र सर्वे विशेषाः प्रोता दुन्दुस्थादिदृष्टान्तेः।...रसतन्त्रावक्षे मित्र सर्वे प्रव-विशेषाः प्रोताः—इत्यादि,.....स्ववत् सर्वे अनुस्ति मित्र सर्वे परस्यरव्यावनं तत् प्रोतं,....चतः प्रपचातीतोऽहम्।"

["Strike a musical instrument, the strike will produce a general undifferentiated sound— সন্তব্যান। Then strike it more and more, varieties of sound would now be produced upon it. But all these varieties—these various degrees—high and low—of different sounds would all be heard accompanied by the general সন্তব্যান first produced. As a piece of thread enters and touches all the different flowers in a garland, so 'I', the Self, have entered and kept constantly touching all the mutually exclusive (আরম্) finite objects of the world. As the continued Identity (সন্তব্য) remains distinguished from, and unaffected by mutually exclusive objects :...so, I transcend the world".]

Each of the objects of the world is finite and it arises from its negative relation to others *; as Plato

^{*} Sankara's idea in this respect is identical with Plato's.—
'A finite is that which has a limit. If something is limited, it follows that beyond the limit, there is another something. Hence to be finite means to be limited by something else and so on'.—''प्रवाल गोलमित प्रचदिव भवति। स च प्रनी (Limit) भिन्नेषु वस्तु दृष्टः।'' Thus arises a complex system of many inter-related finite things. But limit, according to Sankara, always involves negation (निवर्त्तकत)—''यती यस वर्ष्ट्च 'निवृत्तिः', स तस प्रनी भवति, यथा गोलविंद्ध रखला 'विनिवर्त्तते' (ते॰ भा॰ 2. 1). "The idea of the 'cow' negates or excludes the idea of the 'horse'. This is what keeps one thing separate from another thing. Each one negates or excludes the other ones from it." Thus one finite object negates another finite object. There are, therefore, series of finite objects—many.

says—"in their distinction from each other, things are limited and hence many". But as Brahma is present, as Sutra, in each, contains everything, the many are also one—Infinite. We thus find that the phenomenal objects are the expression of the active non-phenomenal essences (सामान्य) behind them, and these latter are all involved in the Ultimate Essence—Brahma.

''क्यमवगस्यते श्रज्ञाने (i. e. श्रब्याकृते प्राणे) तम:-प्राधान्यम् इति तवाह... जाड्याधिकादर्भनात्, सत्ता-स्मूर्त्ति प्रदले न चैतन्यस्यापि ईषदनुवृत्तिं स्वयति'' (रामतीर्थे in वे० सा०).

["Why there is prevalence of Tamas in their cause?"....the author implicates from seeing non-intelligence in the effects; there is also in all products some degree of intelligence (चेतन)".]

Now, then, this Prána is the germ, the energy (জুরি) of the Supreme, from which perishable things take their rise. This is the imperishable (মুন্তু), undifferentiated, seed (বীল) or germ, with Brahma behind it as its source—the real seed.—

''वीजं मां सब्बें भूतानां विद्धि पार्ध सनातनम्'' (गी॰, 7. 10).

And

"अचरात् परत:, पर: (अचर:)"—(सु॰, 2. 1. 2).

It is that which causes the growth of all things that germinate and this endures as long as Samsāra endures. Nothing springs up without a seed, and since growth is constant, the continuity of the seed never fails.—

''नित्यच प्ररोहदर्भनात् वीजसन्ति ने ब्ये ति'' (गी॰ भा॰, 9. 19)...

["I am the manifested which manifests itself in relation to the cause; and I am the reverse, the non-existence i. e. the unmanifested, the cause"—"सत्—यस्य यत्-सम्बन्धितया विदासानं तत्, तिहपरीत'मसच' चहमेव"—गी॰ भा॰ 9. 19.]

This causal power (बीज)—is subject to God, subject to His control—

"तदात्रया तदैष्वर्यभूता"—

—and existing in Brahma, this causal Seed—Prāna—developes into differentiations of Nāma-rūpa, the world.

(b) Brahma is the source and regulator of the Prāna——

We have seen there is $T\bar{a}d\bar{a}tmya$ relation between this Prāna and Brahma, and through this Prāna, Brahma is the cause of all.

The Gitā says-

"When Brahma is said to be not accessible to the thought or word of सत् (existence), one may suppose it to be असत (non-existence). To prevent this supposition, the Gita declares its existence as manifested in the upadhis, through the senses of all living beings (13.12-13)". "There must be some selfconscious principle behind the insentient principles in activity, such as physical body; for, we invariably find self-consciousness lying behind all insentient objects in activity, such as a carriage in motion." Brahma the sentient principle is not actually engaged (व्यापाराविष्टतया) in the particular activities ;—and in that supposition Brahma would be as if reduced to qua or assuming the character of that with which it is connected. We should understand, Brahma manifests itself through the Upādhis or limitations

of the senses, through the functions of all the senses; that is to say, the knowable Brahma (a) functions as it were, through the functions of all the senses ('As it were'—i. e. not actually engaged, only seems to be so engaged).

Sankara elsewhere observes—

"विक्रियादिविशेषरहितस आत्मनः मन-श्रादि-प्रवृत्तौ निमित्तलम्"

(वेन॰ वा॰ भा॰, 1. 2).

["Atmā is not subject to modification or change, and remaining unaffected in its own nature, it is the *director* of the intellect, senses etc".]

And again-

''सर्व्याचितनप्रवृत्तीनां चितनाधिष्ठानपूर्व्यकात्, तिमान् चेतने सर्व्याचितन-वर्ग-प्रवृत्तिने नास्ति नास्तित्वश्रद्धाः' (गी॰, 13, 13).

" न हि अचेतनं चे तनानधिष्ठितं खतन्तं प्रवर्त्तते प्रवर्त्तयति वा"

(ब्र॰ भा॰. 2. 2. 12).

["The existence of an intelligent principle cannot be doubted behind the non-intelligent objects in activity, as their source, inasmuch as, wherever there is activity of any non-intelligent objects in the world, that activity must have an intelligent principle as its controller or regulator."]

["A non-intelligent thing cannot act or cause others to act of its own accord and independently, without being presided

over by an intelligent principle".]

Compare what Rāmatirtha says in Vedānta-Sāra—

"प्राचाः खातिरित्त-खान्तर्गतचे तन्याधिष्ठानपूर्व्व कप्रवत्तयः अचे तनलात् रथादिवत्।"

["The vital airs have, as the antecedent of their activities, superintendence of Intelligence other than themselves but residing in themselves, because they are unintelligent like a chariot."]

During the dissolution of the world, the Prāna merges with all the varieties of its actions, in Brahma. And this Prāna is, in Vedānta, not an independent

principle, and as it is non-intelligent and always acts in combination with senses and others, it cannot be held to be independent in its activity and must be held to be acting for some Sentient Principle, as is stated in the Brahma-Sutra, thus—

"संहतलाचेतनलादीन् प्राणस्य स्वातन्त्रानिराकरणहेतृन् दर्भयति" (2. 4. 10).

Prāna may, therefore, be called to be the creative energy of Brahma, and Brahma for this very reason, called in Vedānta as—"nuva nu:". It is not anything which can exist and work separated or divided from Brahma. It has not any independent Swarupa or nature of its own like the Pradhāna of the Sānkhyas, but is in constant and living relation with Brahma.

"यदि हि प्राणादयः प्रागुत्पत्तः 'स्ते न त्रात्मना' (i. e. as an independent principle) सन्ति, तदां प्रवृषस्य प्राणादिमस्तं भवेत्। न तु ते ...स्ते न त्रात्मना सन्ति ; त्रतः त्रप्राणवान् पुरुषः" (सु॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 2.)

In this quotation, 'स्नेन मासना' can' be explained in the light of what Sankara stated in न्न॰ स्न॰, 2.3.7. He states there—all finite things are divided (विभन्न), like a water-pot, piece of cloth, pillar and the like. Each of these is characterised by particular modifications or vikāras and such characteristic modifications of each can be said to be the 'स्वरूप' or the characteristic nature of that object and this swarupa separates one finite thing from another finite thing: "निर्धा 'श्रविकत' विश्वित कृतिश्वत् विभन्नमुपलस्यते। ….. येन 'विश्वेष'

व्यतिरिचमानं (i. e. विभक्त') श्रन्धेभ्यः, तेन "खरूपवत्" सविशेषः प्रागुत्पत्तेनीस्ति" (ब्र॰ 2. 3. 7).

In the light of this hint, the words 'a summi' occurring in 40 410 quoted above would mean that such particular modification, by which Prana is characterised as Prána and is distinguished from other particular modifications characteristic of other objects, was not present in Brahma, prior to its manifestation. Hence, in that stage the Self (पुरुष) can be called as अप्राचादिमान पुरुष:। Similarly in त्र॰ सु॰ 2. 3. 7. Sankara's conclusion is—"प्राकाशादि-स्त्रभावेन न स्त्रभाववत् ब्रह्म।" Hence, we can conclude that prior to manifestation. Prāna existed in Brahma not in the form of modification but in identity with Brahma, as non-modified seed or power. We thus find that in Vedānta, Prāna is looked upon as a Universal, all-pervasive, quasi-material energy. It is a Self-constructive Divine Energy working from the Centre and gradually evolving differentiations. All the cosmic (. ग्राधिदैविक), physical (ग्राधिभौतिक) and psychical (आधातिक) forces and activities are to be traced to this Energy which first appeared as Universal Pari-Spanda (Vibration)—

"प्राणस परिस्पन्दात्मकले —वागादिष अग्नादिषु च अनुगतं (ह॰ भा॰, 1.5.23)."

And

"नहि प्राणादन्यव चलनात्मकत्वोपपत्तिः"।

["It is the vibration of Prana which is contained in the Cosmic Fire &c. and in the Psychic Speech &c."]

And

["There can be no vibratory motion anywhere apart from Prana",]

"एताविद्ध दरं सक्षे व्याक्षताव्याक्षतश्च यद्दत नाम-इपं कर्मोति...श्रध्याक्षाधि-दैवताधिभूत-भावेन व्यवस्थितमेतदेव" (इ० भा०, 1. 6. 3).

["It is this Prāna which, without forfeiting its own nature, divided itself into those three main forms of activities everywhere in the world, and it works as varieties of names, forms and acts".]

And-

''स प्राणमस्जत...तदुपाधिद्वारा चात्मिन सर्व्व विक्रियालचणः संव्यवद्वारः''। ''सहं प्राणः...सर्व्य परिस्पन्दक्षत''।

["He created Prāna.....By this Prāna all practical concerns of life consisting of all changes are done by Atmā."]

["I am Prāna....the active source of all vibrations".]



The Vedantic Prana: ITS TWO-FOLD MANIFESTATION.

Part II.

-:0:-

The Prāna-víja existing in Brahma in unmanifested avyakta form exhibits from the moment of its manifestation two phases, one concomitant of the other—

(3) Every manifested form of Prāna shows two inseparable sides—কৰ্মায় (Energy or motion) and কাঠায় (Matter). The Sruti declares—

"उभयात्मको हि प्रजापित: ; उपकार्व्योपकारकदर्भनात् भना, भयञ्च । निह कार्थ-करणप्रत्याख्यानेन संसारीऽवगस्यते ।...कार्थ्यकरणानामात्मा—प्राण: ; प्राण-ख्यितिकरं सत्—भन्न', न खातन्त्रीय भन्नसम्बन्धः * (३० भा०, 1. 3. 18).

["As there is always interaction and inter-relation between the two—motion (or energy) কৰোম and matter কাৰ্যাম, the Prajāpati (the Universal Prāna) is two-fold in his nature—composed of these two concomitant and inseparable † factors.

^{* &#}x27;'भन्न' पूर्तिभावनापद्यते ऋते प्राणात्। प्राण: अन्नीन विनान शक्तोति भावमानं धारिवतु' (ह॰ भा॰. 1. 5. 20).

t We find two other terms for Anna, as रवि and सोम; for Annada, two other terms, as अपि and प्राप (Vide. प्र० उ०, 1.4—5). The manifestation of the Prana from the Supreme Self (अचरात् पुरुषात्) is considered as an अतिप्रश्च; for, it lies beyond the province of logical argument and rational demonstration; it is hard to know (Vide: प्र० उ०, 3.2-3).

"ब्रिंग-बोमात्मकं जगत्—प्रजापतिः (प्राणः)" — इ० भा०, 1.4. 6.] Again—

"नामरूपे सत्यं—कार्थात्मके शरीरावस्थे। क्रियात्मकस्य—प्राणसयीरूपष्टभकः वाद्यास्यां शरीरात्मकास्यां क्वः अप्रकाशीक्षतः" (व० सा०, 6. 6. 3).

"वाद्यय कार्यवचणः उपजनापायधर्मकः * टण-कुश्र-मृत्तिकासमः" (2. 1. 1).

["The nama-rúpas are true;—these nāma-rǔpas are ৰাখায় or material portion; it becomes gradually developed into the form of organism and it is liable to growth and decay. The Prānaportion appears as motion (কিয়া) which nourishes or supports the former. It is by ৰাখায় or matter that the কংখায়—motion or energy lies concealed'.]

["The कार्यांश is its exterior and करणांश interior."]

The change from a diffused, imperceptible state to a concentrated, perceptible state is dissipation of motion and concomitant integration of matter t. The loss of energy or motion is accompanied by a gain in the volume of matter. When the loss of insensible motion—we call heat, light, sound—proceeds, the particles of diffused matter becoming more and more concentrated will be followed by liquefaction—fluidity—तारख, (अप—जल), and eventually by solidification—hardness—(कारिय—प्रथिवी).

As there is radiation of heat and light (রাজ:) into space, there is dissipation of motion (বায়) therein. And it is followed by concentration of its

^{*} cf. "उत्पत्तिप्रलयात्मके हि नामक्षे" (ब॰ भा॰ 2. 1. 20).

[†] Herbert Spencer's First Principles.

concomitant matter in the form of liquefaction (সৰ);
—for the Veda instructs—

''वातस्य सर्गः अभवत् सरीमिष (अग्रेः)"-ऋग्वेद, 7. 1. 34. 11.

"चलनस्य वायुपूर्व्वकत्वात्" (का॰ भा॰, 4. 3. 1).

["When the Fire speeds on, the ang is implicated therein".] ["All movement is preceded by ang or vibration."]

Then-

''अग्रेराप:" and-

"अपां य: शर: स समहन्यत, सा पृथिवी समभवत्" (ह० भा०,)

[i. e. "The radiation of heat and light is followed by lique-faction (अप ् or तारख्य)"]

and—

["What constitutes the essential substance of water became integrated and the result was solidification—(ঘূঘিৰী, কাতিৰ)".]

We thus find the manifestation of sound (ग्रन्ट) and heat and light (तेन:)—on the part of motion; and consequent appearance of liquefaction (जन) and eventual solidification (प्राथनी) on the part of its concomitant matter. About आनाग or space, the Aitareya-Aranyaka says—

"त्रावपनभाकाणः, प्रायः उष्यतेऽसिन्"

[i.e. "It is the space into which the Prāna-vibration is interwoven".]

The Upanishad also similarly describes the space by saying it as—

"वायुर' खम्" *

[i. e. "the space containing and (vibration) can be said to be qualified by it".]

It is in this way that from the ক্যোম and the কাঠাম respectively, of the Prāna-vija,—the five

^{* &#}x27;'वायादेरेव शब्दवत्त्वसथावात् किम् आकाशिन ?—इति अतिप्रसङ्गात्, यतः श्रुतत्वात् वायादिकारणते न आकाश्रवत् आगन्तुकत्वे न &c. &c.''—रत्र० प्र०, 1. 1. 5.

elements have come out; i.e. from the करणांग (Energy or motion), the sound (नाद, स्पर्भ), heat and light (तंज:) come out; from the कार्यांग (Matter), the liquefaction (ग्रप्) and solidification (ग्रय्वी) come out. Space (ग्राकाग) is the container of all these.

This also holds good in the case of animal organisms. It is the Prāna which builds up the body in the mother's womb and distributes the sense-organs and its other parts. In the Protoplasmic cell, the fertilised ovum does not petrify (\$\overline{\pi} \cdot \overline{\pi} \overline{\pi} \cdot \overline{\pi} \overline{\pi} \cdot \overline{\pi} \overli

''प्रथमो हत्तिलाभः प्राणस्य चचुरादिश्यः...गभे पुष्यति प्राणः''

(व॰ भा॰, 6. 1, 1)

"कार्थ-करणानामात्मा प्राण:..... अङ्गानां रसः"

(इ॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 19 & 8).

["It is Prana which first manifests itself in the ovum in the womb of mother and it gradually builds up the sense-organs and owing to its presence and activity the ovum does not petrify".]

["Prana is the essence of both the करणांच and कार्यांचit is the essence of the limbs of the child's body in the mother's womb."]

The phenomena of growth, circulation of sap and blood, nutrition, arrangement of cells, unfolding of the structure of the fœtus—are due to the agency of Prāna. Even the power to heal injured organs by the growth of flesh ("देई प्रापः ग्रस्तादिहिंसितं पुनर्माः सेन श्राप्रयति"—ह॰ भा॰ 5. 13. 4.) is due to the activity of this Prána. It mæintains (देईन्द्रिय-रचा) and nourishes (देईन्द्रिय-पृष्टि—व॰ भा॰ 2. 4. 11.) the animal life

—"याबदिसान् देहे प्राणी वसति, ताबदायु:—त्र॰ भा॰ 1. 1. 29. As from this Prāna, both cognitive and active powers within the organism are produced—this energy is termed in the Sruti as cognitive and active—'ज्ञानित्यायक्तिमत् or वोधावोधात्मकं' (कर॰ भा॰). It is called the collective प्राण, because it possesses power of action; and इर्ण्यमभें, because it possesses power of cognition;—or it may be described as—

''चयवा ज्ञानिक्रयाणिक्तमत्-समष्टिप्राणेन्द्रिय-समुदायात्मक' समष्टिलिङ्ग्यरीः''' (रामतीर्थं).

[i. e. "The collective subtle body consisting of the aggregate of all the vital airs and organs, possessing all cognitive and active powers in the form of Buddhi, Manas and Prāna."]

The Prāna within the body is the modification of the Sutra (स्त्र)—"मुख्यप्राणोऽपि वायोवी श्रस्य स्तामरूपस्य विकारः" (रा॰ ती॰ in Ved, Sára). It is called Antahkarana when emphasis is laid on the cognitive powers, and the same is called Pràna when emphasis is laid on the active powers. In this way—Buddhi (बुद्धि) stands for cognitive power, Manas (मनः) for desire or feeling and Prāna for active power or willing;—and all these are but the द्वित्र or modifications of this same Prāna or Sūtra. *

Here it will be instructive to bear in mind what विज्ञानभिद्य has explained about this Prána— 'महत्त्रलं हि एकमीन प्रकृते:—
(i. e. अव्याकतात्) उत्पद्मानं, ज्ञान-क्षित्रायक्तिस्यां दुद्धि-प्रायण्वद्मासामिलयते
दित स्मृतिषु अवधारितं'। 'यो ने प्रायः स प्रज्ञा, या प्रज्ञा सा प्रायः द्वलादि य तिषु च।
अतएव महत्त्रलख्टः पृथक् प्रायस्थिः य तिस्मृतिषु प्रायशो न य यते.....यद्यपि प्रायानाःकर्षयोरध्येकव्यक्तिल्मेन, तथापि क्रियायक्तेरवान्तरभेदाः पञ्च, ज्ञानयक्तेरवान्तरभेदाः प्रवः, ज्ञानयक्तेरवान्तरभेदाः प्रवः, ज्ञानयक्तेरवान्तरभेदाः प्रवः, ज्ञानयक्तेरवान्तरभेदाः (or the Máyá or Avyakta Prána) which appeared first as
क्रमल्ल (or Sutra) and this is called as बुद्धि (चनःकरण्) or प्राया—
with reference to its cognitive and active powers exhibited

In the Samvarga-vidyā (अंबर्गिवदा) it is stated that the activities of the external objects-the sun the moon, the light, the heat &c. derive their respective functions from the Prana, and that when their respective activities cease, they merge and disappear undivided (अविभक्त छपेण) in the Prana. The different functions of several internal sense-organs also merge during sleep in this Prana within us and when we awake it is this Prana which sends forth these organic activities again to their respective objects. It is not a resultant of the operations of all the forces in the organism, as the Sankhyas hold, but a separate Energy which is at the root of all kinds of activities going on in the creation. It is this Prana which has brought the finite selves and all finite existences into relation: it is the common medium in which they interact and out of which their organisms differentiate-

"परस्परोपकार्योपकारकभूतं जगत् सर्व्वं पृथिव्यादि । यच लोके परस्परोपकार्यो-पकारकभूतं, तत् एककारणपूर्वंकं 'एकसामान्यात्मकं' (Common medium), एकप्रलयच इष्टम'' (ह॰ भा॰, 2, 5, 2).

"भूतानां शरीरारस्थकले न उपकारात् 'सभूलं'। तद्वर्गतानां तेजीमयादीनां करणले न उपकारात् 'मध्ल' (2. 5. 5)".

"[There is reciprocal sympathetic interaction among the elements of the world. And this reciprocal action of the elements presupposes unity of some kind; they belong to a wholea common medium-in which the elements interact, from which source they come and in which they disappear."]

by it. Both the नृद्धि and प्राच-constitute one principle. Though one in substance, it is modified into 4 cognitive acts and 5 active or vital powers.

"The external elements help in building up the organism; and the organs—the result of Tejas &c.—act upon the elements;—"

i. e. "Between the inorganic and organic world, a constant interaction goes on, and elements from the external world are absorbed and are made to function as constituents in the life of living beings. This presupposes adaptation and sympathy".

But this whole or the principle of unity continuously present in and differentiating and determining all the elements of the world has its source or final ground in a transcendent Reality. We have pointed out previously that the characteristic of the world (or the common medium of Prāna) is self-transcendence. This is, as stated above, due to the transcendent element behind the world which is its ultimate ground. That the transcendent Supreme Self is the Director (पेरक) of the activities of the Prāna has been beautifully described in Sankara's Sata-Sloki (भव-सोक)) thus—

''व्यापारं देइसं खः…प्राणः सर्वे न्द्रियाणामधिपतिरनिष्णं,…यस चिद्रधनस सत्तया कुरुते,…प्राणस्य प्राण एवः'' (89)

["The Prāna, residing in each body.....master of all the senses, incessantly carries on all the activities.....by a Power which belongs undoubtedly to the Self that is pure consciousness;—it is the life behind all life (সাব্দ সাব:)"].

Again-

"विचक्छेदे जुठारः प्रभवति यदपि, प्राणि-नोद्यस्तवापि । स्वातन्त्रां नश्वरेऽस्त्रिन् न हि खल् घटते, 'प्रेरको'ऽस्त्रान्तरात्मा' । (84)

["Although the axe is able to fell a tree, it is nevertheless wielded by a living being;......Yet the axe cannot do it independently; it is impelled thereto by the inner Self."]

Sankara in his commentary on the following Stanza of the $Git\bar{a}$ —

''नयाध्यचिष * प्रक्रति: स्यते सचराचरं । हेतुनानेन कौन्ते य जगद्विपरिवर्त्तते"॥ (गी॰, 9. 10).

thus explains-

''दश्मावस्वरूपेण त्रविक्रियात्मना 'त्रध्यचे प' जगत्...व्यक्तात्मकं... विपरिवर्त्तते सर्वास भवस्थास'!—

["Because 'I' am the witness, I preside; this Universe comprising the manifested and the unmanifested moves on in all stages".]

Here Anandagiri—"कार्य्यवत् कारणस्यापि माच्यभोना
प्रवृत्तिरिति 'ग्रव्यक्तत्व'मारु"—

[i. e "The term 'Avyakta' has been employed to show that not only the modifications of nama-rupas at present perceived, but also the *Causal seed* of this world were impelled or moved to action because 'I' presided".]

Then Sankara adds-

''सर्व्वासु अवस्थासु 'दृशि-कर्मावापत्ति'निभित्ता हि जगतः प्रहत्तिः, 'अइमिटं भोत्त्ये', 'एतदर्धमहमिटं करिष्यामि'...द्रव्याद्या अवगतिनिष्ठा 'अवगत्य-वसाना' एव''।—

That is to say-

["All activities of the world arise by way, of forming an object of consciousness", i. e. all activities have their value only in the fact that they may be used by the Drisi (হিম)—the rational 'I' for his own purpose, that they may be utilised for his own end; that they may prove useful to him (কৰ্মনাৰ্থিক or ভ্ৰম্কাৰ). Otherwise, all these movements and actions (মহলি) will lose their value, and thus the realisation of Drisi (ইমি) is its final end—its খৰনাৰ, its पर्यान'.]

Elsewhere he has brought this important fact in a slightly different way, thus—

^{*} cf. ''प्रेरियता हि असी भोग्य-भोको:''— म॰ भा॰, 1. 1. 1.

''बप्रसिंडें हि चात्मिन, खार्थाः सब्बाः प्रवत्तयः व्यर्थाः प्रस्तेप्ररन्...दुःखं दुःखार्थमेव सुखं सुखार्थे''—

["If no Atma is present behind these activities and movements, they would prove useless; for, in that case the activities would be for their own sake;—as pain exists for pain, pleasure exists for the sake of pleasure; but this is quite absurd"].

''निह चन्दनकार्यकाते दुःखे चन्दनकार्यकार्ये अतः तिहज्ञातुर्मम चन्दनादिकतोऽर्यः, अहं हि ततोऽन्यः" (उप० सा० गर्यात्र)।

["The pain produced by a thorn cannot be for the sake of the thorn itself; which is non-sense. It must be for me who feels the pain, and 'I' am distinct from the thorn as well as from the pain."]

These remarks are important. They show that the intelligent Self (चेतन) has his own purpose of being in himself and his purpose is realised in these activities, and it is he who utilises these actions for his own use in which lies the value of these actions.

From all these discussions the fact stands out very clear before us that urged on by the Infinite within, the Prāna or the world is constantly moving towards the realisation of an End and this End is the transcendental Brahma itself. For this, the finite world ever keeps on transcending its finititude until it will reach its own End. The world is a sort of self-working system with Prāna—the vital principle, for its maintenance. It is composed of several members among whom functions are distributed, so that each member with the co-operation with other members exercises its own function in the place alloted to each, and the unity of the whole system is maintained by the vital principle—Prāna. We would quote the whole passage here—

''तिश्वान् चातातत्त्वे सित नित्यचैतन्यसभावे...मातिरश्वा वायुः (प्राणः) सर्व्यपाणस्तृक्तियात्मको, यदाश्रयाणि कार्य्य-करणजातानि यस्मिन् चौतानि प्रोतानि च, यत् सूत्रसं ज्ञकं, सर्व्वस्य जगतो विधारियद, स मातिरश्वा...प्राणिनां चे ष्टाखचणानि चम्चादित्यपर्जे नादीनां ज्वलन-दहनाभि-वर्षणादिलचणानि दधाति 'विभजति'। ''सर्व्वा हि कार्य्य-करण-विक्रिया नित्यचैतन्य्यात्मस्वरूपे सर्व्वास्तरभूते सत्ये व भवति''।—ईशा० भा०, 4.

["It is because the Atmā whose nature is eternal intelligence is constantly present (behind), it has become possible for the Mātariswā *—the Prána which is the essence of all activities of those who possess life and in which, as the substratum, all the material and psychical elements are woven as warf and woof, and which under the designation 'Sutra' † sustains the whole world,—to allot and to distribute various functions of burning, lighting and raining to the respective objects viz, the fire, the sun and the clouds and to allot various functions to the living beings also". "All the physical and psychical activities (of the world) are maintained, because there exists behind them the Atmà whose nature is eternal intelligence and which is the ultimate ground of all".]

It is for this reason that the Prāna is called as an instrument of the Self for the accomplishment of all purposes or ends in—

''प्राणो राजमन्त्रिवत् सर्व्वार्थकरणभूतः, न स्रतन्तः" (ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, २. ४. १०).

["The Prana is not an independent principle, it is an instrument which the Self employs for the realisation of all its Purposes or Ends (पर्य) as a minister is employed by a king."]

^{*} माति अन्तरीचे असिति-इति।

[†] It is "Sutra"—because like a piece of thread it passes through all the elements of the universe and binds them all.

VII

The Vedantic Prana:

Part III.

-:0:--

The Prāna is identified with the Ajnāna (प्रजान) or Avidyā, and hence Ajnāna in Vedānta is not a mere Subjective notion.—

(4) We have found that the term Māyā is used in Vedānta with regard to the world, both in its undeveloped and developed conditions. But there is another term 'Avidyā or Ajnāna (false knowledge) which is often employed in this connection. But this has, unfortunately, led to a serious misconception. There are people who regard the world to be due to our Ajnāna—a subjective idea of the individual Soul.

A distinction is to be made between the Individual sense of Avidyá and the cosmic sense of Avidyā. The individual Avidyā or Ajnāna is what Sankara has called as fundamental Adhyāsa (अधार), under whose influence we superimpose the world of nāmarūpa on Brahma, and Brahma becoming thus concealed from our view, we look upon the world of nāmarūpa as a Self-sufficient, separate (अन्य, खतेन्त्र) and independent entity. As Sankara has observed—"नाम-इयोपाधिदृष्टिरेव भवति खाभाविकी" (Vide: विश्वार भारती

3.5.1). But Avidyā has got another sense in Vedānta. It is used in the sense of आवरण i. e. self-concealment or self-limitation of Brahma. The Supreme Self has partially concealed Himself by creating or manifesting the world of nāma-rūpa, as the Upanishad declares—"देव: एक: खमाइणात् तन्तुभि: प्रधानजें:)",—and Sankara explains—"नाम-रूप-क्योभि: आयानमावत्वान्" (Vide. खे॰, 6. 10); i. e. "by names and forms and actions the Self covered Himself.". It is the 'cosmic Avidyā' and it is equivalent to Māyā (माया) or the Frāna (प्राण) described in Lecture V.

Now, take the following passages-

(1) ''ईश्वरस्थ चात्मभूते इव 'चविद्या-कल्पिते' नामरूपे संसार-प्रपचनीन-भूते...मायाणिकः प्रकृतिरिति...चिमलप्ये ते, ताथ्या मन्यः' * सर्व्ये ईश्वरः।" (ह० भा० 2. 1. 14).

ি "The names and forms are constructed or produced (কৰিব, কাব) by Avidyā. They are, as it were, the self or nature of Iswara…are called Màyà-sakti or Prakriti…Iswara is distinct from these names and forms."]

(2) "...' अविद्यात्मिका'हि सा वीजशिक्तरव्यक्तशब्दिनिहें ख्या परमेश्वरा-श्रया मायामयी" (ब्र० स्० भा०, 2. 2. 8.).

["The seed-potency (vija-sakti) of the world whose self or essence is Avidyà, is indicated by the term Avyakta (unevolved) and its substratum is the Supreme Iswara."]

In the two passages quoted above, Avidyā cannot be taken as the 'Individual Avidyā'; for, the Avidyā inherent in an individual Soul cannot be held to produce nāma-rūpa, cannot be the cause of the whole material world including our body, senseorgans etc. Here, avidyā must denote the 'cosmic'

^{*} Also cf. ''नामरूपाभ्यामीत्मनोऽन्यत्वाध्युपगमान्''...' 'छत्पत्तिप्रलयात्मके हि नान-रूपे, तदिलच्याच ब्रद्धा'' (ह० आ०, 2. 1 20),

avidyā or Māyā which is the cause of the material world.

The term avidyā has, thus, two different uses in the Sankara-bhāsya. The 'individual avidyā' is what Sankara has called as 'fundamental Adhyāsa' under whose influence we superimpose the differences of the world of nāma-rūpa on Brahma. But avidyā has also been used in the sense of what may be called 'cosmic' avidyā or Māyā or Prakriti, as we have stated above. The former is false and may be destroyed by Vidyā (true knowledge); but the latter is not so. The Vidyā or true knowledge annihilates the avidyā or the ignorance of an individual and sublates for him the world imposed on, or identified with, Brahma—

"श्रविद्याध्यस्तः ब्रह्मणि एकस्मित्रयं प्रपञ्चः विद्यया प्रविलाप्यते" (ब्र॰ भा॰, 3. 2. 21.)

But this Vidyā is quite powerless with regard to the 'cosmic avidyā' which is the causal seed of the world of nāmā-rūpa, which latter continues to subsist after the Mukti of the Jiva or the individual Soul. *

This distinction, in use between the 'individual avidyā' and the 'cosmic avidyā' or Māyā shows conclusively that the world born of the latter is not a mere Subjective appearance. The world does

^{*} In a letter addressed to the author, Dr. H. Jacobi of the university of Bonn, Germany has rightly pointed out this distinction of cosmic and individual Avidya, but he has drawn from it a conclusion entirely different from the conclusion reached here.

not vanish into nothingness the moment the individual Soul attains Mukti. All that is involved in the attainment of Mukti is the displacement of the false outlook (अविद्याध्यक्तं) by the true one, and not the annihilation of the world. The final realisation of Bāmadeva who declared his inner conviction by saying—"बहुं मनुरमनं सूर्यम् " &c. &c. does not show that Manu, Suryya &c. disappeared from the world. But since the world is not due to our individual avidyā, its only locus is Brahma;—the false error of 'independent being' of the world—what may be called the 'fundamental Adhyāsa'—this alone disappears in the Mukti and not the world itself.

Here, in the quotation of the passage marked (1), the world of नामरूप is described as श्रातमूत of Iswara; but Iswara is described different from, distinguished from, and independent of, the world of nāma-rūpas—"ताभ्यामन्य: मर्ळेज्ञ देश्वर: ।" This part of the commentary clearly shows that the world of names and forms cannot be our subjective construction. What does our mental construction really signify? It means that in the place of the Supreme Self our mind and our senses have constructed a world of nāma-rūpa, that there does not appear to us the Supreme Self at all, that it is completely concealed by the distorted view which has taken possession of us, that the Supreme Self is entirely reduced to the world of names and forms. Such is the influence of our 'individual avidyā' or false knowledge. Everywhere, before us and behind us, only the differences of nāma-rūpas

appear and Brahma becomes concealed from our view. The world of nama-rupa is thus viewed by us as something separate (स्वतन्त्र), self-existent. self-sufficient, independent entirely ("नामरूपोपाधि-दृष्टिरेव भवति खासाविकी")। But it is not a real view. The world is not really the construction of our mind. There is the Supreme Brahma who underlies the differences of nama-rupa, without being affected by them. * The differences of namarūpa cannot really conceal Brahma. These are to be taken as the manifestation or expression of His nature and they cannot, therefore, be taken as sômething different (अन्य), as some self-existent, self-sufficient entity †. Brahma is distinct from them, since they cannot be taken as a complete expression of His nature. He stands beyond the world of nāma-rūpa; He transcends it, yet he is immanent in it. This is the significance of the sentence-"ताभ्यामन्य: सर्वेच देखरः"। If the world of nāma-rūpa were simply the mental construction of the finite Self, no distinction in that case could be made between Brahma and the world. The fact is, while it is neces-

^{*} Maya in Vedánta is to be looked upon as ábarana (Indi vidual sense) and Vikshepa (cosmic sense); i. e. both as concealment and projection. In Mukti of jiva, the former only disappears, while the latter remains.

^{&#}x27;'आवरण-विचेपश्रित्रद्यविशिष्ट'मजानं'—कूटख्य नगत्कारणलोपाधिः''—रा• तीर्थं in वे॰ सा॰।

^{† &#}x27;'चत्पत्थादिश्वतीनामैकात्मग्रावगमपरत्वात्...न बासां निराकाङ्गार्थप्रतिपादनसामध्य-मिल्ति' (त्र॰ भा॰ 4. 3. 14).

cf. रामतीर्थ in the Vedanta-Sara—''आल्मश्रातिले न ततः पार्धगर्धग्रायोगात् ... प्रथम् सत्ताऽयोगात्'।

sary to distinguish the world from God, it is equally necessary to distinguish it from illusion or Subjective phantasm.

(a) Rāmatirtha's view on Ajnāna (ignorance)-

In commenting on the celebrated Vedānta-Sāra, Rama-tirtha, that most learned interpreter of Sankara has established the important position that Ajnāna (মন্ত্ৰাৰ) must not be understood in the sense of subjective notion—of an individual Soul. What he says, I shall quote here—

"भिय्याज्ञानजन्यसंस्तारः अज्ञानं, असत्प्रकाश्चनश्चित्ते असिंहा प्रति सतदयं निरस्यति"।

["Two doctrines about the Ajnana are to be rejected; viz. that Ajnana or ignorance is an *impression derived from false cognition*, and that it is non-existent (i. e. something merely negative)".]

["The author", says Ramatirtha, "now rejects the alternative that ignorance (মনাৰ) is an erroneous cognition and a quality of the Soul".

His argument is stated below-

''सत्त-रज-समीलचणास्त्रयी गुणाः, कारणमव्याक्ततात्मकम् 'स्रज्ञानं' विरुपेण विगुणात्मकं। तथाच, गुणस्य गुणवत्तानुपपत्ते ने मिथ्याज्ञानम्—'स्रज्ञान'मिलार्थः।"

["By reason of the three constituent elements—Satwa, Rajas and Tamas—in the products, the cause—Ajnāna—also is composed of these three constituents. Since, therefore, a quality cannot possess qualities, the erroneous cognition which is a quality of the Soul cannot be ignorance (i. e. Ajnana); for, it possesses the three constituent elements (i. e. objective and not a quality of the Soul.)"]

Thus, refuting the opinion that Ajnana is a subjective quality of the mind, he now goes on to show that it is positive ("MIREQ") and not mere negation; thus—

''ज्ञानाभावीऽज्ञानमिति मतं निरस्रति''।

[i. e. "He refuses the view that ignorance is mere absence of knowledge"].

Then giving reasons in favour of the positive character of Ajnāna, he establishes the fact that it is a sort of relative entity and thus concludes—

''देवस्य स्वयंप्रकाथस्य भात्मनः शक्तिमत्-परतन्तां स्वयुणैः सत्तादिभिः निग्दा-माजिङ्गितां...भपस्यन्...ब्रह्मणो स्वप्रकाथत्वे न 'श्रतिः' प्रकाथते' इति, तिहपरीत-स्ववहारस्य भात्मिन 'भावरण'मन्तरेण भनुपपत्तिः''

That is to say-

["They beheld the power (मिल) of Atma self-illuminant, subject to its possessor, embraced by three constituent—satwa—rajas—tamasunless the Soul were enveloped (मानत), there could not exist the practical assurance—'It is not', 'It shines not'—contradictory to another assurance—'It is', 'It shines'—in the constant self-illumination of the Supreme Spirit' (Gough's translation)].

This 'आवरण' or अज्ञान is explained as तम: with a slight admixture of रजः and सन्त.

(b) Sankara's own view on Ajnana-

Now, I shall show that Sankara himself identified Ajnāna with the Prāna-Sakti in his Māndukya-bhāsya. And this, I think, would be a conclusive proof about the objectivity of Ajnāna. In describing the condition of Pralayā (and the dreamless susupta state of the finite Self), we find the following observation in Sankara's Brahma-Sutra-bhāsya:—

''निष्याचानप्रतिवद्वा विभागप्रतितरनुमास्यते—चपौताविष ; एतेन सुज्ञानां पुनवत्पत्तिप्रसङ्घः प्रतुप्रज्ञः, सस्यग्द्वानेन निष्याचानस्य चपोदितत्वात्'' (त्र० स्० भा०, 2.1.9).

["So in Pralaya (at the dissolution of the world) the presence of a causal potency of differences—with which the Ajnana or false notion is bound up—must be inferred. By this, the possibility for the re-appearance of those, who have already been released is precluded, since their 'false notion' or Ajnana (which binds to samsāra and causes difference) has been destroyed by true knowledge"].

But let us see how Sankara expresses himself in describing a similar condition in his Māndukyabhāsya:—

"वीजात्मकलाभु प्रयम्भात् सतः। जीवप्रसव—(सर्व्वपदार्धजातस्य उपलचणं — भा० गि०)—वीजात्मकलमपरित्यज्यैव प्राणशब्दलं सतः।.... निवीजतयैव चेत्, सित प्रजीनानां सुष्ठित-प्रजययोः पुनरुत्यानानुपपत्तिः सुक्तानाञ्च पुनरुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गः, वीजाभावाविशेषात्" (मा० गौष्ड-का० भाष्य, 1.2 Karika).

["We are to understand the term Sat (47) as containing the causal seed. The term 'sat' denotes prana, without leaving out the sense of its causal potentiality which is productive of all objects..... If we abandon the idea of this causal seed, then the possibility for the re-appearance of even those who have already been emancipated will arise, along with those not emancipated; since no productive causal seed exists."]

In comparing the two passages quoted above it would be seen, what Sankara described by the term Ajnāna-Sakti in the Brahma-Sutra-bhāsya, is the same as what he called by the term प्राप-वोज—Prāna-vija (the causal seed of Prána) in the Māndukya-bhāsya. The Ajnāna or ignorance being bound up with the causal seed of Prāna, it is clearly an objective matter and not merely a Subjective notion. This aid is the cosmic seed or the Prāna-energy of the Sat. Thus we find that according to Sankara the world cannot be a subjective notion of the mind of man. It is called Ajnāna, because it is the other i. e. opposite (fautia) of sign or the absolute Knowledge.

In this connection it would be instructive to mention what रामतीर्ध has said about this Ajnāna in his gloss on the वेदान्तसार—''समष्ट्राज्ञान'मव्याक्षतं', तदुपहितः देखरः; तदुभयात्रयम् चनुपहित'मचरणब्दवाच'' चिमान' अव्याक्षतात् विचचपः तत्माची चिद्यातुः"। We give here Gough's translation of this passage—

["The avyākrita (the undifferentiated world) is the collective aggregate of Ajnāna; what accompanies this Avyākrita (or the collective Ajnāna) is (called) Iswara. And the substratum of both (i. e. of the Ajnāna and God), viz, Pure Intelligence designated by the term Akshara is the witness of that which is undifferentiated (Avyākrita)"].

Here, I should like to call your attention to the concluding remarks of Sankara—

''सवीजलाभुग्रवममेनेव सतः प्रायल्वयपदियः, सर्वेश्वतिषु च कारणलव्यपदियः। ...नेति नेति च वीजवन्तापनयनेन च व्यपदियः''।

Sankara also adds further down there that-

''इतरान् सर्व्व भावान् प्राणो वीजात्मा जनयति'' (6 Karika).

"चे तोंऽयवो ये तान् पुरुष: पृथक् स्जिति विषय-भावविलचपान्"।

["It is this causal seed of Prana which is the productive cause of all objects of the world"].

["But the finite Souls have come out from the Absolute Spirit directly".]

We see from all these that the Ajnana is not a Subjective idea, but an objective seed or matter

which is described by Rāmatirtha as "coloured by the potentiality of all effects" ("समस्तकाथैसंस्कारीप-रिचान")।

(c) Ananda-giri's view-

Anandagiri first of all raises the following very clear objection—

''नतु अनायनिर्व्याच'मज्ञानं' संसारस्य 'वीजभूतं' नासीयन, निम्याज्ञान-तत्मं सारायामज्ञानशब्दवाचलान्" ?

["If some one urges the objection that since the word Ajnana means false mental conception and its impression, there does not exist Ajnana as the beginningless causal seed of the world"].

Anticipating this objection, Anandagiri gives his own conclusion on the subject thus—

''ब्रतः 'खवादानले न' बजान-सिंडिः—

["Thus our conclusion is that—the beginningless Ajnana is established as the material cause of the world and it is not a

subjective mental idea"-Gloss on Mandukya bhasya 1. 6.]

That there is a matter which is transformed into the differences of the nāma-rūpa of the world is thus stated by Anandagiri in another place on another occasion—

"परिवामितात् तस्य 'परिवास्युपादानं' वक्तव्यं। तत्र वियदादैः परिवामित-मङ्गीक्रत्य चत्र्याक्रतं 'परिवास्युपादान'मिक्ति'।—

["As the world is always modified, it must have a modifiable material cause. Taking into consideration the fact that the Ether and others are always transformed from one state to another, we hold that there exists a transformable material cause of the world in the state of Avyakta (prior to its differentiations or transformations."]

Another argument in favour of Ajnána being the

matter of the world is-

''ज्ञानदाद्य वीजा'भावे ज्ञानानवंकाप्रसङ्गः"

[i.e. "If the existence of a 'causal' seed which can be burnt by (the fire of) perfect knowledge is not admitted, all instructions about the perfect knowledge (विद्या) would become useless".]

In bringing this discussion about the Prāna to a close it may not be out of place to mention here an important fact in this connection. In some places in the commentaries of Sankara, we come across two kinds of Nitya (निस्त्र)—the one is called utula-निस्त्र and the other क्रम्-निस्त्र। The Parināmi-Nitya is defined as that which while changing incessantly in its states retains a kind of continuous identity of being, as in the following passage—

ें ''विक्रियमाणमपि तृत्-प्रत्ययानिव्रक्तेर्नित्य'" (व॰ भा॰, 1. 4. 7).

["That is called নিঅ which can be recognised as identical with itself through the successive changes of its states".]

But the Kutastha-Nitya is what stands beyond change, eternally existing without changing its nature. This is the Supreme Self—

''इदश्च जूटख्यनित्यं सब्वैविकियारिहतं निरवयवम्'' (त्र० भा०, 1. 1. 4).

["It is devoid of any change, without parts".]

In Sankara's commentary on the Chhāndogya Upanishad the remarks made by him about the Prāna leaves no doubt in our mind that he considered it as a Parināmi Nitya, and the Supreme Reality which constitutes the truth of the Prāna and stands beyond it as its ultimate Principle is the Kutastha Nitya.

Thus he describes the Prana here-

''सर्ज्ञ' क्रिया-कारक-फलभेदजातं प्राच एव ; त प्राचाद वहिमू तमिल'

(सा॰ भा॰, 7, 15).

["It is Prāna consisting of all varieties of differences bound up in the relation of cause and effect which may be described as विकारावतवझ, and outside of this Prāna nothing exists".]

The Prāna is not the ultimate reality, since all phenomenal changes take place within this Prāna, and to this Prāna "are fastened all differences, as the spokes are fastened to the nave (of a wheel)". But "there is a Spirit greater and higher than this Prāna", and "he who realises this Spirit is the true Ati-vādi (प्रतिवादी), not he who knows merely the nature of the Prāna".

VIII

Why is Maya Called So?

-:0:-

According to the Vedantic theory, no cause exhausts its nature in its effects or the changes which the former successively produces or undergoes. No effects can, either collectively or individually (EHE or EEQUU) entirely manifest or express the nature of the cause; or in other words, the cause cannot be resolved into its effects or the sumtotal of the effects does not constitute the nature of the cause. The cause evolves the changes, it lives in each of its effects, it supports them, but cannot be identified with any of them. The cause, because it is universal, cannot be confined to any particular effect, but passes beyond it to other effects—

''न कारणस नार्थात्मलं'' (व॰ भा॰—2. 1. 9.)

In its explanation, the author of the Samkshepa-Sāriraka points out that, as the universal cause is present in other particular effects also, any of the particular effects cannot restrict it to itself only—"नाथस परिक्तिस्स, कार्यान्तरेष्वि वर्त्तमानेन कार्यध्येष सम्बन्धभावात्।"

The effects are, in fact, its modes of activity which but imperfectly and incompletely reveal or represent the nature of the cause.—

"अय मन्यसे सुनेदिति 'दभ्र'मेनापि नूनं लं नेत्य ब्रह्मणी रूपं, यदस्य लं यदस्य देनेषु'। (केन॰ 2. I).

''न केवलमध्यात्मीपाधिपरिक्तिस अस ब्रह्मणो रूपं लमस्पं वेद, धदस अधिदैवतीपाधिपरिक्तिस रूपं देवेषु वेख लंतदपि नृनं दसमेव वेखा' (भाषा)।

["Whether in cosmic or psychic objects, the manifestations of Brahma are all limited. These objects, therefore, represent the nature of Brahma very inadequately. Brahma cannot be known in its full form in any of these particular manifestations".]

The cause, therefore, cannot be the sum-total of its effects, but something more.

When the changes appear in the cause; they are sustained by it, and they ultimately merge in it.

The causal Reality is thus the bond of unity of its effects and is distinguished (মন্ত্র) from them—

" 'चविभन्न' विभन्ने पु, विभन्नमिव च स्थितं" (गी॰, 13. 16).

''यदा मूतपृथग्भाव'मेकस्थ'मनुपस्यति' (15. 30).

["It is undivided in different bodies, still it appears to be different in different bodies".]

["All the various classes of beings abide or are centred in the One—in the Self".]

In fact, the effects or the changes are but its reactions produced in the causal Reality in consequence of its relation (संसर्ग) with the external environment.—

''भूतमावास'सर्गस्तु ऋस भवति''

"संसर्गभावे च तत्-लतस्य विशेषविज्ञानस्य अभावात्"

(ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰ 1. 4. 22).

''वपाधि-सम्पर्क-जनित-पृषुध्यमान-(Aroused)-विशेषातानः"

(इ॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 20).

["It (Self) comes into relation with the external elements".]
["In the absence of its relation with the external objects, it cannot have its particular state stimulated by them in it".]

["Its particular states or activities are excited or stimulated in it in consequence of its connection with the things which set a limit to it".]

We find thus that no actions can be produced in an object in the absence of an operative cause (कारक); for, it is the operative cause which stimulates particular activities in an object.

Now, Sankara informs us that what is produced by an operative or stimulating cause (कारक) cannot be the real nature or the essence of a thing; these are its modifications or predicates (विशेषण); and these predicates are the effects of the thing, and these are change-able.—

"न हि कारकार्यचं वस्तुनसत्त्वं। सती विशेष: कारकार्यचः, विशेषस्त्र विक्रिया"; (ते॰ 2. 9.)

And-

"विषयादिसाधन-सम्बन्धवणात्...चनविद्यतः सम्पद्यते" (तै॰ भा॰, २. ४).

The relation between the cause or the nature of a thing and its effects is this:—The effects produced are all আহল or mutually exclusive of one another, but the cause remains identical with itself—uनुगत—behind each of these effects which it permeates or includes within itself.

"सर्वास व श्रवस्थासु प्रत्यभिज्ञावलीन श्रन्यविच्छे दर्भनात्"

(ao mo, 2, 2, 22,)

["In and through its changing series of states, the real cause without break, runs on connected with each state, whose identity is easily recognised".]

It is the cause or the real nature of the thing which pervades its states or qualities which are its predicates; and these predicates which we call effects fall far short of, and are incomplete expressions of, the real Swarūpa of the thing. Take the following passage—

"कत्स्रो हि श्रमी खेन वस्तुरूपेण ग्रह्ममाणः। श्रिस्मन् हि प्राणाद्युपाधिकताः 'विश्रेषाः' प्राणादिकभैज-नामाभिषेयाः ••• एतानि कभैनामानि न कत्स्नात्मवस्त्व-वद्योबकानि" (व्र० भा॰, 1. 4. 7.)—

"In its essential nature, the Self or the Cause is complete. But certain particular activities are produced in it in consequence of its relation with the conditions or limitations (Equit) of Prāna and others. But these particular activities by which we generally designate it cannot express the full nature of the Self". Those who restrict the infinite Atmā to any of its activities or predicates—which are its incomplete expressions—and think them to be the real and complete nature of the Self do not know what the Atmā really is. But we usually, in this way, take the world of nāma-rūpas as the complete manifestation of God's nature. But this is wrong. It is done by us under the influence of Māyā.

We shall now proceed to collect the passages where and how Sankara has found occasion for declaring the unreality (मायामयत्व) of the world of Nāma-rūpas—

(1) "दृष्ट-नष्ट-खरूपलात्···स्ररूपेण श्रनुपाख्यलात्" (व ॰ सू॰, भा ॰ 2. 1. 14).

We have seen generally that the effects or the Nāma-rūpas cannot be independent entities; for, they cannot appear separated or divided from their cause. The names and forms are the modifications or transformations of the causal reality. These modifications we call as effects. The modifications or changes are the characteristics (सभाव or सक्ष) of all Nāma-rūpas (Vide: ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2. 3.7). But these modifications are perpetually changing. They have no independent and self-sufficient Swarupa—स्त्रूपेण प्रनुपाख्यलात्। The names and forms are seen one moment and vanish in the next; they are, therefore, perishable, not constant (अनित्य)*. Sankara declares these characteristics of the changing Nāma-rūpas as—इष्ट-नष्ट-सङ्ग्र। Elsewhere he characterises them as — "कदबीस्तअवदसारं।" What persists in these Vikāras, what is constant behind these modifications is the being of the causal reality, which finds its expression in them; and these forms are not to be perceived apart from the being of the causal reality—"व्यतिरेकेण अभाव:"। But as the being of the causal reality lies hidden from our view, we take these modifications of Nama-rupas, these vikāras, as self-sufficient entities. We forget that the vikāras cannot be self-sufficient 'things'—"ৰ হি 'वस्तुवृत्ते न' विकारो नाम कश्चिद्स्ति" (ब्र॰ भा॰ 2.1.14). Looked in this way, separated from the underlying, hidden, causal reality,—the modifications of changing Nāmarūpas must be unreal, false.

[&]quot; 'प्रतिचवप्रध्व'मान् ... कृद्वीगर्भवदसारान्"—मु॰ भा॰, 1. 2. 12.

(2) "मायामात्रमेतत्...यत् परमात्मनः...अवस्थात्रयात्मना अवभासनम्, रज्वा इव सर्पोदिभावेन"

(ब्र॰ स्र॰ भा॰, 2.1.9).

Under the influence of Avidya, we reduce the underlying Reality into its three states—स्टि-सितau-in which it appears. Or, we entirely reduce the underlying individual Self into its three successive states, namely-waking, dreaming and dreamless slumbering states—which it undergoes daily. We forget the independent existence of the underlying Self which, without being affected by them accompanies these states. By ignoring or forgetting the Reality of the ever-present, underlying, hidden Brahma of which the process of the world of nāma-rūpas is a gradual manifestation or appearance, and by severing the connection of the world with the underlying Brahma, we always come to exclusively occupy ourselves with the continuous process (परिणामि-नित्य) merely, imagining a kind of causal relation among the changing antecedents and consequents (क्रिया-फलाब्सक:) among them; or a relation of means and ends (साध्य-साधनलचणः). But it is a law of phenomenal or scientific causality-here the cause is external to the effect. In this way, forgetting the real cause which lies deeper down, we fix our look upon these changing namarūpas alone and call some nāma-rūpas as the cause and some others following the former as its effect. But the modifications or Vikāras when thus severed from their connection with the underlying Self and looked upon as something having independent reality, cannot be real in themselves; we erroneously call that to be real which is unreal.

''त्रात्मस्वरूपात् 'त्रन्यत्'...'वस्त् न्तरं'...खप्प-माया-मरीचुदकवदसारम्'' (ह॰ भा॰, 3. 5. 1),

"सती'रचले अन्तलम्" (का॰ मा॰, 6. 3. 2).

["The nāma-rùpas, when separated from the Atmā and regarded as something self-sufficient and as an independent entity (বলু লাব), as something quite another (খৰ) from the Atmā,—become as unessential as a dream, as an illusion, as the appearance of water on the shining surface of a desert".]

["When looked upon as something quite other than the Sat (i. e. the underlying Reality), the Vikāras become false".]

Thus, under the influence of our Avidyā, we take the effects separated from, outside of, the causal reality underlying them and working among them,—as something other (प्रच). Sankara would call it a wrong view. This view arises either by separating Brahma altogether from the world of Nāma-rūpas as an unkowable and unknown something (as has been done by Herbert Spencer), or by entirely reducing the nature of the cause (Brahma) to the nāma-rūpas, taking the latter as all in all and ignoring the separate life of the underlying Brahma, altogether (as the Pantheists of the types of the Vrittikāra do);—this is reducing the cause to the effects, against which Sankara has raised his warning voice; thus—

(मा॰ भा॰ 7).

[&]quot;न कारणस्य कार्यात्मलं (अनन्यले ऽपि कार्य-कारणयो:)"--व्र० स्० भा०, 2. 1. 9.

^{(3) &}quot;ज्ञस्तरपाविभेषेऽपि, इतरेतरव्यभिचारात् असत्यत्वं ... सर्व्यत अव्यभिचारात् ज्ञस्तरूपस्य सत्यत्वं ।"

["The changing states (of consciousness) are always variable, liable to perpetual transformations—one state continuously supplanting the other state—but what invariably runs through them all is constant. The variability is the mark of their unreality and persistence is the mark of reality."]

Consciousness is present in each state (of our consciousness), because consciousness is common to all its states. One state excludes the other, but none of the states can exclude consciousness which is present in each of these states. Thus the states being variable are unreal; but consciousness is constant and is therefore real.

Compare in this connection the remark—"ग्रन्था-भवत्यपि ज्ञात्र्ये, न ज्ञातुरन्थथाभावोऽपि, वक्त मानस्रभावतात्" (ब॰ भा॰, 2. 3. 7).

We find the following observation elsewhers—
''सर्कंत दे बुद्धी सन्दे दालस्थेते समानाधिकरसे ;—सन् घटः, सन् पट
इत्यादि। तथोर्घटादिबुद्धिनेप्रभित्तरति, न त सद्द्धिः' (गी॰ भा॰, 2. 16).

["Every fact of experience involves two-fold consciousness (বুলি)—the consciousness of the real (चत्—Universal) and the consciousness of the unreal (चचत्—particulars). Now, that is said to be real of which our consciousness never fails; and that to be unreal of which our consciousness fails".]

Hence, what is fleeting must be unreal, and what

is constant must be real.

In this connection, 1 would draw your attention to the following definition of unreality—

"यदिषया बुद्धियं भिचरति तत्—'असत्' (गी॰ भा॰ 2. 16).

Also— ''यद्रूपेश यद्रिश्वतं तद्रूपं व्यक्षिचरत्—'श्रवत'मितुरचते'' (तै॰ भा॰ 2. 1).

"अतः विकारोऽबतम्"।

["That is 'unreal' of which our consciousness fails i. e.

which is fleeting, not constant".]

["That is 'false' of which the character, determined as it is, fails i. e. which changes in its pre-determined character; therefore, change-ability is falsehood".]

We find, therefore, that change-ability is the mark of unreality.

"नाइं प्रकाशः सर्व्यं योगमाया-समावतः।

मूढ़ीऽयं नाभिजानाति" ॥ (गी॰ भा॰, 7. 25).

["I am not manifest to all, veiled as I am, by Māyā.; the deluded people know not my real nature (Swarúpa)".]

The causal reality always lies hidden from view and it is the changing nāma-rūpas (Vikāras) which are always perceptible to us—"पाक्षतविषयविकारविद्याने: प्रकृतम्" (कढ॰ 2. 12).—It is for this reason that Sankara in several places has defined the changing differences of the world as visible and Brahma which is beyond modifications as invisible—

"दृश्यं नाम विकारो, दर्भनार्धेलात् विकारस्य। न दृश्यम् श्रदृश्यं—श्रविकारः। श्रविकारञ्च ब्रह्म"—

(ते॰ भा॰, 2. 7).

Thus when our view is fixed exclusively upon the changing names and forms which conceal Brahma, and when in this way they are looked upon as something other (प्रच) than Brahma, they become unreal, false. But if we can take these nāma-rūpas as क्रा-लिइ—as expressing the characteristics of Brahma, then such a world of nāma-rūpas cannot be charac-

terised as unreal, because such a world would help us to realise the Absolute Reality—Brahma—'ब्रह्मदर्भनोपायत्वे नैव विनियुच्यते……… न स्वतन्त्रप्रजाय'। "स्वष्टृत्वादि……नामरूपनिवेष्ट्याभिधानादेव……'ब्रह्मालिङ्ग'-मभिद्दितं भवति" (व्र॰ सू॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 41.)

How does the world of Nāma-rūpa conceal the Absolute Reality? Sankara explains it in his commentary on the *Brahma-Sutra* (1. 3. 1.); thus—

Brahma is the ground (आयतन) of the differences of Nāma-rūpa. When we reduce the ground entirely to the world of names and forms, the ground to our, view loses its independent existence and takes the form of the world, and is present now in the form of Nāma-rūpas. In this way, Brahma becomes—"उपाच"—i. e. something composite—"इय' विकियासने सावयवच्च स्थात्" (कउ॰ भा॰). That is to say, Brahma would now appear as an aggregate or sum-total of the differences of nāma-rūpa merely. This is His विशिष्ट रूप। When this happens, only the names and forms are present before us and not anything else. This erroneous view Sankara explains thus in his commentary on the Brihadāranyaka-Upanishad—

''केनचिदस्पृष्टस्तभावमपि सत्, नामरूपक्रतकार्ध्यकरणीपाधिस्यो विवे केन नावधार्थते, नामरूपोपाधिदृष्टिरेव भवति स्वाभाविकी, तदा सर्व्वाँऽयं 'वस्तनरास्तिक-स्ववद्वारः'; — अस्ति चार्य भेदक्रती मिष्यात्र्यवद्वारः' (3. 5. 1). "सप्रपञ्चलं मह्मणः प्रसन्तेत्रतं' (इ० स्० भा०, 3. 2. 21).

["When the Absolute Reality which is always unaffected by anything cannot be discriminated by us from the adjuncts of the finite material and psychical elements produced by the Nāma-rúpas, then it is that our view becomes naturally fixed exclusively upon these finite names and forms and all these

differences of names and forms appear to us as so many independent entities. Thus arises our erroneous view of the differences of the things of our practical life"; "and in this manner the underlying Reality is taken as a composite whole."]

But if, instead of such a view, we can feel and recognise the presence of Brahma everywhere in the world, if the objects are not looked upon as something other than Brahma but as manifestations—expressions—of the nature of the highest reality, this, according to Sankara, is the real view of the world. The idea of Anyatwa () would be supplanted by the idea of the presence of Brahma in all things—as the expression of Brahma everywhere. This is the correct view of the world—

''यदा तु परमार्थहरूरा, परमतत्त्वात् 'श्रन्यत्वे न' तिरूप्यमाणे नाम-रूपे ... 'वस्तु नरे' तत्त्वतो न सः,...तदा परमार्थदर्शंगगोचरत्वं प्रतिपद्यते'' (Ibid, 3. 5. 1.)

''सध्यादिप्रपञ्चस ब्रह्मप्रतिपच्चर्यतां दर्भयति'' (ब्र॰ स्ं॰, भा॰ 1. 4. 14).

"परिणामञ्जतिः...ब्रह्मात्मभावप्रतिपादनार्था" (ब्र॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 27.)

["All the Srutis describing the creation of the world of names and forms, all the Srutis describing the changes or modifications are to be taken only for the purpose of the knowledge, through them, of the nature of the Absolute Reality."]

(5) The differences of nāma-rūpas are called Māyā, since these are all described as আগলুক (accidental), in as much as they are produced by some stimulating cause (কাৰে), in the absence of which they do not appear—"আগলুকীৰ নামহুণিয়" (র॰ মা॰, 4. 4. 5).

As the differences of names, and forms are single (agantuka) or accidental, they appear for a time, work for some time and then disappear and are supplanted by others, in connection with their external causes. But the real nature of a thing is not of such a character;—it is constant, abiding in its own Swarupa or nature which is uniformly the same, as Sankara declares—

''आगनुकं हि वस्तु निराक्रियते, न सक्यं।

न हि बात्मा बागनुकः कस्यचित्, खर्यं सिङ्कलात्'-

(ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2. 3. 7.)

["What is due to some external cause which stimulates it or brings it into being, can be easily repudiated; but not so with the real nature of a thing. The Self is eternally abiding in its own nature and as such, it cannot be got rid of".]

I can put aside the notion of reality of all other things, but I can never be relieved of the sense of my own reality. The differences of nāma-rūpa are the result of the activity of something beyond them; they change their forms with the change of their stimulating cause (कारक-व्यापार). This change-able character of their forms marks them, according to Sankara, as unreal.

In this connection, we must note an important fact. These particular differences which are produced by the action of some accidental (आगत्त) cause, must have a 'nature' underlying these particular differences. For, Sankara tells us in another connection, the production being a sort of activity, it implies the agent of this activity—

"उत्पत्तिश्च नाम क्रिया, सां सकर्त्तृ के व भवितुमर्हित। क्रिया च नाम स्थात्, सकर्त्तृ का चैति—विप्रतिविध्येत"

(ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 18).

["An activity is there," but there is no one who acts,—is contradictory".]

We cannot, therefore, conceive of activity without thinking of something which is active; and activities are referred to definite centres to which they belong and do not fly to and fro. If you resolve the centre entirely into its activity, it would have no nature or character of its own, in virtue of which it maintains a continuity between its past and present. A reference to that which is other than itself (i. e. its कारक) implies a reference to its own Self or its own nature (कर्प). Thus this two-fold relation, to Self and to other-than-Self i. e. कर्प and वाहरूप is essential to all objects (Vide. क्र. स. प्रा., 2. 2. 17.)

(6) The world of nāma-rūpa—বিষয—we represent to us in terms of our own mind and the senses (খল:কাষে). The one involves the other; for, both are of the same nature. Sankara tells us—

"विषय-समानजातीयं करणं मन्यते श्रुतिः, न तु जात्यन्तरं। विषयस्थैव स्वात्मयाइकले न संस्थानान्तरं करणं नाम।...सर्व्यविषयविश्रीषाणामिव स्वात्मविश्रेष-प्रकाशकले न संस्थानान्तराणि करणानि" (व० भा०, 2, 4, 11).

["The Stuti regards our subjective senses as of the same nature with our experienced objects, and not of different essence. The senses are but another form or phase () which the experienced objects have assumed with a view to come to a comprehension of their own nature as the objects of senses. For the manifestation of, or with a view to give expression to, what infinite wealth the objects contain in their own nature,—the objects have taken the forms of the subjective senses".]

The Mundaka also states the same thing in a different way—

'दर्भनयवणमननविज्ञानाद्युपाधिधस्त्रै'राविभू तं सत् लस्यते इदि गुहायां — अनाःकरणे कोषे— सर्व्वप्राणिनां" (2.2.1 & 9.)——

["In the inner and exterior senses of the finite

Selves its nature is expressed through the cognitions of sight, hearing, reflections and intellect—"आवसक्षोप-विद्यानलात्"—which are the places of its expression."]

We thus find that there is no difference in kind between the physical and the organic world. The same reality is present in two different aspects, which are distinguishable from each other, but essentially identical. It appears then that whenever our outer senses and our inner sense (মন: ক্যে) are more and more developed, the aspect of the world (विषय) will change its feature. The world, therefore, as it appears to us at the present moment cannot be taken as rigidly fixed and final in its form. The appearances of the world, as we take it, must therefore be unreal. Our knowledge works with the subject-object relation-"अयमहमिति विषयेण विषयिणः सामानाधिकरण्योपचारात्" (ह॰ HI. 1. 4. 7), or in other words, we are concerned always with Adhyāsa as Sankara would say. Our thought cannot go beyond this relation. It attributes 'what' to 'that'. But that is not the true nature of the Reality. In this way, in Sankara-Vedanta, such relative view of the Empirical world may be called unreal.

Now, all these arguments can be brought to a focus and the conclusion arrived at as the result of this discussion points to the fact that there is an Immutable and Eternal Principle behind the process of the world. The changes going on in the world are not mere capricious variations—"arfu प्रवृत्तिः, उपात्रवृत्तिः वा"—(ब्र॰ प्.॰ 2. 1. 33), nor the dances of mad energies, but an advancement, a methodically gradual

progress—''उत्तरोत्तरमाविस्तरत्वमात्रनः (ए॰ आ॰ आ॰) which the mundane process involves. This regularity (रचना—ब॰ आ॰) proves the presence and working, throughout the process, of such a principle and it is deeper than any such process; for, the process is always changing in its elements. It is that transcendent Principle behind it which is finding its expression in the process. It is wrong therefore to separate the latter from the underlying Principle taking the process of nāma-rūpa itself to be all-in-all. Such a view is an unreal view, according to Sankara. Sankara thus summarises his final opinion—

"As a player (AZ) taking on successive characters upon himself, enacts on the stage the parts of each of these characters in succession but yet retains his own distinct character; so the underlying Causal Unity (मूलकार्यमेन), retaining its own distinct identity, realises itself successively in each of the changing effects produced" (AO HO HI 2. 1. 18. and 1. 3. 19.)

Compare also-

"परमैश्वर एव तेन तेनात्मना श्रवतिष्ठमानी तं तं विकारं सृजति"।

It is He who assumes all these forms, but He does not become changed by these assumed forms under which He appears. For, Sankara quotes here the lines—"यः पृथिको तिष्ठन् पृथिको मन्तरो यमयति " देश्येति" (त॰ भा॰ 2. 3. 13). It is His immanent activity directing and controlling (यमयित) the process of the world and guiding it in its upward progressive path.

This is the true significance of the term Māyā as applied to Náma-rūpas in the Sankara-Vedānta, and of the term Māyāvi applied to the Supreme Reality, who in connection with the Nāma-rūpas appears in various forms.

Herbert Spencer's conclusion that 'we know only the manifestations, but what is manifested is unknown and unknowable to us'—is entirely opposed to Sankara's idea. In Māndukya-bhāsya Sankara tells us that it is the manifestations which enable us to realise the nature of what is manifested, to a certain extent. Were there no manifestations, the underlying Reality would remain quite shut out from our knowledge and would itself be unreal.—

"कार्येण हि लिङ्गेन कारण-ब्रह्मज्ञानार्धे सृष्टियुतीनां ...तचेदसङ्गवेत्, न तेन सम्बन्धधीरिति कारणमिष असदेव स्थात्।"—

It is the manifestations that throw light upon what is manifested; they do not serve any independent purpose or use—"खतन्त्रम अपनी"।

The names and forms, to the ordinary people appear, no doubt, as concealing Brahma and therefore to be something quite other (and) existing on their own account, but the truly initiated know all the while that Brahma itself expresses itself in them.—

''ब्रह्मखरूपावगमाय च त्राकाणादाव्रमयानं कार्यं' प्रदर्शितम्'' (तै॰ 2. 6.)

["The effects beginning from the ether and ending in the sheath composed of Anna are to lead to the apprehension of the nature of Brahma. Only for this end, the evolution of the effects is described".]

(7) I should like to point out another important fact in connection with what has just been stated. In section (6) above, we have shown that the object (विषय) and the subjective senses (इन्द्रिय & अन्त:करण) are essentially of the same nature. Matter and mind are not antethetical and independent substances having nothing in common. If they were absolutely opposed to each other, how could the subject be aware of the object? Consciousness which is a unity involves the knower and the known and must therefore transcend them and at the same time express itself in the two.

"अध्यात्माधिदैवतयोः परस्परोपकार्योपकारकलात्… …एकस्य सत्यस्य ब्रह्मणः संस्थानविभिषी"

(व॰ भा•, 5. 5. 2).

'मामेव उभय-रूपेण—चेत्र-चेत्रज्ञरूपेण—स्थितं विश्वि" (गी॰, 13. 2. नीसकग्रह).

It is thus that the subject is capable of knowing the object, and the object also is capable of coming into relation with the subject. As the same Spirit works in both the subject and the object, the object does not, in reality resist or oppose, but conforms itself to the subject and there is adaptability between the two. As the object or the system of things expresses the Self behind it, it has been possible for our mind to know it, and that nature can respond to the forms of our knowledge, and that nature serves the purpose (पार्थ) of the Spirit. Thus we find that the elements from the inorganic world are absorbed by the organic beings

which become constituents in their life—"भूतानां यरीरारभकतं न उपनारात्" (मध्विद्या in इ॰ भा॰). If we take the object not as परार्थ i. e. not serving the purpose of the Spirit, and not mutually benefitting each other (परसरोपकार्योपकारकलात् 'मध्ल"—इ॰ भा॰) but as opposed and independent entities, Sankara would declare it to be unreal and false.

Sankara-Vedanta is not Pantheism.

-:0:-

From a perusal of Sankara's commentaries, it appears that a kind of Pantheism was current in his time and it went by the name of one Vrittikāra who held it. He reduced unity to multiplicity—Brahma or the Self to the changing nāma-rūpas. In this view, Brahma was looked upon as the whole and the differentiations of names and forms including the finite Spirits, as parts of that whole—as modes of its self-expression—as mere reproduction of the whole. Thus the Vrittikāra made Brahma as composed of parts—unama I But yet, most inconsistently, he looked upon both the unity and the multiplicity to be equally real. * He failed to develop the logical consequences of his own premises.

Sankara, in several parts of his commentaries on some of the most important Upanishads and on the *Brahma-Sutra* and on the *Gitā* has criticised this theory. He put the theory to severe test and exposing its inconsistency and inaccuracy, exploded it. It cannot, in the face of such criticism, be held that Sankara's own theory is no more than Pantheism, as

^{*} Vrittikara's view has been thus stated by Sankara in ब॰ भा॰, 5. 1. 1.—"एवच हैताहैतात्मकमिकं ब्रह्म। यथा किल ससुद्री जल-तरङ्ग-फेन-बुहुदा-त्मक एव; यथा च जलं सत्यं, तदुइवास तरङ्ग-फेन-बुहुदास्यः ससुद्रात्मभूता एव.....पर-मार्थसत्य एव' &c. &c. So also in other places.

stated by some of his critics. We would quote here the opinions of one or two of such critics:—

The writer of the "Indian Theism" thus observes—
"India has always been recognised as so determinedly Pantheistic in its religious thoughts that 'Indian Theism' will seem to many an unnatural collocation of words. There are some who will maintain that whatever can be so described is really foreign to the Indian spirit."

Yet another-

"The later doctrine of Sankara may be named Pantheism—strange as its pantheism is—for it says that Brahma is all, because all but Brahma is false."

Dr. Flint in his "Ante-Theistic Theories" says-

"In the Pantheism of the Vedānta doctrine the finite is lost in the Infinite. Along with the affirmation of an impersonal God, there is the negation of the reality of the worlds—both of sense and consciousness. In other words, the issue of this kind of Pantheism is a-cosmism. But Pantheism is just as likely to issue in atheism."

Dr. Galloway writes-

"Even the distinction of worshipper and worshipped dwindles and fades, till the Hindu thinker recognised that he was one with All, with Brahma. The very appearance of difference is explained away, it is the product of illusion. The Vedanta is a strict Pantheism"

To show the injustice made by these and other writers of their train, I should like to give here the tenour of Sankara's criticism of this Pantheism from which it will be seen that Sankara can never be held

to be a Pantheist and it was something very different from Pantheism which he preached and wrote.

I have said that the Vrittikāra reduced the unity (Brahma) into the differences of nāma-rūpa. Sankara in his criticism of this theory of the Vrittikāra argues that when the differences emerge, the underlying unity does not and cannot become entirely reduced to them. It retains its unity, its own character, its separate substantial life, behind these differences. As the plurality of the nāma-rūpa arises, the unity does not become something else, losing its own nature in them.—

''यह मंको यः पदार्धः प्रमाणेनावगतो भवति, स देश-कालावस्थानिरेष्वपि तह मंक एव भवति, स चैत् तह मंकलं व्यभिचरति, सर्व्यः प्रमाण-व्यवहारो लुपेग्त''

(इ॰, भा॰, 2. 1. 20).

["When by all manner of proofs a thing is known to be of such and such essential nature, it cannot lose that essential nature, through the change or alteration of its place, time and states. If its essential nature changes, all proofs will lose their validity."]

And also-

"न हि विशेषदर्शनमात्री स वस्तु न्यलं भवति...स एवेति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात्"

(ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 18.)

["The appearance of a thing in a particular form does not make it something other than it.....it is recognisable as the same identical thing—in this changed form."]

It is forgotten that what is composite, what is सावयव cannot be eternal for, being composed of parts, it must be perishable—Vikāri—''सावयवस्य अनेकात्मकस्य क्रियावतो नित्यत्वान्पपत्ते:" (व॰ भा॰, 5. 1. 1). The unity of which the Vrittikāra still speaks of is an abstract unity, a mere empty logical abstraction-a mere unity of aggregate. For, the so-called unity has now no existence except in the form of multiplicity; because it has no nature by which it is recognisable apart from the many. It is a contentless abstract idea in general. Hence, argues Sankara, it cannot be held to be real. It is a mere unity of collection, aggregate of parts. And the parts, -the differences-(of which the whole is a mechanical aggregate of disconnected parts) with no organising principle behind to connect them would be an unreality. For, mere differences, haphazard changes, with no purpose-no plan-no end-to govern them and to connect them are unreal, according to Sankara. He says-

"न हि 'निरात्मकं' किश्वित् व्यवहाराय अवकल्पते"_

["What has no self or nature behind it cannot be put to any use in practical life".]

The finite selves also, being, according to Vritti-kāra's view, mere phases or reproductions of an indeterminate whole have no real life, no character, of their own. Mere parts unrelated to, and separated from, any organising unity behind them are, in Sankara's opinion, unreal.

In this way, Sankara has shown that both the unity and multiplicity cannot be held to be equally real, as the Vrittikāra supposes in his own theory.

Sankara shows in the following extracts that "it is a self-contradiction to speak of Brahma as possessed of all specific attributes (Multiplicity) and at the same time as devoid of all specific attributes (Unity)"—

"निह एकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्मेवन्तं तद्रहितत्वच गकां प्रतिपत्तुं ... निह कूटस्थस्य ब्रह्मणः ... भनेकधर्मा-ययतं सम्भवति (ब्र॰, 2. 1. 14).

"विशिष्टशिक्तमस्वप्रदर्शनं विशेषप्रतिषेधस इति , विप्रतिषिद्ध" (गी॰ भा॰, 13.12).

"कथम् एकस्य त्रात्मनः त्रयमायाद्यतीतत्वं, तदस्वच्च — इति विरुद्धभौसमवायित्वसिति'' (व्र॰ भा॰, ३. ५. १.) "न हि एकं वस्तु परमार्थतः कन्नीदिविशेषवत्, तच्छृन्यच्च — इतुरभयथा द्रश्ट्' शकाते" (तै॰ १. १२).

But in Sankara's Adwaita-Vāda no such absurdity as noticed above may arise. In his own theory, the 'One' is the Reality which has a 'nature' of its own, which is self-sufficient and independent (अत: चिड), and which is permanent, eternal and which for ever retains its own uniform character, and it is not subject to any change, any transformation. It is Brahma who has taken upon Himself the various forms of नाम-इप, who has assumed the form of this world with a view to reveal, to a certain extent, the infinite and inexhaustible treasure which His nature contains. And the world of nāma-rūpas—although distinguishable from Him, being a partial expression of Himself,—cannet be taken as a separate and independent whole.—

"धदात्मक नामक्षे ... यस तामां नामक्षाम्यां विलचणः, खतो नित्यग्रह-बुड्युक्तस्वभावः" (ह०, भारू, 1. 4. 7).

"न हि सप्ट' सप्टु 'रर्थानारं'; तस्यैव तेन तेन रूपेण भायाविवत् अवस्थानात्" (हु भा-चा । गिरि, 1, 4, 5).

["Names and forms have their essence in Brahma and are therefore non-different from it......But Brahma is different from these names and forms."]

["The created (world) is not something different and not a separate entity from the Creator; for, it is the Creator Himself who stands in the forms of such and such objects, like a juggler (मायानी) who shows himself under different assumed forms,—without being affected or altered by these objects or forms".]

With a view to impress upon us this fact, the Srubi declares—"रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो—'विश्वयं"—(विश्वयं—i.e. स्वेन प्रविक्षतेन रूपेण प्राकाणवत्")—कठ॰ भा॰, 5. 10.

"He has Himself assumed the forms of the innumerable Nāma-rupas, but yet He stands beyond them; that is to say—this world is to be regarded as only a very partial and inadequate expression of the infinite and unfathomable depth of His resources, and thus the world is distinguishable from Him, though it is not a separate or a different (4-2) entity"—

"'यथैव हि ब्रह्मणो जगदुत्पत्ति: यूयते, एवं विकारव्यतिरेक्षणापि ब्रह्मणोऽ-वस्त्रानं * यूयते" (ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 2, 1. 27).

["As the world has come out of Brahma, so also Brahma stands beyond the world distinguished from it".]

^{*} cf. ''यस चालानोऽपगमे चणमात्रात् कार्य-करणकलापरूपं सर्व्वनिदं इतवलं विध्वसं भवित विवष्टं भवित, 'सोऽन्यः' सिन्ध चाला'' (काउ॰ भा॰, 5.4). Brahma is thus the sustaining ground of the modifications of नाम-रूपs, which, if removed from behind them,—will leave all these immediately annihilated.

Sankara asks—"why has Brakma taken upon Himself the various forms of names and forms"?—

"किमधें पुन: प्रतिरूपागमनं तस्य इतुरचते"?

He thus answers-

'बिदि हि नाम-इषे न व्याकियेते, तदा अस्यातानो निरुपाधिकं इपं प्रज्ञान-घनास्यं न प्रतिख्यायेत।.....यदा पुन: नामक् पे...व्याक्तते भवतः, तदा अस्य इपं प्रतिख्यायेत'' (व॰ भा॰, 2. 5. 11).

["If there were no unfolding of the names and forms in the world, there would be no manifestation of the Absolute which is eternal consciousness in its nature...Through the unfolding of the names and forms, His nature became manifested, His consciousness found its expression."]

The नामक्ष which are the multiple expressions of the nature of Brahma cannot, therefore, be independently real; but they are real only in connection with the unity of Brahma of which they are the expressions. It follows, therefore, that the 'unity' is the true reality. A thing cannot be both 'one' and 'multiple' in its true nature. If it be one, it cannot be manifold. If it be manifold, it cannot be The relation between the unity and the one. multiplicity—is not like the temporal relation of succession which obtains between the antecedent and its consequent phenomena. The unity stands unaffected amidst the multiplicity. It is a relation, says Sankara, like the relation of a piece of rope and the serpent appearing upon it.

"रज्जादेक्रगायै: सम्बस्वदस्य द्श्यसम्बसः"

(Sankara's Swātma-Nirupana, 72).

Also-

"रज्जामिन सपै:" (खे॰ भा॰, 1. 6).

That is to say, Sankara's idea is that there is an intimate relation between the two, yet the unity stands behind the multiplicity of names and forms unaffected by it. The unity connot be reduced to the multiplicity. The Vrittikāra, Sankara thinks, was possessed by a feeling of Divine immanence, rather than Divine transcendence. The world, to him, was the direct representation of the Divine. He was satisfied with looking upon uninflature (relation of identity or co-ordination) between God and the world.

(1) Sankara in numerous places has employed certain illustrations to bring out the relation between the Absolute Reality Brahma and its appearances of THEU! Some of the illustrations are—the sea-water and the forms of waves, billows, ripples, bubbles &c., the clay and its successive transformations, viz: the (powders) fragments (TU), the lump (TUS), the pot (TUS) &c.; the tree and its successive developments in the forms of sprouts, branches, flowers, leaves etc. We are not to understand by these illustrations the ordinary phenomenal relations which subsist between the antecedent and consequent states of things.

"न हि जननमरणाद्यनर्थश्रतसङ्खभेदसमाञ्जलं ससुद्रवनादिवत् सावयवं अनेक-रसं ब्रह्म—ध्येयत्वे न चो यत्वे न वा श्रत्या उपदिष्यते" (३० ५. १. १.).

['Nowhere the Sruti holds the nature of sa as composite, as consisting of thousands of differences and distinctions, such as the ocean composed of billows, foams, waves, or as the forest consisting of trees, bushes &c. &c. Such (composite) sa is neither to be known nor to be worshipped,"]

The main purpose of these illustrations is to show that as the real causal substance stands unaffected behind, untouched by the changes; so Brahma as the true causal power remains unaffected as the sustaining ground (মহিছান) of the perpetually changing world of নামহত্ত. * This is the relation between the two.

(2) Every true cause is a centre of power; it is a source of power which is liberated on the occasion of its stimulation by something else. As a cause it is a source of power, but this power is manifested gradually in its activities in successive stages. These activities are its effects which are the result of relation between the Subject and the Object-"विषयेण विषयिण: सामानाधिकरण्योपचारात्" —व॰ 1. 4. 7.—"विषय-विषयिजचणम् अनेकात्मभावगमनम्" -go 4. 5. Both are more than these activities which cannot exhaust them. The Subject or the Object is present in all its manifestations which cannot be resolved into mere changes and which is more than the sum of the changes. Phenomena by themselves are not true causes. Every phenomenon arises out of something which is not a phenomenon. It is wrong to regard phenomena as causes of phenomena and ignore the non-phenomenal power underlying them. Sankara has pointed our attention to this transcendental cause as the true cause. He is not willing to regard the invariable antecedent phenomena as the true causes of. the consequent phenomena. He remarks-

^{• &#}x27;'यनेक धादर्भनापवादाच 'खत्यो: स सतुरमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्चिति' इति... निन्दितत्वात् न द्रष्टत्य'" (व॰ 5. 1.)

"नासावुपस्यमाना पूर्व्वावश्या उत्तरावस्थायाः कारण-मभ्युपगम्यते, श्रनुपस्यमानानामेव श्रनुयायिनां (continued identity) वीजाद्यवयवानां श्रङ्कुरादिकारणभावा-भ्युपगमात् (ब॰ स्॰, 2. 2. 26).

"After the disappearance of the antecedent state, the consequent state is produced; but we do not wish to regard the former as the cause of the latter. The true cause rather is that which cannot disappear or change its character, which remains identical with itself, and is constantly present in all the stages."

The phenomenal cause is no true cause; for what we call as cause is really the effect and not a cause at all. It is rather the expression in time of the true cause which transcends time-order, which is beyond time. It can originate effects in nature by itself, not as a result of, or determined by, any antecedent in time-series. In empirical effect, its ground must always be a past phenomenon, but the true transcendental cause does not follow the order in time. It is outside the time-series.

(3) The relation of the underlying principle to the objects is not the same as the relation of one of the objects to others. The principle of unity through which the objects are related to one another is not one of them and is not itself subject to the relations of which it is the source. The phenomenal causal determination is determination from without; but Brahma is not external to the world and cannot, therefore, be the cause or effect of it. Brahma and the world are not external to each other; but the world is the aspect of the nature of Brahma; neither

of these has the nature of its own apart from the other—"यसति श्रायमः प्रविभन्ने वस्तुन्तरे, श्रमति च श्रायमि ततः प्रविभन्ने"—ह॰ 4.3.31. The world is a self-expression of Brahma and is, therefore, non-different (श्रमच) from it, has no real existence apart from Brahma—"सतोऽन्यत्वे श्रमृतत्वम्"।

(4) Here in this connection I would invite your attention to the story found in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad of king Ajāta-satru and Vālāki. King Ajāta-satru of Benares was a real রয়র ; he corrected the misconception of a Brahmin youth named Vālāki who like a Pantheist seems to have resolved all individuals into a mere tissue of relations and qualities within a whole. He divided the objects of the world into three main classes—ग्राधिदैविक (cosmic), श्राधि-भौतिक (physical or material) and आध्यात्मिक (psychical); and he seems to have thought that a general mind (प्राच) is entirely: immanent in all objects and minds, and so, it means that apart from its presence in the minds of the individuals, it would have no existence, nor can individuals have any being in themselves apart from the general mind. You cannot say that "I" have an individuality of my own or a definite purpose of my own; for, "I" am nothing else than a particular modification of Prana-the whole, and "I" represent Prana in some difinite aspects. The individuality of myself as well as of others is only apparent -the result of reciprocal relation and connection which give a meaning and place within the whole. All those objects-the sun, the moon, the cow, the man &c. which, in this view, are mere phases of the पाण-ब्रह्म, are but the manifestations of one Brana in

some determined phase. For it is the Prana which is entirely immanent in each of us. In this way Vālāki took all the objects as mere phases of Brahma or Prāna. Ajāta-satru corrected this view. In our opinion, Sankarāchāryya did not appear to have abolished the individuals. Sankara in his criticism of the Nyaya theory of causality, has incidentally shown that all objects have a सक्य and a बाह्य-क्य or HERE :- that is to say, the objects must be something for themselves ere they can be something to one another. The connection of individuals shows that they all depend on a common ground and this makes possible that interaction among themselves—"परस्परीपकार्योपकारकलं ·····तहेकसामान्यानकं एककारपात्मकलं दृष्टम्"। If you assume, like the Pantheists, that the individual is simply its relations, then it may be deprived of any being for itself () in one Identity—in the whole -which comprehends all, where all the elements are determined in relation to one another and to the whole. But, if in one sense, the qualities or universal relations belong to the Reality as a whole, these are grounded in the various activities of individual objects. In this immanent view, the distinctive differences which separate the experiences of one Self from another would be unintelligible. But the Transcendental Principle does not reduce these individual centres to mere appearances, but connects and correlates them so that each may serve the purpose of the whole; yet it allows to each its own functions and activities, as it distinguishes itself

from them and is not lost in the elements it unifies and connects.

(5) Now, we shall invite your notice to some of the places where, and the manner in which, the theory of Pantheism is described and criticised and refuted by Sankara—

(a) Brahma-Sutra, II. 1. 14-

''नतु चनेकात्मकं ब्रह्म। यथा वचीऽनेकणाखः, एवमनेकण्रिक्तप्रवृत्तं ब्रह्म। चतः एकतः नानात्मञ्च उभयमिप सत्यमेव। यथा वच दत्येकतः, शाखा दित च नानातः। यथा ससुद्रात्मना एकतः, फेनबुहुदात्मना नानातः। यथा सद्रात्मना एकतः, प्रवृत्तिमावस्य दृष्टान्ते सत्यात्मना एकतः, घटण्यावाद्यात्मना नानातः।...नैवं स्थात्, प्रवृतिमावस्य दृष्टान्ते सत्यात्मवापात्। (१) न हि एकस्य ब्रह्मणः परिणामधर्मातः तदृष्टितत्वच प्रस्थं प्रतिपत्ते। न हि कूटस्थस्य ब्रह्मणः...चनेकधर्माण्यस्यः सम्भवति। (२) न च यथा ब्रह्मणः प्रतिमत्तदर्णनं भोचसाधनं, एवं जगदाकारपरिणामित्वदर्णन-मिप स्वतन्तसेव कस्य चित् फलाय अवकृत्यते। न हि परिणामिव स्विज्ञानात् परि-णामवस्तमात्मनः फलं स्थातः।

We give the sense of the above-

It is the cause which transforms itself into effects. It is the cause which is 'one', but has divided itself into 'many' forms and appeared as the world of THEGS! The sea is one, but it has taken the forms of wave, bubble, ripple &c. The clay is one, but it is many in the form of plates, pots &c. The tree as tree is one, but it has manifested itself as twig, branch, flower &c. The Absolute Reality (Brahma) has appeared as the world of many qualities, forms, activities &c. That is to say, this world is His nature; there is no other nature than this world which may be said to be separate from the world. For, Brahma has entirely

manifested Himself-His nature-in the changing forms.

Describing in this way his opponent's view, Sankara criticises thus—

A thing cannot be one and also many at the same time. If the 'one' be real, the 'many' must be unreal. Again, if 'many' be real,—if you regard the various changing states to be real, in that case, the 'one' cannot be real. When an object is changed into various forms and qualities, it loses its one-ness, it is now composed of many forms &c. Since it was one, which is now present in the shape of many forms; its unity has now disappeared; Brahma is thus something composite, manifold (अनेकासक) in its nature. This is the view of Divine immanence; there is thus a सामानाधिकारण between बहा and the world. This is इत्तिकार's idea.

Sankara then goes on to state his own theory,

These manifested changes, no doubt, constitute the world; but Brahma transcends them all, and hence it is separate, and distinct and distinguished from them. Brahma has got a nature of its own different from the changing objects—names and forms. It has appeared as the world, has assumed the forms of TH-QU, remaining unaffected by these, in its own nature. No finite form can adequately manifest Him. The world cannot reveal the depth of the Divine nature. It exists beyond all changes, all transformations. It is not its entire nature that has appeared in the form of the world. In and through all changes, the identity of its essence can

be recognised. You cannot, therefore, look upon the nature of Brahma as composed of these changes.

(b) Sankara thus observes in हु॰ 2. 1. 20.—"यद्-च बद्यापश्चित्रपट्ट वृद्धसमुद्रादिवच उत्पच्याद्यनेकधसैविचित्रता विजिग्राइियिषता, एकरसं धनन्तरमवाद्यां इति नोपसंइिष्यत्…'य इह नानेव पद्यति' इति निन्दावचनञ्च न प्रायोच्यत"। "His unity does not become composite by the productions of नामक्ष्य, like a tree composed of its branches, flowers; and a cloth dyed with variegated colours. Then बद्धा would not have been described as of uniform nature (एकरस)".

Pantheism, as we have stated above, reduces the finite Self also to certain states and activities; certain relations. The sum-total of these qualities, relations, senses etc. constituted the nature of the individual Self. But Sankara has shown that the real essence () of the finite, empirical Self is what underlies these relations and qualities, unaffected by them—

"भारीरस्य ब्रह्मात्मलसुपदिस्यते । ब्रह्मात्मलसभुग्रपगयमानं, स्वामाविकस्य भारी-रात्मलस्य वाधकं सम्पदाते" ।.....न अनेकात्मकब्रह्मकत्मनवकाभोऽस्वि ।"

(c) Brihadāranyaka, II. 1. 20—

"अनेकद्रव्यसभाष्टारस्य सावयवस्य परमातानः पूर्वसंस्थानावस्थस्य वा परस्य एकदेशो विक्रियते; सर्व्व एव वा परः परिचानेत्। अय नित्यायुतसिद्धान्वयवानुगतः अवयवी पर आता, तस्य तदवस्थस्य एकदेशो विज्ञानाता—तदापि सर्व्वावयवानुगतत्वात् अवयविन एव अवयवगती दोषो गुणो वा इति विज्ञानातानः संसारिकदोषेण पर एवाला संवध्यते—इयमपि अनिष्टकस्था।"

"Some hold the view that Brahma is the whole, and what constitutes that whole must be its parts. What we find in the form of manifestations, must necessarily be the parts of Brahma—the

whole. He has divided Himself into several parts and the manifested names and forms constitute those parts. For, the sum-total of the parts gives us the whole. How can the parts then exist apart from the whole? The faults and merits belonging to the parts must necessarily affect the whole. For, how can the whole exist apart from the parts constituting it? The finite Selves also being the constituent parts of Brahma—the whole, must affect Brahma when they are affected by pleasure or pain. But the pain which I feel cannot, at one and the same time, be my pain and a part of God's perfect experience."

Sankara also remarks here that it is the essence of the conscious Self to be for Self, to distinguish itself from all other things. How can the finite minds as consciousness, interpenetrate or merge into one another? But in the Pantheistic view, the finite Self would lose his own as ; for, it would merge in God's consciousness.—

'एकदेशैकदेशिकत्यना च ब्रह्माण चनुपपद्मा ।.....एतेषु पचेषु चनिर्मीच-प्रसङ:, स'सार्थात्मत्वानिहत्ति:, निवत्तौ वा स्वरूपनाश्रप्रसङ:।'

(d) Brihadāranyaka, IV. 3. 30-

'स्रव केचित् व्याचचते—स्रात्मवस्तुन: स्रत एव एकलं नानालस्र। यदा गोद्रव्यतया एकलं साम्रादीनां धर्माणां परस्परतो भेद:। तथा निरवयवेषु समूर्तः वस्तुषु एकलं नानालस्र सनुमेयम्।...न, स्रव्यपरत्नात्।....न च निरवयवेषु सन्भवित, तथा भनेकात्मकता सन्धते कल्पयितुं। सा च क्रिया नैव सविसेषे सन्धवित, तथा धर्मभेदा:।' (Also vide —ह० भा० 5. 1. 1.)

"Atma", the Pantheists say, "is one and many in its nature; as a cow in its character as a cow is one, and also, in its various qualities (such as having

dewlap, colour &c.) is many. But this, says Sankara, cannot hold good in Atmā which has no parts (निरवयन). Atmā cannot be 'many'—composite—i. e. manifold in its qualities or actions which really belong to नामक्ष,—not to the underlying nature of the Atmā".

When my Self comes in contact with certain objects beyond it, it stimulates in myself certain reactions (through my senses and mind). All these reactions in the form of my states, feelings &c. cannot really affect or change the Self. My अन्तः करण is transformed and as such I falsely identify my consciousness with those mental transformations. But it is not परमार्थ, cf. "सर्वो दि लोक अवदारः ब्रह्मण्ये कल्पितः, न परमार्थः" (इ॰ 1. 4. 10). My consciousness seems to be changed. But really my consciousness remains unaffected by these.—"न ब्रमः……ब्रह्मणि अवद्येगधारीपणा नास्तीति" (इ॰ 1. 4. 10.) *

The idea is that through the changes of the states, activities &c. the real substratum of these changes, the real essence of the Soul does not at all change. Sankara humourously illustrates the fact thus—

"न हि लोके गौस्तिष्ठन् वा गौभैवति; श्रयानस्तु अखादिजात्यन्तरमिति। यहभैको यः पदार्थः स्य-कालावस्थान्तरेष्वपि तहभैक एव भवति।"

"The essential nature of a thing is not subject to change or alteration, under the changes of its states, actions, place and time. You call a cow a cow,

i. e. The Reality is Reality; but we refer this or that predicate to it.

when she is sleeping; but when she gets up and begins to walk, can you call her a horse?"

Thus it is that what constitutes the essential nature of Brahma remains the same, is not changed and affected, under the appearance of the changes of नाम-रूप। As soon as the modifications of नामरूप appear, our Avidyā imagines the underlying unity of Brahma as entirely reduced to these नाम-रूप, as if Brahma has become सावयव i. e. composed of parts.—"न हि सविद्याकिस्पतिन रूपभेदेन सावयवं वस्तु सम्पद्यते" (ब्र॰ स्॰, 2. 1. 27). But in reality Brahma retains its own unity. It is our वृद्धि, says Sankara, which imagines Brahma to be सावयव (composite) through changing नामरूप imposed on it—"वृद्धिकस्पितिस्य: सावयवेस्य: विकार-संस्थानोपपत्तेः" (क्रा॰ सा॰ 6. 2. 2.).

- (6) Other arguments used by Sankara in disproof of Pantheism may be noticed here.
- (a) The qualities or relations are accidental—

 থানন্ত্ৰৰ—are produced by stimulating causes ("থানঅৱিধাখনাট্ৰনা"—g• মা•) and therefore, they are not permanent. How can these constitute the nature of the Self which is eternal and permanent ("বিষামিঅন")? They are manifestations of its nature; they represent that nature very inadequately and partially; they always change their character.
- (b) For this reason Sankara has remarked more than once that no co-ordination (सामानाधिकरा)* is possible between "तत्" and "सळेम्"—Brahma and

^{*} समानाधिकरण—occupying the same level (समानात्रय)। नामक्पड really occupy a lower level (than नद्ध's level). For, they are incomplete manifestation and विषय (not विक्यो). Vide—Lec. I. P.12.

the world (Vide. 30 30 410 1. 3. 1). How can then 'one' and 'many' both constitute the nature of the Self, as the Pantheists want us to believe? If there be सामानाधिकरका between one and many, the theory would be like that 'held by the Stoics—spiritual would be material—no distinction.

(c) Then again Sankara asks—what is the final emancipation (मृति)? To get rid of 'many'—pleasure, pain and other changes—is to be free from their power. But if they constitute the nature of the Self, how can they be got rid of? For, you cannot rob a thing of its essential nature—

"न हि स्वाभाविकेन धम्मे प कस्यविदियोगो दृष्टः" (इ॰ ४. ३. ४).

and—

"एकस्य अनेकस्वभावानुपपत्तेः (त्र॰ स्॰, ३. २. २1).

(d) It is proved, therefore, that the real nature of a thing is what lies behind the changing states &c. unaffected by them, and the latter very inadequately express that nature. A thing cannot have more than one nature. All these changing states, far from constituting the nature of the Self, are rather the 'object' (a or fagu) and being 'object', * the Subject or the Self must be different from it. It is only the ignorant who look upon them as constituting the nature (a) of the Self.—

[&]quot; "बयं कर्याभूतं सत्, कर्णुस्तरपटिशिविशेष्यम् (धर्मः) स्तात् ? कर्मा डि कर्णु-क्रियता व्याप्यमानं भवति ; चन्नव न्यापंत्र, भन्तत् न्यापके ; न तेनेव तत् न्यापके ।" (इ॰ सा॰, 4, 4, 6.)

"श्रव्हाद्याकारावभाषाः ... तस्यैव 'विषयभूता' उत्पद्य-मानाः ... श्रात्मन एव 'धर्मा' विक्रियारूपा इत्यविवेकिभिः परिकल्पन्ने" (तै॰, 2.1).

"अनामानं देहिन्द्रियादिसंघातं आत्मनी दृश्यमानमिष (i. e. "object— क्रेय") घटादिवत्, आत्मत्वे न... ग्रह्णाति …मायया मीमुद्यमानः" (कठ ॰ ३. 12).

- i. e. They are presented as 'knowable objects'. Only the ignorant people construe them as 'essential qualities' of Atmā.
- (e) Another point noticeable is—they being परार्थ (we have already dealt with it), they work in the interest of the Self which must be other than these. They cannot, therefore, be held as constituting the nature of the Self. The 'object' cannot affect the real nature of the Subject—"न हि यस यो विषय:, स तेन होयते वहेते वा।" (सा॰ का। 5 on 6 सन्त).

We cannot understand how, in the face of these arguments advanced by him, the charge of Pantheism could have been found possible to be levelled at Sankara's poor shoulders by some of his modern critics and interpreters!



The Subject and Its true Character.

The Subject (च्रेंबच) and the object (च्रेंब) are but two different aspects (संख्यानविशेषो) of one Reality—

''श्रध्यात्माधिदैवतयो: श्रन्थोन्योपकार्योपकारकलात्,...एकस्य सत्यस्य ब्रह्मणः संस्थान-विश्वेषौ"--(इ॰ भा॰, 5. 5. 2.)

["Both the Subject (अध्यात्म) and the object (अधिदैवन including अधिभूत) are aspects of one Truth—one Reality (एकस्य क्षत्रस्य प्रजास:)'']

The separation between thought and thing is a separation within the unity of thought; the object is not something outside thought, unknowable. The Commentary on the Gitā states—

''चेव-चेवजी येन जानेन विषयीकियेते तत् जानं सम्यक् जानं'

(गी॰ भा॰, 13. 2).

["That knowledge is the real and perfect knowledge which comprehends within itself both the Subject and the object."]

It is the unity of the Absolute which expresses itself in the finite subject and the object—

"मामेव उभयरूपेण स्थितं विद्यि, उभयाका अहमेव" (गी॰ भा॰, नीलकाग्ठ's gloss, 3. 2). The finite Self, as pointed out before, is rooted in the Infinite, and it is the Infinite which is bifurcated into, and expressed in, both the Subject and the object. Each of the Selves, in their negative relation to the others, is finite; but in virtue of the presence, in every one of these Selves, of the unity of the Universal Self, complete and undivided *, in which each of them shares, is also Infinite. Every Subject and object are, therefore, at once finite and infinite, one and many, universal and particular. The subject and the object are thus correlated elements within the unity of the ultimate Principle which, as their sustaining ground, brings them into relation, yet transcends them.

The unity of the Universal Spiritual Principle which is present in each of us is the true Subject (जाता or जल्दा) in which we share, and which, as Universal, cannot be restricted to a particular object but goes out to other objects.

Thus, there is correlation among the finite objects and subjects of the world—"विषय-विषयि-अञ्चर्ण 'यनेकाल-भाव'-गमनं"—(प्र• 4.5), but yet both the Subject and the object are more than these relations, as each of them, as we have pointed out above, shares in the unity of the Infinite which is completely present in each—

"यदापि कार्यात्मना छिट्टिचतै.....तथापि वत् पूर्वे सक्षं तम्र जङाति..... पूर्वमेव छिट्टिचते" (ह० भा०, 5. 1. 1.)

^{* &#}x27;'समीऽ'हं सर्वेमृतेषु'' and ''धनिमक्तं विभक्तेषु''—गी॰। ''मिन सर्वावि भूतानि।''

[i. e. The mind, senses &c. &c. are all modifications of Prakriti. All these set a sort of limit to the Subject and are therefore called in Vedānta as its *Upadhis* or adjuncts. These are all its *objects* of cognition or experiences and cannot therefore form the essential properties of the cogniser.]

'धावत् किश्चित् चेवज्ञस्य दु:खितलादिहीषजातं श्रविद्यमानं (i.e. not inherent to it) श्रासञ्चयित्, तस्य ज्ञेयत्वीपपत्ते:, चेवधर्मां लमेव, न चेवज्ञ- धर्मालं। न च तेन चेवज्ञी दृष्यति; ज्ञेयेन ज्ञातु: संसर्गानुपपत्तेः"

(गी॰ भा॰, 13. 2).

["What is perceived (कर्ष) is an attribute of Kshetra (matter); and Kshetrajna, the cogniser cannot be vitiated by the blemish due to it. Whatever blemish—not inhering in Kshetrajna—you ascribe to Him, it comes under the cognised and therefore forms a property of Kshetra, not a property of Kshetrajna. Nor is Kshetrajna really affected by it, since association (चंचने) of the cogniser and the cognised is impossible."]

(a) The Empirical Self described—

In one of our previous Lectures, we saw there is mention of Prāna-continuum which Sankara stated as Parināmi-Nitya. This is Māyá or Prakriti under the control of Brahma, out of which the five elements (पञ्चन्त) and the four successive types of beings gradually arose; and this Prāna-continuum is the connecting link of all these—(एकसामान्यासकं). This may be called generally as Non-Ego or विषय which constitutes the environment of the Ego or the Subject or विषय. There is interaction between the Subject and the object, and all the experiences (विशेष-विज्ञान) of the Subject are the result of this interaction. The empirical Self is described in Vedānta as "मृतमावासंग्रीत् लव्यविशेषविज्ञान" (इ॰ भा॰, 4. 5. 13);

because it is a part of nature or विषय which has equipped it with its organs of senses and the nervous system, and in connection with which it receives all its experiences or विशेषविद्यान।

"बिसन् गरीरे प्राणः पञ्चवतिः इन्द्रियमनीवुडियुक्तः प्रज्ञातमा विज्ञानिक्रया-गित्तदयमं मूर्च्छितातमा युक्तः" (का० भा०, 8. 12. 3).

[i. e. "In this body, Prana, together with mind and Buddhi which mean "Conscious Ego" covered by the two faculties of cognition and action is attached."].

"सदातानः प्राण-सम्बन्धमाचमेव...जीवलभेदकारणं......न प्राणेवियुक्तस्य जीवलमुपम्बतं" (छा॰ 5. 10. 2).

["It is its connection or relation with the Prāna which constitutes the empirical Subjects and their differences from one another".]

This Empirical Self is composed of five Koshas or spheres—the अन्मय, प्राण्मय, मनोमय, विद्वानमय and In each of these spheres, the Self identifies itself with the particular sheath and looks upon it as the true Self. The lowest function discharged by the Soul or this physical Ego (अवसय) is the nutritive function—the desire felt by the Soul is hunger and thirst (अग्रना-विवासे). The next form is the sensory Ego which is called as —प्राचमय with its 'sense-perception and motor actions, such as locomotion, excretion &'. The functions which stand higher are classed under the mind and heart and it is the mental Ego or मनोमय। Higher than these are विद्वानमय—intellectual activities. At the top stands—गानन्सय—which is contemplation of Divine bliss and it is the sphere of feeling or enjoyment. The Soul composed of these five sheaths

with these five varieties of functions is the Empirical Self. It is merely a bundle of passive states and feelings and possesses a fund of impulses and passions. This Self, according to Sankara, is with अपरमार्थ:, i. e. it is not the real Self at all. All its experiences (कन् ल-भोज्ञल) produced by these functions in relation with its environment or fauz or not-Self may be regarded as effects; for, all its experiences (कन् व-भोकृलादिविशेषविद्यान) are changes or Vikāras caused by its relation with its object (विषय) -- "अयं (object) अहं (Subject) - इति सामानाधिकरच्यो-पचाराव" (व. 1. 4. 7). Sankara's idea is, because the Self erroneously identifies or confounds itself with the body, the senses, the states, feelings &c., it experiences the qualities born of the Prakriti, manifesting themselves as pleasure, pain &c; it thinks-"I am happy, I am miserable" &c. Its identification with what it experiences (विशेषविद्यान), forgetting that the true Self lies beneath these five sheaths and is distinct from these experiences, forms its Samsara-state and is the main cause of its birth. The Psychologists discover only the laws of these states or its experiences (विशेषविद्यान), -how they are connected with the antecedents and consequents. The antecedent condition undergoes destruction in being replaced by subsequent condition-

"सर्वे हि कारणं कार्यमृत्पादयत्, पूर्व्वीत्पन्नस्य बात्मकार्यस्य तिरोधानं कर्वेत कार्यान्तरसुत्पादयित" (३० भा॰ 1. 2. 1.)

This is merely the description of the changing

The antecedent phenomena are held to be the productive cause of the consequent phenomena. Hence the whole of the Soul changes from its antecedent condition to its subsequent condition in time; and the Soul is nothing more than the sum-total of its phenomena or experiences. This is equivalent to saying that becoming is everything and that there is no being which is becoming or manifesting. But the real Self is more than its experiences. The real Self cognises, feels, wills with the help of these five vehicles. It is this Self which has manifested itself in these successive spheres and identifies itself with each of these sheaths and is limited by these.

The true Self is conscious of its three states—जायत, जाय and सुर्शत—in all of which its true character can be detected. During our wakeful hour, our sense-organs are exposed to the influence of the external objects (विषयेन्द्रियमविकार), and they become affected by the latter. Thus acted on, we wake up and actively compare the similar with dissimilar impressions and thus form concepts and make the sensations our objects of knowledge—

"निष्कृष्य समानासमानजाती येथी इदलदिति विवेचनम्" (तै॰ भा॰ 2. 6.)

During our dreaming moments, when the environment no longer acts on, and produces relations from, our sense-organs and the mind, it is our inner sense (द्वि), which remains engaged with the reminiseences of the impressions left upon it during the wakeful hour and these the mind recollects.

"The intellect is kept engaged, during dream, with the relics (वासना) of waking presentations, and these become the objects of the Self. The Subject being always distinct from its object, its luminosity is not destroyed.—"

''मनिस कामकर्यमिनिमित्तीङ्क तवासनावति...वासनाः...चन्यदिव पद्यतः... द्रष्टु: वासनाभ्योऽन्यत्वे न स्वयंज्योतिङं...न वारियतुं शक्यते'' (प्र० 4. 5.)

During deep slumber, all these activities not being aroused by external or internal stimulus cease, and they merge undifferentiated in Prāna.——

''सं हतानि करणानि 'खाम्यर्थानि' परतन्त्राणि च जायहिषये। खापेऽपि सं हतानां 'पारतन्त्रेयनैव' किस्त्रंश्चित् सङ्गतिन्यांच्या। जायत्-खप्रव्यापारादुपरताः सन्तः प्राणे सम्यगेजीभृताः...विवेजानक्षां भवन्ति'

["All the senses combined together work for the Lord—the Soul—dependent on him during our waking states and hence the coalition of all the senses etc. in One is reasonable even in Sleep, because of their dependence on, and acting in co-operation on behalf of,—some Lord. Waking and dreaming activities having ceased they blend indistinguishably in the Prāna]."

This undifferentiated Prāna in which all activities of the mind have merged in deep sleep is the seed—root-cause—of both the dreaming and waking states. For, when we wake up, from this seed the different activities (of the mind) become aroused by the action of the environment. This undifferentiated Prāna is not an independent entity apart from the Self; it cannot be explained without referring to the Subject whose energy it is. Under no conditions Prāna exists separated from the Subject.

"सुषुप्तावस्त्रायां विश्रेषविज्ञानाभावमेव दर्शयति, न् विज्ञातारं प्रतिषेषति"

(त्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 19.)

["During dreamless slumber, the experiences merge in Atma but we do not deny the existence of the Cogniser 1."

We thus find from the brief description given above that the Self in its three states is an active Subject and not merbly an abstract indeterminate principle. -

"बवस्यावयसाची...... अवस्थावयेष व्यभिचारिषा न संस्पृश्यते" (i. e. cognizer of 3 states)—ब॰ मृ॰ 2. 1. 9.

(b) The true Idealistic Self described-

That the passive empirical Self (which is merely the aggregate of states, feelings &c. &c.) described above is not the true Self is very clearly brought out by Sankara in several places. We shall collect together some of his arguments about the nature and the distinction of the true Subject from the empirical Self.

"Men and others are called as endowed with Atmā not only because they possess the five sheaths (पश्च-कोष given above), but they are known as endowed with Atma because they possess that selfexisting, eternal, changeless Atma...who is beyond these five Sheaths". Here are the lines-

''एवं मनोमयादिभि: पूर्व-पूर्वव्यापिभि: बानन्दमयान्तै: बाकाशादिभूतारसै:... 'बात्मवन्तः' सर्वे प्राणिनः । तथा खाभाविकेनापि बाकाशादिकारणेन नित्ये नावि-क्रतेन,..पञ्चकोषातिगेन 'बात्मवन्तः'...(तै० भा०, 2, 3)."

Thus we find the empirical ordinary knower and doer is subject to change (fana), but the true character of the knower and doer-which is the real essence of the former-is not subject to change. Sankara emphasises this truth in another passage in

another way. He says there that the "I" (अइं) is two-fold. The empirical "I" is subject to change (विकारि), but the real "I" is what underlies the former which is its essential nature, since the empirical "I" is the result of the confounding of the Self with its body, the senses, states, actions &c. &c. I quote the passage here—

- (i) "अइंकारेण देहादिस घातोऽपि आदिखते अविवेकिभि: !...
- (ii) द्रष्ट्रनन्यलदर्भनाधें भूमैव निर्द्धियते षहंकारिष, 'षहमेवाधसात्' इलादिना' (का॰ भा॰, 7. 25. 1.)

["The indiscriminate people describe the body, the senses &c. as "I"...but with a view to point out that the Infinite is non-different from the Seer or the Subject, it is described as "I"—'the I below' &c. &c."]

Here it is to be particularly noted that the real underlying "I" is stated as 'दृष्टा'—i. e. active Subject or Knower. In the Taittiriya-bhāsya also Sankara shows that what we call as the knower (वेदिना) is not the true character of the knower. What is true knower lies deeper, it is the Absolute itself—"वेदिनुः चढ्णं ब्रह्म"—ते॰ 2. 1.

In the Katha-bhāsya, we find-

"नेवनसामान्यविज्ञानवान् सर्व्वतो यातीव। विशेषविज्ञानस्यः, स्वीन रूपेण स्थित एव सन्" (कठ० भा०, 2, 21.)

Here two facts stand clear before us:

Underlying or accompanying our particular experiences which we ordinarily know as our Self, there is the true Self; and this is the true knows; and agent.

In the Chhandogya also the same truth is brought out thus—

''बात्मनेति वचनात् खात्मनोऽव्यतिरित्तो न ... 'बविशिष्टे न' इति दर्शयित''।

Also

"तेजोऽतत्रसं सर्गेन 'लुखविग्रीषविज्ञाना' &c." (क्टा॰ 6. 3. 2).

["By means of that belf partaking of the character of Intelligence and as such not differing from the real Self—is indicated."]

Also

["Having obtained specific consciousness by contact with fire, water, food, manifest" &c.]

Here also we find that when the true Subject comes in contact with the external objects, special experiences (विशेषविद्यान) are produced in it, and this is our ordinary Self. We confound the true underlying Subject with these experiences. But the underlying Self is the true Self which has these experiences.

The Brahma-sutra also gives us the same idea——

''ब्रह्मणो जीवासना चवस्त्रानं, ब्रह्मात्मना च'' (ब्र॰ सा॰, 2, 3. 17).

["Behind the empirical Jiva, the Infinite Brahma is present"].

Again——

"अस्मिन् निरुपाधिके आत्मिनि, प्राणाद्युपाधिकता 'विश्वेषाः' प्राणादिकर्यः जनामाभिषेदाः" (इ० भा०, 1. 4. 7).

["When there is relation with Prana and others, in the real Self certain particular activities are produced or manifested."]

The aggregate of these manifested activities and states is our ordinary empirical Self; but the real Self lies deeper which we ignore.

(c) The true Self is the real cognizer and Doer (i. e. active conscious Subject):—

In all these passages, we come to realise the important fact that Sankara every, where reminds us that although to us the aggregate of the specific conscious states &c. constitutes the empirical knower, the real knower is the Intelligent Self underlying the specific states etc.

Similar is the case with the *Doer* (कर्ता) which is two-fold in its character. This fact has been brought out by the mention of two kinds of vision—
हरि ।

"दिष्टिरिति विविधा भवित—लौकिकौ, पारमाधिकौ च। तम, लौकिकौ... सा क्रियते इति जायते विनन्धति च। या तु भाक्षमो दृष्टिः...सा तु द्रष्टुः स्वद्रप-लात् न जायते [विनन्धति च। सा क्रियमाणयो...संस्टेव स्वपदिन्यते'

(इ॰ भा॰, 3. 4. 2).

['The vision is two-fold: one is ordinary vision—it is produced, and it is destroyed and thus it is liable to change; the other is the true character of the Subject (zei) and that is eternal, not changeable. We ordinarily confound or identify the latter with the former and describe as zei or Doer."]

Sankara gives the true character of the Doer in the following Bhāsya——

"अविपरितुप्तस्वभावया दृष्ट्या नित्यया 'द्रष्टे ति' उचाते"

(80, 4. 3. 23.)

["The eternal unchangeable Vision is the real 'Doer' (द्वरा) ["]

The reason is given below-

"न च द्रष्टु निंत्ये व दिष्टिरित्ये वं विज्ञाते द्रष्टृ विषयां दृष्टिरन्यामाकाङ्गते... तद्यक्षवात्...न च सक्दपविषयाकाङ्गा सस्ये व'' (इ॰ भा॰, 1. 4. 10.) A similar idea is given in the Brahma-Sutrabhāsya also. (2.2.28.)

The sense of the above quotation is this. When it is realised that the activity of the Subject is unchangeable and eternal, this eternal activity is itself its own Subject (दूदा). For, if you still ask what is the Subject of this activity, Anavasthā—regressus ad infinitum would be the result. Sankara puts the idea more clearly thus—

''वो हर्ष' 'द्र' हा' स 'हिष्ट' यह भवति, नित्यसेव पञ्चति हिष्ट',.....तव द्रष्टु हं छ्या नित्यवा भवितव्यं'' (व॰ 1. 4. 10).

[i.e. The eternal activity of the Atmā is itself the Doer, that is to say—the real character of the Subject (zet) is the eternal unchangeable activity (zfe)].

In his Vākyavritti, Sankara states the fact thus-

"धनापन्नविकार: सन् धयस्कान्तवदेव य:। बुद्धगदीन् चालयेत् प्रत्यक् सीऽइमित्यवधारय"॥ (Sl. 19,)

["Let you bear in mind this fact that 'I' am the true inner Subject who remaining unaffected and unchangeable in itself moves or impels the intellect, the senses &c. &c. like a load-stone".]

All these discussions prove the fact that in Sankara-Vedānta the Subject is the true Knower and it is not affected by the object of knowledge; and the Subject is also the real Doer who remains unaffected by its object of action and the activities—"न हि यस यो विषय: (object), स तेन होयते वह ते ना' (मा॰ का॰ भा॰). It is sally the empirical knower and doer (कत्तृं तभोतृ ता दिविधिष्ट:) who is dependent on and is affected by its object.—

"न हि केवलाव्यनो 'भीकृत्वं, वृद्ध्याद्यपाधिकतमेव 'भीकृत्वं' (कठ॰ भा॰, 3. 4.)"

And also__ / ''कर्नु'लभोतृलयोः 'विकिथयोः' विशेषानुपप्तिः" (प्र॰ भा॰, 6. 3.)

[i, e, "There is no difference virtually between কৰ্ ৰ and भोक् न ; for, both are the changing states of the Atmā and they produce changes in it. These are in reality the modifications of the Intellect (ৰ্ভি)".]

It is to be borne in mind in this connection that wherever in his commentaries Sankara has refused to ascribe 'Agentship' * to the Self, it is such agentship as noticed above which is really a sort of changing state of the Self. The real character of the Subject, in Sankara-Vedānta, is that it is the original source of activity and of knowledge. There are some critics who have misunderstood Sankara's real position in this respect and they have made Sankara's Self as merely an abstract, indeterminate principle,—"a sort of action-less, consciousness-less void".

As the topic is very important, we would quote here the explanation given by the famous Tikā-kāra Rāmatirtha in his gloss on Sankara's Upadeshā-sāhasri which will, I am sure, support my contention. I would give the purport of what he says there—

^{*} cf ''क्रिया नामरूपसाध्या प्राणसमवायिनी'' (व॰ 1. 4. 7).

Also—''प्राग् भोगोत्पत्ते: केवलचिन्त्रावस्य पुरुषस्य 'भोकृत्व' नाम 'विश्रेषी' भीगकाले चेच्चायते, निवृत्ते च भोगे तिक्षेश्रेषादपेतः...दित 'विश्रिष्टविक्रिया' कसाते'' (प्र० 6. 3,)

"The external objects produce modifications in our inner sensory (মন:ন্মে); and these are the states of consciousness produced in the Self, and the conscious Self is reflected in these states. Thus the Self becomes identified with its states, and the aggregate of these istates is looked upon as the real Subject. This is the empirical "knower" or cogniser (মারা or মমারা)".

Again-

"The Prāna acts in various ways within the body, and its activities are stimulated by the organs of action (coming in contact with the external world). The Self accompanies all these activities and we fail to distinguish the Self from these activities. In this way, the Subject becomes the Empirical "Agent" (कर्रा)".

But, Rāmatirtha concludes that—

"But as the real Subject is always distinct and distinguished from these states and activities, it is the witness of all states and activities, it is the eternal cogniser and Agent". *

 ^{&#}x27;'बन्तः करणहत्तीनामाविभीव-तिरोभावधर्म्भवत्वात् तिहिश्रिटतया स्मुरणमङ्गीकत्य, विषयस्यचैतन्याभेदेन प्रकाश्रमानहत्ति-तत्स्थाभासात्र्यतया भासमान प्रात्मा—'प्रमाता' (ज्ञाता) इतुरुचते।''

[&]quot;कम्पर्रे न्द्रियाख्यिष्ठाय क्रियावत्-प्राणप्रधानान्तः करणलिङ्गगताभासाविवेकात् 'कर्चां' _रति च उच्यते।"

^{&#}x27;'एतां सर्व्वामेव चित्तविखासावस्थां 'सद्दपचैतचातुगम'-माते ण, साचादवभास्यन् इव भासनानः चलुप्तप्रकाशः...साची र्जवलक्षा 'ज्ञाता' इति च व्यपदिश्यते..... 'निर्विकार' एव ('कर्चा') कृटस्थः।"

We thus come to the conclusion that the Subject (as well as the object) is the real Seat of Power—the active Source—which produces states and activities—its manifestations—in interaction with each other.

The true character of the Subject then is इ ता and कर्ता।

We may conclude then that everywhere, there is the empirical causality and the nœmenal causality simultaneously present in each situation. Thus both the Subject and the object have a double character: an empirical and a nœmenal character. The empirical character is the expression in time of the nœmenal character which is not in time but expresses itself spontaneously and freely.

- (d) We now proceed to collect particular instances where the Self is shown to be a true cogniser and active agent, which will bring out the fact that the Subject with Sankara was never a mere abstract, indeterminate principle:—
- (I) "No presentation coming to the Self can remain unknown or unperceived. It is absurd to suppose that an object (fava) is there, but it is not known by the Self (faval)".—

''वस्तुतस्तं भवति किञ्चित्, न ज्ञायते—इति च अनुपपत्रं......हपञ्च द्रस्यते, न चालि चनुरिति यथा। व्यक्षिचरित ज्ञेयं, न ज्ञानं व्यक्षिचरित कदाचिदिप ज्ञेयं। ज्ञेयाभावे ज्ञेयान्तरे भावात् ज्ञानस्त्र' (प्र० भा०, 6. 2.)

["Whatever be the nature of the object of cognition, there is always the consciousness to cognise it....When one object is

replaced by another, when one object 'is removed and another is placed in its stead, the consciousness cognising them does not cease to exist, but continues unchanged behind it'.]

"सद्दाव्यभिचारिषु पदार्थेषु चितन्याव्यभिचारात्, यथा यथा यो यो पदार्थः ज्ञायते, तथा तथा ज्ञायमानलादेव, तस्य तस्य चैतन्याव्यभिचारिलं", *

["The objects may change, but the consciousness is constant to cognise and hence the cogniser does not change"].

The passages quoted above show that the Self whose nature is consciousness is always a conscious Subject (সাবা or cogniser) in reality.

Consciousness may exist where there is no object to be known, but an object can never exist without being cognised by the consciousness. The reason is—"The consciousness, if it does not exist, how can there exist a knowable? Where there is no consciousness, there can be no knowable".

- (2) In our every-day changes of three states, viz: our waking state and also our dreamless state, and the dreaming state,—the one and the same identical Intelligence (ইনৰ) continues to be present, and it is the cogniser (ছানা) of all these states. This shows that the Self is a conscious Subject.—
- (i) Even when the Self falls asleep in deep slumber (सुप्रीप्त), the conclusion of Vedānta seems to be that although there is apparently no knowable

^{*} cf ''वाल्यादिष्विप जागदादिवु तथा सम्बन्धिवस्थास्ति, व्यावनास्वनुवर्त्तमान'मह'-भिष्यनाःस्कृरनं सदा'' (दिचणामूनिं ०, ७).

present in that state, the Self must, says Sankara, be regarded as cognizant, inasmuch as the absence of the knowable being itself a fact to be known; but that cannot be known in the absence of a cognizer (no mio, 6.2). The Brihadāranyaka agrees with this view—

"विद्यमानस्थैव स्वयंजीतिष्य स्य (ज्ञाटलस्य) मुष्ठते ऽग्रहणमिकीभावाद्वे ती:... सञ्चसम्बन्धातीतमितदूपं" (4. 3. 22).

The expression एकोभाव gets its elucidation from Chhāndogya-bhāsya thus—"द्रष्ट्रान्यत्वेन सभावात्, मृतः: व पश्चित च" (8.12.2-3)—i. e. In the सुष्ठम stage or in the final release (मृत्ति) the cognizant Subject is present. Only because the knowables do not appear as different from or apart from the cogniser, he seems to be non-cognizant of anything knowable—"सुष्ठमावस्थायां……न 'विद्यातारं' प्रतिषेधित'' (त्र॰ सु॰ भा॰, 1.3.19).

(ii) During our dreaming state, although the sense-organs cease to operate, our mind (पन:करण) is active in that state with the waking reminiscences which are aroused. These reminiscences are to be regarded as its knowable which the Self cognizes—

''सप्ते प्रिंप 'द्रष्टु'-(cognizer)-रेवोपर्दशः ।...यद्यपि सप्ते स-धीः भवति (भातमा).....जायद्यासनाश्रया 'हश्चीव' धीर्भवति द्रति न 'द्रष्टुः' सर्वज्योतिष्युवाधो भवति'' (का॰ भा॰, 8, 12. 1,)

(iii) During our waking state, when we perceive the objects of the external world, the Self is proved to be an actively conscious Subject. This is shown below:—

(3) No perception can be had unless the Self exercises its power of discrimination and assimilation, and active comparison of the sense-impressions aroused by the action of the external objects in the Self-

"इसासायं स्पर्भ:, जानीरयिनति विवेकेन (Discrimination) प्रति-पदाते... ला मार्बे च काती विवेकप्रतिपत्तिः ?"

"सर्व्वी हि लोको मनसा पण्यति (Attention).....जानं भवति" (30 1. 5. 3.)

["The surface of the body (ৰক) itself cannot make or comprehend the difference between the two kinds of impressions excited in the body by the hand and the knee respectively, unless the Self attends to those impressions (and institutes comparison between them). This attention shows the active nature of the conscious Subject."]

(i) The Self as real stat (conscious Subject)-

"बच्चषा रूपं विजानाति. श्रोवेष शब्दं विजानाति, रसनेन रसं विजानाति ...दित स्र्वेत च 'विज्ञानश्रद्र'वाचतामेव दर्भयति...दित 'प्रज्ञानखभावतैव' (इ॰ भा॰, 4. 3. 2-30.)" "यो 'वेद' इदं मन्वानीति,...इदं जिन्नाचीति, 'वेद'...इति सर्वेव प्रयोगात 'वेदन'मस सद्धं (का॰ भा॰, 8. 12. 4-5)."

[i.e. "A mental act in which the Self is known implies, like every other mental act, a perceiving Subject. In every act of cognition, in each case, I am immediately consciouss of myself as seeing, hearing thinking &c." Thus the Self is inferred to be a conscious Subject 1.

(ii) The Self as real कर्ता (active Agent)—

"दर्शनादि-क्रिया-(different functions)-निह चर्चानि तु चचुरादि-करवानि...इट्ख अस्य 'सामर्त्यात' (Active power) अवगस्यते ।...आकनः सत्तामात एव 'कत्तंत्व',' नतु व्यापृततया'' (का॰ 8. 12. 4-5)

["The organs of sight, of smell &c. are for fulfilling the functions of seeing, smelling &c. This fact is inferred, because the Self possesses the capability, because the Self is an active Power. This agentship (কর্তুল) of the Self is to be understood not as if the Self is actually occupied with the particular functions of the organs; i. e. the Self, is active without being affected by those activities."]

Thus, the Self is inferred to be an active Subject. From these, we find that in the perception of the objects of the external world, the Self is proved to be not merely as an abstract intelligence, but as a conscious and active Subject (जाता and कर्ता).

with the objects of the world, certain states of consciousness are produced in the Self, they are all known by the term 'cognitions' (विज्ञान). The aggregate of these cognitions constitutes the ordinary jiva. As these states are all permeated by the consciousness, the ordinary indiscriminate people take these cognitive states to be the essential properties of the Self. To such people the Self is what is constituted by the sum-total of these states. But, in reality, these states are felt to be the 'knowables' (विषयन्ता:) or objects of the Subject.—

"चनुरादिहारैविषयाकारिण परिणामिन्या (बुद्धेः) ये श्रव्दायाकारावभासाः भाकाविज्ञानस्य 'विषयभूता' उत्पद्यमाना एव, श्रात्मविज्ञानेन व्याप्ता उत्पद्यने ।"

But to the ordinary people these states are regarded as the sais i. e. the essential properties of the Self.——

(तै॰ भा॰, 2. 1.)



[&]quot;त्रातान एव धर्मा विक्रियारूपा इत्यविवेकिमि: परिकल्पानी"

This is the ordinary empirical Self consisting of these modifiable and changing states, which the ignorant people take as stat and what. But this Self is merely the "bundle of sensations, appetites, desires, affections which constitute its experience. It is resolvable into the series of its conscious states."

But this is the Psychological account of the Self. There is another account of the transcendental or idealistic Self which is its true nature.

Here, 1 would draw your notice to certain terms. We have seen that the true character of the transcendental Self which underlies the cognitive states is not subject to modification. Although these states are its manifestations and belong to it, still it is not affected by them. With a view to show this, Sankara has used the word Vijnāna (विज्ञान)—'consciousness'—to indicate its nature—"आमिविज्ञानेन यामा उत्पद्यन्ते".

But as these cognitive states are 'pervaded' by consciousness and are felt to be its 'object', this Self or consciousness must be the conscious Subject.

We would support our position by quoting what Sankara has stated elsewhere.—

"कार्य कर्म्य स्थातां, दिश्वना व्यापात ? कर्म्य हि कर्नृ कियया व्याप्यमानं भवति । अन्यस व्याप्यं, अन्यत् व्यापकं; न तेनैव तत् व्याप्यते"

(इ॰ भा॰, 4. 4. 6).

["The object is always pervaded by the activity of the Subject. And the pervader is distinguished from, other than, the thing which is pervaded by it. A thing cannot be pervaded by itself."]

We find then that here, as the cognitive states are stated as its object, the consciousness mentioned

above to indicate the nature of the Self must be understood to be the conscious Subject (जाता or cogniser).

In connection with this point, the following observations of Sankara must, be conclusive—

"द्य-कर्मलापत्तिनिभित्ता हि जगतः सन्ना प्रवितः— 'यहनिदं भोत्त्ये' 'प्रशामि'...'एतदर्थमिदं करिष्ये '—इत्याद्या... यवगतिनिष्ठा''

(गी॰ भा॰, 9, 10).

["All the activities of the world have value in so far as they prove useful to the Subject, if the Subject can derive benefit from them, if these activities can be utilised as an object which might serve the purpose of the star i. e. the Subject".]

- (5) That in the Sankara system, the consciousness is to be taken in the sense of 'conscious Subject' (and 'active agent') can be gathered also from the following——
- (i) The world is divided into two parts—the Self and not-Self.

''यदा हि सर्व्य 'न्ने यं' कस्यचित्, तदा तदातिरिक्तं 'न्नानं' न्नानमेविति दितीयो विभाग:...द्रत्यादि'' (प्र० भा०, 6. 2.)

"All things can be classified as 'knowledge' and 'knowable'— ज्ञान-ज्ञेययोरन्यतम्—and all those who are not Nihilists in their opinion concede only a two-fold classification of 'knowledge' and 'knowable' and do not admit a third kind."

Here we find knowledge' (जान) has been used for 'cogniser (जाता) or the Percepient Subject.

(ii) "Those who hold that 'cognition' () is formless and is not known by mediate perception must admit that since an object of knowledge is

apprehended through 'cognition', the cognition is quite as immediately known"—Gitā-bhāsya, 18. 50.

Again in the following sentences, note why Sankara makes no difference between eternal 'cognition' and 'cogniser'.

''अप्रसिद्ध' चेत् 'ज्ञानं' ज्ञेयवत् जिज्ञास्येत...न चैतदिस्त । अतीऽस्यनाप्रसिद्धं (Self-sufficient) ज्ञानं, 'ज्ञातापि' अतएव प्रसिद्ध इति''

["Just as a man seeks to reach by 'cognition' the cognisable object, such as pot, so also would he have to seek to reach cognition by means of another cognition. But the fact is otherwise. Wherefore, cognition is self-revealed and therefore also is the cogniser self-revealed."

We find in these passages, 'cognition' means really the 'cogniser' or the conscious Subject i.e. there is no distinction between the two.

The reason for using the term cognition for cogniser is to guard against the fact that the empirical cogniser or sidi with whom we are familiar is always changeable (विकारि-जाता). But the real conscious Subject is devoid of change when it cognises its object; that is to say, the object of cognition cannot affect him.

(iii) ''यदि ज्ञावापि ज्ञेयसम्बन्धो ज्ञायते, षन्यो ज्ञाता कल्याः स्थात्, तस्यापि षन्यः। यदि पुनरविद्या ज्ञेया षन्यहा, ज्ञेयं ज्ञेयमेव ; तथा ज्ञातापि ज्ञातेव, न ज्ञेयं भवति'।

["If the relation between the cogniser and the cognised could be cognised, another cogniser should be supposed to exist, then another and so on. If avidya or anything else is the cognised, then it is always the cognised only () So the cogniser is ever the cogniser &c."—Gita-bha. 13. 2.]

Here the term 'cogniser' is employed, but this cogniser is not like the changing *empirical cogniser*; this cogniser is free from modifications i. e. not affected when it knows its object.

(iv) ''तस्मात् देहादिलचणान् च रूपादीन् एतेनैव देहादिव्यतिरिक्ते नैव विज्ञान-स्वभावेन आत्मना विज्ञानाति" (कड० भा० 4. 3.)

["Atma, whose nature is 'consciousness', cognises the body, the senses &c. composed of colour, sound &c."]

Here, it is to be noted that to denote the 'cogniser', the term 'consciousness' has been employed.

Take the following also——

"सर्वे प्रत्यया 'विषयीभवन्ति' यस्त्र, स...सर्व्यप्रत्ययदशैँ चिच्छतिसहप-मातः।...सर्व्यप्रत्ययदर्भिले च उपजनापायवर्ष्णितदृक्तसहपता, नित्यलं,... निर्विशेषता, एकत्वद्य...सिद्धं भवेत्' (केन० भा०, 2. 4).

["All cognitive states (name:) are known by it...the cogniser of all its knowable states is in its nature pure intelligence... That the cogniser of all its states is really eternal, free of particular determinations, one and not subject to changes of states in its own nature becomes well established."]

Here also, the eternal, changeless, 'consciousness' (चित्सक्ष्यमातः) is the real "Cogniser of all his cognitive states."

The reason is stated in the following significant line for the employment of the term 'consciousness' for the 'conscious Subject (हुए।)'—

''द्रष्टु हिं दश्यं त्रर्थान्तरभूतं......इति द्रष्टुः, त्रसङ्गलात् । खयंग्योतिष्टं (non-affection) सिक्षं" (ह॰ भा॰, 4. 3. 22).

[i, e, "The conscious and active Subject is always to be distinguished from his objects of cognition; for, it is not attached to and not affected by anything."]

I must conclude by calling your attention to the fact that the conscious Subject being distinct from the object, there can be no identity between the consciousness and the being. The consciousness does not create or constitute its object ("बाक्सममदायित द्रश्यतानुपपत्तेः"); but the object is the manifestation of the Being or Power from which it is produced in interaction with the Subject.—

''ज्ञानन्तु प्रमाणजन्य'; प्रमाणच यथामृत'वस्तु'विषयं। चतो ज्ञानं कर्त्तु मन्त्रया कर्त्तु मश्रक्य वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत्'' (ब्र॰ भा॰, 1. 1. 4. & 3. 2. 21).

It is thus seen that the Intelligence is not constituted of its objects of cognition. The object is 'given'. The object has an existence over and above its presentation to consciousness. The object possesses an identity which is not made by our mind, but persists in its changing modes or activities. This is the fundamental truth in the Subject-object relation. It is thus found that both the Self and not-Self-fava and faval—are known to us intuitively, according to Sankara, in the same act of perception, both being inseparable cor-relatives, although in their essence they are ultimately identical.



Jiva's State of Samsara or False Predication and How to get rid of it?

-00-

"नासि लं संसारी,—'अमुख पुचलादि-'वर्षावान्'; किं तिर्हे ? 'सत्' यत् लमसि'' (क्टा॰ भा ॰ 6. 14. 2).

- i. e. "This spatial and temporal world does not enter into the substance of the nature of your Self; nor does any of the states,—say, the state of your-self being somebody's son &c. &c. belongs to you as your essential nature (). What then? You are really distinct from, and unaffected by, the world or the states;—You are true Being, that thou art."

will not be turned inward into the true knowledge of yourself (आस्त्रान)". Why he speaks of Avidyā, we shall see that later on.

When an object (favu) acts upon the Self by affecting the sense-organs, the impressions produced in the Self it interprets in terms of its own sensations.—

"गम्भादिभिरपि प्राणादिषु अनुग्रहीतेषु, प्रवित्त-निवृत्त्याद्यो (Motor and sensory activities) भवन्ति, तेन तैरपि अनुग्रही भवति कार्य-करण-संघातस्य" (व॰ भा॰, 4.3.5).

Also

"मन:- मंत्र लपवशानि हि इन्द्रियाणि प्रवर्त्त निवर्त्त ने " (ह॰, 6, 1. 5.) *

[i.e. "There are action and reaction between the senseorgans and their respective sense-objects; and the result is knowledge of external world and stimulation of impulsive action (সর্বাবি & নির্বাব)"]

["The Manas is an organ of reflection and volition and will. We have cognition followed by consequent action". (Vide.

also 10, 7. 18-22).]

The true Subject, as we have seen, has a nature () of its own, it has its own reason of being in itself; it determines its own activities for the realisation of the end inherent in it. (), 7. 22-23).

That it is active proves its interaction (संसर्ग) with the environment beyond it.

"सतो विश्रेषः कारकापेचः, विश्रेषस्तु विकारः,,,,तदभाविऽभावात्" (तै॰ भा॰, 2. 8).

Thus the Subject is related to its own Self (खरूप) as well as to others beyond it (बाह्यरूप or सम्बन्धरूप,

^{* &#}x27;'शब्देन (अधिभूत) योचे न्द्रिये प्रदीप्ते, मनिस विवेक उपनायते, तेन मनसा वाह्यां चेष्टां प्रतिपद्यते'' (4. 3. 5.)

—ब॰ भा॰, 2. 2. 17). This self-reference and reference to others constitute its outward characteristics or relations. The object is therefore known to the Self so far as it comes into relation (संगं) with it.

But the Subject and the object do not derive their whole meaning from the relations into which they come to each other through interaction. Both are something more than their relations; possess a Swarūpa (nature) of their own which come into reciprocal relation.

"उपाधिसम्बन्धकृतं विश्रेषात्मस्तरूपं &c. &c. सर्वा भृत-भौतिकमात्रा श्रस्य 'संसर्ग'कारणसृता विदानों " (३०, 4. 3. 9 and 2. 1. 18).

["When some object in the environment comes into relation with the Subject, certain particular states and activities (বিভাগ-বিমান) are produced in-it'.']

Thus, neither the Subject nor the object can be wholly resolved into these relations.—

"विशेषविज्ञानवत्त्व' परित्यन्य, खेन इपेण अभित्यन्यते" (त्र० भा॰, 1. 3. 20).

These relations, or in other words, the particular states and activities &c. of the Self are but its partial or inadequate manifestations.—

"दर्शनयवणमननविज्ञानादुरपाधिधन्त्र": (क्रीधहर्षादिप्रत्यवैष) 'चाविर्भू तं' सक्तत्यते (ब्रद्ध)''—स् अभार, 2, 2, 1, But—

"उपाधिपरिच्छित्रसास रूप' लमलां वेत्य" (वेन० भा०, 2. 1).

In these relations, its nature finds partial (प्रस्त्य and प्रस्) * expressions; they cannot represent it fully and adequately, as we have considered fully in our previous discussions.



^{*} Vide: Lect. VIII P. 106 & 108.

But such is the habit of our intellect (36) that instead of taking these states &c. as partial expressions of the Subject which underlies them, our intellect takes them to be the component parts, of which the Subject is composed. Thus reducing the nature of the Subject to these parts, or relations, our intellect makes the Subject as usua or composed of parts i. e. the sum-total of these states &c. constitutes the whole nature of the Subject. Here compare what Sankara has stated—

"रज्जारावयविभाः सर्पादिसंस्थानवत्, बुडि-परिकल्पितेभाः सदवयविभाः विकारसंस्थानीपपत्तः" (छा० भा०, 6, 2, 2,)

["Just as the parts of the serpent are assumed in the rope as its own parts, so the modifications are assumed by our intellect as parts constituent of the Being (सन्)".]

Also-

"निर्विशेषे एव भावानि सुखिलादयो 'विशेषाः' कल्पिताः (i. e. भविद्यया भध्यलाः);...... भदयस्य भव्यभिचारात्, कल्पनावस्थायामपि भदयता शिवा" — मा॰ भा॰, 2. 32.

[i.e. "The determinate states &c. are imagined (by our intellect) in the Self as its qualities or constituent parts (क्यंड). But still, even while they are thus imagined, the Self remains unqualified by these (since the Self is unaffected by these and changeless), as it transcends these".]

Sankara elsewhere argues that all these states, viz: pleasure, pain &c. &c. are felt by the Subject to be its objects; and being its objects how can they constitute the nature of the Subject?

"मुखदुखयो: विषयधर्मालं, न भात्मधर्मालं। न दु:खेन प्रत्यचिषयेच भात्मनो विकेथलं" (ह० भा•् 1. 4. 7).

["Pleasure and pain (and all nama-rupas) are the proper-

ties of the object, they *cannot, therefore, be the properties of the Subject."]

Another argument advanced by Sankara-

''एकप्रत्ययनिषयत्वानुपपत्तेः। न हि सुख-याहकेण प्रत्यचनिषयेण प्रत्ययेन, नित्यानुमियात्मनो निषयीकरण्मुपपदाते" (ह० सा०, 1. 4. 7.)

["Both the Subject and the object cannot be comprehended by the same kind of knowledge; i. e. they cannot stand in co-ordinate relation. For, the pleasure, pain &c. are the objects of perceptual knowledge, whereas the Self is an object of inferential knowledge".]

There cannot be सामानाधिकरण (Identity) between the knowledge of the Eternal Self and the knowledge of its changing states or qualities.

But of the deeper unity of the Subject, our intellect, as we have stated above, perceives only the outer qualities spread out side by side. It sees one object outside another; and in the object also, one point of space outside another point of space. It makes the underlying unity of the Subject as composed of its multiple states, as unitaria; as if the sum-total of these states constitutes the Subject. Thus the Subject, to the view of the intellect, becomes altogether a new thing (auteria), something other (unity of the Subject, and the unity of the object * also, appear to our intellect and our senses. This

The object is not mere 'manifold,' as Kant thought. It is already a unity and there is orderly connection among its qualities. For, they are the factors of a Purposive Unity, in connection with one another.

view is known in Sankara-Vedānta as the view of Avidyā—

"श्रविद्या 'श्रव्यत्वे न' प्रतुप्रस्थापितमासीत्... वस्त्रून्तरिमन' ;... करणादिकतं हि तत्, न श्रात्मकतं ; श्रात्मकतिमन प्रत्यवभासते" (ह० भा०, 4.3.23).

Take in this connection the following মাৰ on the Aphorism (র ও মৃ ও 3. 2. 15.)——

"एवं ब्रह्मापि पृथिव्यादुर्रपाधिसम्पर्कात् तदाकारतामिव प्रतिपद्यते"

As soon as the names and forms become manifested and the objects appear before us, we think as if Brahma has become these forms; Brahma seems to us to be of such and such forms. That is to say, we restrict Brahma to such and such forms, as if Brahma has itself become such and such objects; i.e. in this view, Brahma's presence in the objects is in reality their presence. No distinction exists between the presence of God and the mere presence of objects. But this, says Sankara, is the view of ignorance. The real view is thus stated—

''निराकारमेव ब्रह्म खवधारियतव्य''' (ब्र॰, 2. 3. 14.)

"प्रतुर्गाधिमेदं हि अमेदमेव ब्रह्मणः यावयति शास्त्रम्"

(व॰ 3. 2. 12, 16).

The manifested objects look like Brahma's forms, but they are not really so. They are not His forms: as if he has been reduced to these forms: as if He has actually become these forms: Brahma has no form at all *.

(a) That such erroneous views are due to our intellect (बुद्धि) and to our sense-organs will appear

^{ैं} i. e. ''यत् सर्व्वें, तद्दन्ब्रह्मोति,....चतु यद ब्रह्म, तत् सर्व्वेमिति" (रवि॰ ॰, 1. 3. 1.)

particularly from the commentary on the Gitā where $Avidy\bar{a}$ has been said to be an inherent property of our intellect and our senses.—

"It is not right to hold that Avidya is an inherent property (भर्मे) of the cogniser. For, we see such diseases as lead to the perception of what is contrary to truth and so on pertain to the intellect, to the eye, to the organ. Neither the perception of what is contrary to truth, nor the cause there-of (viz : the disease of timira) pertains to the percepient Subject &c. &c. (गो॰ भा॰, 13. 2.)

I would quote the text here-

"एवं तर्षि जात्रधमाँऽविद्या ? न ; करणे, चनुषि, तैमिरिकलादिदीषीप-लबें: ।.....यथा करणे, चनुषि, विपरीतगाइकादिदीषदर्भैनात्... सर्वत्रैव धग्रइण-विपरीत-संग्रवादिप्रत्यथा: तिक्षित्ता: करणस्थैव कस्यवित् भवितुमईति, न जातु: चेवजस्य । संवैदालाच तेषां.....न जात्रधमीलं &c. &c.?'

In the commentary on the Taittiriya-Upanishad, the same conclusion is given——

"विद्याऽविद्ययोक्तां वर्षात्विति चेत्? न ;..... इपादिवत् प्रत्यचाबुपलभ्येते भनः करणस्थाः" (2-8).

["Knowledge and ignorance (भित्रा) could be perceived; colour perceived cannot be an attribute of the percepient.......

Therefore knowledge and ignorance, like name and colour, are not attributes of Atmā; they pertain to the intellect."]

''श्रविद्या न श्रात्मन: स्वाभाविको धर्म्मः.....न स्वाभाविकस्य छिक्कितः कदाचिदुपपदाते'' (३० भा०, 4. 3. 20).

["Avidya cannot constitute the essential nature of the ātmā; for, you cannot deprive a thing of its essential nature".]

It is thus seen that our intellect and our senses take only an outward view of things, and they can not go deeper into the inmost unity.—

''पराचि खानि व्यटणत् खयमः', तस्रात् पराङ् पञ्चति, नानरात्मन्''

(कड॰, 4.

["The self-existent क्य created the senses out-going. Therefore the perceiver sees the external objects, and not the ātmā within".]

Everything appears to them as composite—अनेका-क्षक, नानाधकाँविशिष्ट: विचित्र श्राक्षा (ब्र॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 1)—composed of parts, as divided into units (सावयव), one outside the other. In the place of the underlying unity a new thing composed of multiple parts (श्रनेक्षा) is created for the time being—

''एक एव कूटस्थनित्य: अविद्यया... अनेकधा विभाव्यते''

(ब्र॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 19.)

It is therefore the construction of our intellect due to deep-rooted habit it has inherited. This is due to Avidyā (वियाचान). This Vedāntic false knowledge is known as अनिर्वाचनीय-ख्याति. It superimposes the states of Consciousness upon the unity of the Subject, ignoring or forgetting the fact that the Subject is a unity which it maintains in and through its successive states which cannot be its component parts i. e. cannot be identified or confounded with the real nature of the Subject. They are, in reality, the expressions of its nature, and the Self is distinct from them—"अप्रथगेवेति" * (मा॰ भा॰, 2.30); "खतन्त्रो भवति सर्जेदा" (काठ॰ 4. 1.). Similarly, simply because God has taken the forms of nāma-rupas Him-"न ब्रुमोऽतद्वर्याध्यारोपणा नास्तीति"-He has not actually become these. These forms are to be taken as His expressions; His objects; He is to be found partially expressed, manifested in these. These are safers -indicative of His Swarupa to a certain extent, and hence Ananya (अनन्य)-non-

^{*} cf. "पशानोऽपि प्रपश्चनं सारं, पृष्णात्मनो न पश्चेत्" (स्वात्मनिरूपण, १००)

different from the Self-"इटं सब्बें यदयमात्मा"-"Everything, all this, is ātmā". This fact is sometimes described by Sankara as—"स्ट्रादिष्णञ्चस ब्रह्मप्रति-पच्चर्यतां दर्भयति" (ब्र॰, भा॰ 1. 4. 14 & 2. 1. 33.) i. e. the manifestation of the world is for the sole object of leading to the knowledge of Brahma and not for any other purpose. Sometimes this fact is described as —"प्रपञ्च-विजय" as in—"ग्रविद्याक्षतं कार्थ्य-प्रपञ्च' 'विद्यया' प्रविलापयन्तः तमेवैक भायतन भूतमात्मानं जानय (ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 1.). It means that under the influence of Avidyā we used to take the world of nāma-rūpas as something separate, as if the underlying (आयतनभूत') Self has become composed of these náma-rūpas and become something Anya-really other, abandoning its real nature (कार्यप्रपञ्चविशिष्ट: विचित्र श्रात्मा). But by Vidyā (fact), we are now to take the world (प्राप्त) as the expression of Brahma i. e. nothing but Brahma *; -that is to say, everything is to be looked upon as revelation of Brahma's nature, not as this or that thing (i.e. 'अन्यदिव कार्याकारेण प्रस्तम्' -н. 2. 2. 11.). In the Taittiriya-bhásya Sankara himself shows us the way and gives us the indication as to how we are to take the particular objects of nature as Brahma. He says there that-

"चमे पुराय-पापे...... आत्मरूपेणेव, स्त्रेन विशेषरूपेण शून्ये कला...... पर्याति विद्यान्" (2.9,)

[i. e. "We are to look upon virtue (प्राप्त) and evil (पाप),—not as प्राप्त and पाप in their special forms, but as Paramatma."]

A similar idea is given in the Chhandogyabhāsya also—

सर्व्याताले दु:खसम्बन्धोऽपि स्थात् इति चेत् ?ून ; दु:खस्थापि श्रात्मालीप-गमात् श्रविरोध:" (8, 12, 1) *

[•] cf. ''निखिलं द्रखिविषेषं, दुग्-इपले न पखातां विदुषां'' (खाकानिकपणम्, 102).

[i. e. "If you object that if everything is to be taken as ātmā, there will then be connection with 'Suffering' (इ.स.) also; —we reply that even suffering is not to be taken as suffering, but as Atma."]

As there is always an unchangeable sustaining ground in which the modifications of names and forms are rooted (ब्र॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 1), we are indeed, liable to confound the ground with the Vikāras. But it is a wrong view, view of Avidyā—"न कार्य-प्रपच्चविश्वष्टः, विचित्र याक्षा विज्ञेयः य्या यनेकात्मको हचः"। Māndukya-bhāsya calls this view as चित्तदोष, विकल्पना (fault of the intellect). And Sankara has pointed out that—

''न हि बुडिपरिकल्पितेन भवधवेन परमार्थतः सावयवं वस्तु भवति'' (ভা॰)

[i.e. "The unity does not really change to multiplicity, simply because our intellect cannot keep the ground separate and it imagines parts (খৰ্মৰ) in it i.e. identifies the two erroneously".]

"Can the water of mirage", Sankara asks, "render the saline soil (उपर-देश) miry with moisture"? (गी॰ भा॰ 13.2). Again he says— "न तु षड्विडाकाले, तद्पगमकाले च, वस्तुन: कथिडिश्रेष: स्थात् (त्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 1.4.6). That is to say, "when a piece of rope is imagined under the form of a serpent, can that imagined form really make the rope a serpent? It really makes no difference in the rope".

We must make earnest effort to change such intellectual outlook of ours, and try to look upon the world from the stand-point of the Self.—

''सन्दें जगदेकी जल्य, बोड़ग्रधा प्रविभन्य, तिस्मन् ब्रह्मदृष्टि विधातव्या' (का० भा०, 4. 4. 1.)

Even when we are confined to this Samsara,

to the world, we are to take it as Atmā, not as something other than Atmā.

Compare-

''स दहेव ब्रह्म, यदापि देश्वानिव लत्त्यते.....यसात् न हि तस्य 'श्रवहात-परिच्हे दहेतवः' कामाः सन्ति।

"तस त्रात्मेव, 'नान्य:' कामयितव्य: 'वस्त्वन्तरभूत:' पदार्थी भवति'

(ह॰ भा॰, 4. 4. 6).

Nothing ought to appear to him as other than Brahma; but all the differences of nāma-rūpa should now appear as manifestations of the underlying unity which is realising itself in them; for, Atmā is the truth of all differences—"परावना विकासणां मत्यलं, खतस्तु अन्तलमेव"। The differences would no longer appear different (अन्य) from Brahma, as so many self-subsisting things. And all ideas of Separation (भेर-वृद्धि, अन्यल-विध) due to Avidyā would vanish. This erroneous idea it is which stands between our Self and Mūkti (final freedom).—

"भन्यलापोक्षेन संसारोपरमः कर्त्तेत्रः। भविद्याया भन्यत्वे न' प्रत्युपस्यापित-मासीत्, तत् एतस्मिन् काले एकीमृतं" (ह० भा॰ 4. 3. 23.)

''बन्धो हि बिनिइत्तभेदप्रत्ययः। स 'बन्धत्' पञ्चन्, प्रणून्, मन्बानी— इदं कला इदं प्राष्ट्र याभिति हि मन्धते। तस्त्र एवं-कुर्वाती न ब्रह्मसंस्थता''

(ভা॰ भा॰, 2. 23. 1.)

["This Samsāra ought to be got rid of, by means of removing the idea of Anyatwa i. e. separateness. The idea of separateness is due to Avidyā, has been brought on by Avidyà or ignorance. This separateness is to be supplanted by the idea of Brahma, idea of unity".]

(N. B. The significance of the word 'एকী মূব' is to be found in ছা॰ মা॰ 8. 12. 3. quoted below.)



"The man with whom the idea of difference has not ceased regards (everything as) Anya i. e. different or separate from Brahma. He sees things as different from Brahma, hears and thinks things as different—he also conceives in this way—'by means of this thing I will gain that thing' &c. The man who takes things in this way, cannot be said to be 'resting in Brahma'."

''नतु 'कथमेकः' सन् नात्यत् पर्यातः, नात्यत् प्रयोति ।.....कामांच नाज्ञ-जीकिकान् पर्यान् रमते इति च विरुद्ध'?.....नेष दोषः ; द्रष्टु-'रत्यलेन' कामानामभावात् न पद्याति" (का॰ भा॰, 8. 12. 3).

["How is it that you make two contradictory statements? When the idea of unity will be established, one will see nothing hear nothing &c. Yet you say that a "Mukta" will see the mins (ideal forms) in Brahmaloka. The reply is this—He does not see these ideal forms as not see the not see the

Here compare what Sankara says elsewhere—

''अविद्याहष्टीनां.....,'अन्यदिव' कार्थ्याकारिण प्रस्तं। अब्रह्मप्रत्यः सर्वोऽविद्यामावः, ब्रह्मे वैकं परमार्धसत्यं'' (सु० भा०, 2. 2. 11.)

["Those who are affected by avidya view the effects extending on all sides as if they are something other (प्रा) than Brahma. All ideas that it is not Brahma are nothing but avidya; Brahma alone is the Reality"].

(b) In this connection, I should like to draw your attention to Sankara's theory of "Adhyāropa and Apavāda" (प्रशासीप and प्रपाद) which has been resorted to for the purpose of "प्रवासीए" referred to above, i.e. for the removal of the idea of separateness—प्रवास—from our mind and to firmly establish the idea of Brahma everywhere. The significance of the Theory is stated here:—When in the Self, through its contact (संस्त्र) with the objects in the environ-

ment, certain particular states and activities are produced, we superimpose (wantu) these on the Self, and thus confounding the two, we regard as if the sum-total of these particular states &c. constitutes the nature of the Self. This is Adhyāropa. Then Sankara describes the theory of Apavāda. Instead of confounding the states &c, and the Self, we ought to take these particular states &c. as means—squa—for the true knowledge of the underlying Self. Always to look upon the states &c. as a means for self-realisation is the correct view and this Sankara describes as Apavāda. Rāma-tirtha has thus explained this Apavāda theory in his note on the Vedānta-sāra which we should always bear in mind. He explains—

"अपवादो नाम-कार्यस्य क्रियानाचसत्तावश्रीषणं, कारणसङ्ग्यितिरिकेण कार्यस्य असत्त्वावधारणं वा-'अपवाद' इत्युक्तं भवति'।

The lines have been thus translated by A. E. Gough———

"[Rescission or repudiation is the attribution, to the effect, of the being of its cause; or the determination of the non-existence of the effect otherwise than as identical with (i. e. nondifferent from) its cause."]

You will see then that we are not to look upon the effects i. e. the objects of the world or the states &c. of the finite Self, as so many self-subsisting and independent entities, but as having no separate being from the underlying cause or the Self. Sankara regards this view as the means or squafor self-realisation which will remove the idea of separateness or squafor there.

''संख्याखरुपपरिज्ञानाय.....रेखाध्यारोपणं क्राला 'एकेयं रेखां' 'दशेयं' 'श्रतेयं' इति याइयति, धवगमयति संख्याखरुपं केवलं—ते तु संख्याया 'रेखाक्षल'-मेव।…तथा, उत्पच्यादाने 'कोपाय'माख्याय एकं ब्रह्मतत्त्वमाविदितं। पुनः तत्-कल्पितोपायजनित 'विशेष'परिशोधनार्थं 'नेति' 'नेति' इति तत्त्वोपसं हारः क्रतः" (इ० सा०, 4. 4. 25).

1t means-

'ऋजुबुिं कि स्वत् रेखामेव सचरं (or संख्यां) मेने। पश्चात् उपदेशेन रेखायां सचरवृद्धिं (or संख्यावृद्धिं) तत्याज। तद्दत्...धनात्मानमेव सात्मतया जानीते...तस्मात् दृष्टिं वारयिखा...तदुपायमादत्ते द्रति.....तन्स्वरूपं वीधयितं'

(আ০ गि॰)।

[i. e. "We employ lines, dots &c. to represent the numbers and we call certain line as 'one', another line as 'two' and so on. But simply because the lines are used for numbers, the numbers do not become lines; the lines are to be viewed only as a means for the comprehension of the nature of the numbers. In the same way, the manifested differences of nama-rupa and states &c. do not reduce the Self to these differences; but these are to be taken simply as a means of, for the purpose of, the real knowledge of the Self. These differences are not to be mistaken for the Self, simply because they appear in the Self'.]

Compare also-

"'धनात्मानं देहेन्द्रियादिसं घातं आत्मनो हत्र्यमानमपि (i. e. object) घटादिवत्, 'धात्मत्वे न' रहाति... घहो दुरवगाज्ञा विचित्रं यं माया"

(वड॰ भा॰, 3. 12).

["People mistake for the atma the body, the intellect, the senses &c. &c. which are not the atma, but as its knowable objects, like the pot &c. This is due to the influence of the mysterious and marvellous Maya."]

"The true nature of the Self is not tainted by the blemishes of the senses &c.; because the atma is external to the false notion so superposed"—5, 11,]

(2) The Sādhanas, means, for the realisation of Brahma—

By the cultivation of moral virtues and other Sādhanas we must purify our mind and the senses—
"ātmā is seen by the purified intellect" (काउ॰ आ॰
3.12). The infinite wealth (जानेख्या—आगन्द)
of the inexhaustible (अञ्च) nature of the Atmā
is present in our Self. The realisation by the Ego
of the Reality of the Atmā in us is beautifully
described in the Brihadāranyaka-Upanishad by
the help of the impressive illustration of the union
of husband and wife* in deep love and affection. The
husband in the embrace of his most affectionate
wife forgets altogether the presence of objects
near him and loses his separate consciousness and
being in the pure and perfect and selfless happiness
born of such union.—

''यथा लोके प्रियया इष्टया स्त्रिया सम्यक् परिष्यतः', कामयन्या कामुकः, न वाद्यः किञ्चन वेद 'मत्तोऽन्यइस्तु इति', न च भान्तरं 'श्रष्टमिस सुखी दुःखी वेति'; अपरिष्यत्तस्तु तया विभक्तः जानाति सर्व्यमेव वाद्यं &c."

(व॰ भा॰, 4. 3. 21.)

It is thus seen that when the true knowledge arises, the avidyā under whose influence the objects of the world appeared as different from the Supreme Unity will vanish and with it the idea of separateness (अन्यत-वोध) will disappear, and this is जीवना जि—Emancipation.—

^{*} We believe the Vaisnava philosophers borrowed their ideas of मध्र-भाव from this text.

''बन्यत्रभावनिवृत्ती...बात्यभावी भवति ।... सर्व्यात्यभावी मृतिः''

र्र इ० भा० 4. 4. 6.)

"संसारियः संसारितापोद्देन ईश्वरात्मतः प्रतिपाद्यिषितं"

् (ब्र॰ स्० भा०, 4, 1. 3).

["When the idea of (our) separateness (from God) is removed, the idea of (our essential identity with) God will arise. This is Mukti. That we are essentially connected with the world is to be removed, and that we are essentially related with God is to be realised".]

Unless we are able to annihilate this avidyā which has concealed Brahma and created or projected the idea of Anyatwa—separateness—in its place, how can we gain the true character of the Supreme Reality—यायात्मा-दर्भन ? Nila-kantha, the reputed commentator of the Mahābhārata and a faithful follower of Sankarāchāryya states that Nirguna Brahma whose nature is Bliss (पानद) contains within it infinite wealth of जाने अबे and प्रतिसीन्द्ये, and it is this wealth which is finding expression in the world. "प्रानन्द्य नियेख्ये माया प्रियम् के Sankara himself calls Nirguna Brahma as Sivam (शिवम्) in—

''परमार्थतीऽनुपाधिक्रतं एकमेवादितीयं,,, त्रजमभयं 'शिव'निष्यते''

(go HIO, 6. 3).

And also-

''अदयता शिवा'' (मा॰ का॰ भा॰ 2. 33.)

''यच अनमस्तमभयं 'शिव'महितीयं तत् सत्यं स आत्मा तव''

(का॰ भा॰ 6. 16. 3).

As the Infinite is within the finite Self, the Infinite जानेख्य-wealth of Wisdom and Power

[•] Vide : महाभारत वनपर्व, chap. 213.

and Beauty-lies concealed under avidyā within us.—

''नीव: परमात्मांश एव सन्, तिरक्तृतज्ञानैययों भवति...जीवस्य ज्ञानैययं-तिरोभाव:...देहेन्द्रियद्विह-विषयवेदनादियोगात् भवति''

(ब्र॰ स्॰ भा॰, 3. 2. 6).

"परमानन्दस्येव विषय-विषयाकारीय माना प्रस्ता" (व॰ भा॰, 4. 3. 33.)

["The finite Self—being like a part of Paramatma,—like a Divine Spark, Infinite আনীয়াই—exists concealed within him...The infinite wealth of Wisdom and Power is covered up on account of the connection of the finite Self with his body, sense-organs, the intellect and sense-perceptions and the like".]

["Limited measures of the Supreme Bliss work in the world through the Subject-object relation."]

At present, we do not even suspect its presence in us, so completely has avidyā concealed, screened it. Our eye is fixed at present upon the names and forms—"नामरूपोपाधिदृष्टिरेव भवति खामाविको" (इ॰ ३.५. 1). But as that screen is gradually removed by our cultivation of moral virtues and other Sādhanas, the Infinite जानेख्य will gradually stand revealed before us.—

''ज्ञानैश्वर्थाविश्व्यितारिप परेण परेण भूगसी भवति'' (व्र॰ भा॰, 1. 3. 30).

To the extent you are able to remove the Screen of Avidyā (Vide, ब्र॰ स्॰, 1. 1. 12 and 3. 2. 5), to that extent the Infinite Divine Wealth—अगवदेख्य —will stand revealed and realised by you. But it requires great effort and Sādhana on your part.——

"महाप्रयासेन खभावप्रहत्तिनिरोधं कला" (कठ० भा०, 4. 1),

(प्र॰ भा॰ 6. 1).

["Our inherent natural impulses must be curbed with intense effort."]

And our success in this direction is also dependent on the Grace of God.

"परमिश्वरमभिध्यायतो यतमानस्य... 'ईश्वर-प्रसादात्'...कस्वविदेवाविभवित... न स्वभावत: सव्वे वां'' (ब्र० स्० 3. 2. 5).

["It reveals to only a few of those earnest Spirits who meditate on God, through the Divine Grace."]

These dead's are inexhaustible and perfect, they cannot, therefore, be completely revealed here in this temporal and inperfect mundane world, since what is revealed here is but a partial expression of the Divine. To a world beyond this, yet connected with it, we would carry our Soul there with its Sādhana (uanti-a. 4. 4. 2), and be enabled there to further develop our capacities—

"यतते च ततो भूय: संसिद्धी कुर्वनन्दन" (गी॰, 6.43). and thus to perfect our character. We are not merely finite and creature of time, but we are also something more—we are also infinite, which raises us beyond time-limitations and makes us one with the Supreme Infinite (परमास्त्रेक्ट) Principle—Brahma, where all strife and defect will end and we would be perfect with the Perfect.—

"सर्ब्युःखिनिन्धं तचैतन्यात्मकोऽहमित्येष त्रात्मानुभवः (व्र॰, 4. 1. 2). "पुरुषे तु...सर्व्यानर्थनातातीते प्रतिपन्ने हम्पते प्रयोजनं मोचिसिद्धः"

(ब्र॰ भा॰, 3. 3. 14).

["The immediate realisation of the atma is "I" which is free from all suffering and evil." "The Supreme End of existence is the realisation of freedom in the Supreme Purusha who is found to be lying beyond all evils and sufferings".]

The Infinite is within us, God's purpose is revealing in the world, and it is our duty to choose that

Good as our Ideal We may fail to realise it, and in that case there is no advancement. But we are free to a certain extent and there is possibility to adopt it as our End. As God-is working in the world and He is the ultimate Agent, He will see that His good purpose is not frustrated and that the world is, as a whole, advancing to the good Purpose. God is within us in possibility and we have actualised that possibility so far in our character. Infinite possibility lies open in our character and it is not something stereotyped. Determinists say that it is our sharacter—unfa-which finds expression in our conduct (ग्राचरण) - "प्रकृति स्तां नियोच्यति...करिष्यस्ववगोऽपि सन्" (भी. 18. 59); and it is our character that determines our actions. But our character has been formed by us; it is liable to transformations. The Determinists identify the Self with the character which it owns. But the real solution lies in the relation of the Self to the character. The Self is to be distinguished from its content; it has its character, but it is not identical with it. Apart from Self, character is mere abstraction. Hence, that our character determines our action really means-it is our Self (which has the character for its content) that determines; and the basal Self being Infinite, infinite possibilities are always open to it. My past and present life cannot be exhaustive expression of my possibilities; I am always more than my past and present life. Hence, nobody can tell beforehand how our Self will actually express its hidden possibilities. Sometimes the Self surprises all by its action which is quite unexpected, which

leads to quite a different course of action. Take the case of Jagāi of Nadia who broke away from his past, yet he was the same man. But the man sometimes falls when he is expected to stand.

Other Sadhanas for self-realisation—

(a) So long as we are driven helpless to action by the energies of our impulses born of our empirical nature (प्रकृति), we desire objects which are calculated to satisfy these impulses; we are bent on selfish ends and are deluded by 'Egoism'. We must rise above the sway of affection and aversion and restrain these impulses under the law of rational reflection, by "abandoning attachment and the fruits there-of"——

''राग-देषवियुक्तेस्तु विषयानिन्द्रियैयरन् । प्रात्मवग्रीर्यार्थियात्मा प्रसादमधिगच्छति'' ॥—

Worldly desires and interests are useless to a man of wisdom. The commentary on the Gitā says—"By restraining the first natural activities one by one and thereby gradually inducing fresh and higher activities, the Sruti teaching works (क्यांकाण्ड) serves to create an aspiration to reach the inmost Soul" (18, 66).

- (b) "I reward the unselfish who do their prescribed duties and seek for Moksha, by granting them knowledge" (Chap. 4). Free from egoism and without attachment for fruits of action, one must meditate on Iswara, dedicating all actions to Him. Devotion to one's duty leads to perfection. "Self-knowledge is the aim of all endeavour."
- (c) Knowledge of the true nature of the Self aided by all favourable conditions of its rise and de-

velopment, viz : purity of mind, humility, inner purity of mind, "Self-centrol which consists in directing exclusively to the right path the body and the mind which are by nature attracted to all directions", perception of evil in birth, death and old age, in sickness and pain; steady unflinching meditation on the One as our sole refuge &c. &c. --- these virtues are to be cultivated (Chap. 13. 7-11.). ज्ञान-निष्ठा consists in an "intent effort to establish a continuous current of the idea of the inner Self (प्रत्यगावा)—chap. 18, 55.

(d) The Gitā remarks—"The end of knowledge is freedom (मुक्ति). The end should be kept in view ; for, it is only when one perceives the end that one will endeavour to cultivate attributes which are the means of attaining that knowledge. The attributes or virtues to be cultivated have been specified in Chap. 13, 7-10.—

(i) Humility, patience, uprightness, purity, social service, absence of Egoism, society of the disciplined &c. &c.

''बमानिलमदिश्वलमहिंसा चानिरार्ज्ञ वं। दशा भूतेष्वतीलप्त'' &c, &c.

(ii) Cultivation of piety, chastity, right intuition &c. &c. (Chap. 16, 1.)

''ब्रभ्यं सत्त्वसं ग्रहि: ज्ञानयोगव्यवस्थिति:। पहिंसा सत्यमकीयः, वपेशनं % ८. &८.

(iii) मैनी, कर्णा, मुद्ति, उपेना &c. as mentioned by Madhusudana in his Gloss on the Gitā.

(e) Contemplation of the Beautiful-in इमप् कौन्ते य," "प्रभाक्ति श्रशि-सूर्या यो:", "शब्दः खे", 73" etc. etc. (Chap. 6, and 11);

Chap. 5, 25—"सळेभूतिइते रताः" etc.

(f) Sankara's remarks are very useful in the formation of our ethical character.

"The good (चेंद्र:) and the pleasurable (पेंद्र:) are confusedly presented to the man. The intelligent compare the two; and on mature reflection discern their relative value—their difference—and having thus reflected, they embrace the good as worthier than the pleasurable. Then they adopt means to the attainment of the End chosen" (चेंद्र: भा•). We thus compare, estimate our impulses—they are thus our objects of contemplation. A sum-total of feelings, impulses etc. etc. cannot deliberate, cannot control anymore than each feeling and impulse separately. Only a free Self can do so which has them. In every voluntary action, the Self which is not in time, does and can introduce a new element in time.

(g) कर्ष-Work done under impulsive forces and with self-seeking end in view is to be replaced by work done with higher and inner ends in view. Reflection—विचार—guides man in this stage for selecting higher ends. Then lastly, the realisation of the unity of the Self is the highest end and it is the highest activity in life. The meditation of Brahma in and through the manifested objects—"जगतय यस नं वत्परिज्ञानात् परं श्रेय इति सर्वोधनिषदां निश्चितोऽष्टः" (प्र॰ भा॰, 6.1)—in order of increasing value—is regarded as meritorious, and it leads man gradually to the highest Goal. The doing of all prescribed duties and leading a life of virtue ("वृष्टे पुष्टकत् भूवा"—व॰ भा॰ 4.4.9.)—are regarded as necessary aids to the knowledge of Brahma.

It is wrong to fold the view that the Vedanta teaches inertia—inactivity.—

'पूर्वि-पूर्विभूमिषु बैराग्य', उत्तरीत्तरभूमी पानन्दप्राप्तिसाधनं ; वैराग्यस्य 'तर-तम-भावेन' परमकाष्ठीपपर्त्तेः, 'निरतिश्रयस्य' तस्य (Transcendent good —beyond the series of goods in the scale of existence) 'परमानन्द'प्राप्तिसाधन लसभ्यवात्''—(पा० गिरि, in ह० भा०, 4.3.33.)—

i. e. Man cannot find satisfaction of his Self in any earthly and temporal order of things. He seeks in Transcendent God the fulfilment of the Good he is trying to realise in his own life. This Good—"परमानर"—we find revealed gradually in the order of nature.

''यव यव विभूत्याचितिशयः, तव तव ईश्वर इति उपास्यतमा दोत्यते"।

Thus we think of God as a Power in the world—immanent power working in the world and progressively making for Good. The world, as I have tried to show in a previous Lecture, reveals an End or Divine Purpose which is being unfolded stage by stage. The world is striving towards, developing towards, an End and its Goal is out of sight. "Brahma is "una"—"tu"; and this tu is what gives pleasure and joy, is well-known in the world as sweet, sour &c. &c. Here, the worldly bliss produced by the presence of external helps (stimulating objects), has been instanced for understanding the Divine Bliss; for, it is by means of this well-known bliss that the Divine Bliss can be understood" (no HI).

Thus the Ideal Good (মানহ or মান্ত্রী) which is revealing and working in the worldly objects, of which they are but imperfect manifestations—is the highest

End of human pursuit. The lower and higher objects are, therefore, only the proximate ends and these can be made to be embraced in the Highest Good. The multiplicity of human ends is connected with the Supreme End. But as Brahma transcends the temporal order of objects, we ought not to remain satisfied with these lesser ends, but must move through these for a complete and final satisfaction.—

"नगत्कारणं उपास्थं ब्रह्म उन्दा, अनुपाधिब्रह्मप्रतिपत्तिः कर्त्तेवा ... उभयविदेव सम्यग् ज्ञानी । न इि अन्यतरस्य तत्त्वे ज्ञाते कतकत्वता पत्तिः" (नीलकप्र in the Gita).

In the Gitā, it has been shown that Brahma is to be first worshipped as the Cause of the world—as the Power which carries on and sustains the worldly process—परिवास-नित्य i—"सामान्यात्रको मिय सन्धे विशेषाः प्रोताः"। Then at the same time, Brahma is to be known as a Being which transcends this process—क्टब्र-नित्यः A:man who has not realised these two aspects of Brahma cannot be said to be able to realise the Highest Good—the Supreme End (को॰, Chap. 12).



The Source of Adwaita-vada. ADWAITA-VADA IN THE RIG-VEDA.

-::-

While discussing the relation which subsists between the cause and its successive effects. Sankarāchāryya in his commentary on the Brahma-Sutra introduced, as we have stated before, the idea of two stand-points from which this relation can be viewed, viz., the Pāramārthika and the Vyāvahārika. He says that from the former standpoint the effects are to be looked upon as Ananya (अनन्य)—not distinct—from their cause, although from the Vyāvahārika view, we take them to be Anya ()-distinct-from the cause. About the exact significance of these two terms-'Anya' and 'Ananya'-much misunderstanding exists in various quarters and we would try in this Lecture to bring out the bearing of these two terms upon his entire theory in the light of what Sankarāchāryya has himself said about them.

We would here explain the idea with the help of an illustration which Sankara himself has used in several parts of his commentaries. स्वर्ण (fragments of earth), पिंड (lump of earth), घट (pot) are the effects or transformations or manifestations of the cause स्तिका (clay). Now, what is the nature of the relation that exists between these successive changes issuing out of the Enail—effects produced from the cause? This relation can be explained in two different ways. The ordinary common people of the world regard the successive changes thus produced as self-subsisting entities—existing separated or divided from their cause. The clay to their view, has transformed itself as useful and the useful totally transforms itself into useful; and the useful into the use or the pot. One form is changed into another and that again into another and so on. One dies and another is produced. The preceding forms are looked upon as the causes, successively, of the latter forms. This is the empirical stand-point and our practical life is bound up with this view.

But it is otherwise when these are considered from the Pāramārthika stand-point. This view never regards the effects as separated from or outside of the causal reality. They can never exist separated from their cause, out of relation to their cause. च्या, पिंड, घट etc., are not, to this view, so many self-subsisting entities, but only successive manifestations of the one causal reality—च्याचा—lying, hidden behind them. Here, the clay or rather the nature of the clay finds its expression in the successive forms produced out of it. The real essence of the clay is not lost in these forms; it is present behind each of these successive changes; the identity of the cause is not lost but present in each successive change or difference.* It does not itself change with these changing forms;

^{*} Vide: the quotation given at P. 132.

it does not, in assuming these forms, become something else or un. It is clear then that these successively changing forms do not entirely lose their value * in the eyes of those who are possessed of the ununiantee. Sankara has told us that there is really no conflict or opposition (fair) between these two views.

"तेषां (हैतिनां) हैतहर्ष्टः, श्रमाकमहैतहिष्टः।.....तै:.....श्रमहीयोऽयं धर्मानग्रमातृ शासीकलदर्शनपची न 'विक्ध्यते' (मा० का॰ मा०, 3. 17-18)".

["They are all Dualists and dualism is their stand-point, but our stand-point is non-dualism. There is no conflict between these two views, as everything is non-different (भन्य) from the Self"].

Here compare ग्रानन्दगिरि-

"हैतमहैतकार्थं, न च कारणं तत्कार्थप्रतिभासैविंकध्यते, -- कार्थस

कारणातिरेक्षेण भभावात्। अतः दैतपचैरद्दैतपची विरुद्धी न भवति"।

["All dual forms are the effects of non-dual (Brahma); and there is thus no conflict between the effect and the real cause; for, no effect is really different from the cause.]"

As there is no opposition, the परिणामवाद may be retained even when we emphasise the विवक्त-वाद के.

But there are, unfortunately, several modern interpreters of Sankara's System who think otherwise. They regard all nāma-rūpas—the whole universe—as mere illusion, as unreal and false. But, as we have seen above, Sankara has found no necessity for denying the existence of the world altogether. Sankarāchāryya distinctly declares—

^{*} Because they are viewed as the manifestations of the underlying cause (not as this thing or that thing.)

^{† &}quot;अप्रत्याखाय कार्थप्रयंच' परिणास-प्रक्रियां च आश्रयति स्वकारः (वेदा० भा॰, 2. 1. 14).

"Nobody has the power to dissolve both the external and internal existences which are presented to our senses and to our consciousness (বিষয়ন:)."

Here is how he expresses this idea:-

"कोऽयं प्रपंच-विजयो नाम ?.....तत यदि तावत् विद्यमानोऽयं प्रपंची देहादिलचण भाष्यात्मिकः, वाह्यभ पृथिव्यादिलचणः प्रविलापियतव्य इतुरचेत्रत, म पुरुषमात्ने ण भाषकः प्रविलापियतुमिति, तत्प्रविजयोपदेशोऽभक्यविषय एव स्थात्।"

(वे॰ सा॰, 3, 2, 21).

["What", Sankara enquires of the doubtor, "is your idea about the Dissolution (प्रपन्न-विजय), pray ृ The world—both in its subjective and objective condition—actually exists (विद्यमानः); nobody is therefore capable of dissolving the existence of such a world. You cannot really mean this by your term प्रपन्न-विजय" &c. &c.]

In a famous passage in the Brihadāranyakabhāsya, he raises a question—

"If you hold all the nāma-rupas to be real and not false, what would be the fate of your Adwaita-Vāda? Brahman has been declared in the Sruti as One and without a second. If you hold to this declaration made by the Sruti, you cannot, at the same time, admit the reality of the difference of the nāma-rupa—the changes going on in the world."—

"नामक्पोपाध्यसिलं — 'एकमेवाहितीयं' 'नेह नानासि किंचन' इति शुतयो विकथ्ये रन् इति, — न ; सलिल-फेनटप्यानं न परिहतलात्'

(ह॰ भा॰, 3. 5. 1).

The reply here suggested by Sankarāchāryya is very important. He says—"No, you need not deny the existence of the changes—the nāma-rūpas. The existence of these does not at all harm, or come into conflict (विरोध), in any way with the theory of Adwaitism. Take the case of the relation between

water and its productions—the waves, bubbles, foams and froth; the relation between clay and its successive transformations in the shape of स्व पे, स्त्रिंड, बर etc." As it is the cause itself which appears as these changed forms, these are, in reality, non-different (बनस) from their cause. No necessity arises to deny these successive changes, if we conceive them to be (बनस) i.e., non-different from their cause. That these are non-different (बनस) from their cause does not make them different—बन्ध—or independent entities: neither does it abolish their own respective forms. Carefully note also what Sankarāchāryya says in this respect in his Vedānta-bhāsya:—

'न च ससुद्रादुदकात्मनोऽनन्यत्ने ऽपि......फेन-तरंगादीनां इतरेतरभावापित-भंवति।

न च तेषामितरेतरभावानापत्ताविष समुद्राव्यनोऽन्यलं भवति।"

(वे॰ भा॰, 2. 1. 13).

["i. e. The foams, the waves, the billows &c. are nondifferent from the sea-water (their cause), but they are different from one another in their own respective forms; one form does not pass over into another form".

"Each of these is different from the other, no doubt; but

that does not make them different from the sea-water."]

The sum and substance of Sankara's arguments

may be thus stated :-

(a) Whenever the effects are produced, they are produced from their cause; they can never appear divided—separated—from their cause.*—

''विशेषा: सामान्ये उप्ताः, न तत एव निर्मिय यहीतु शकानी''

^{* &#}x27;'यस च यसादात्मलाभो भवति, स तेन अप्रविभक्तो हरू:, यथा घटादीनां सदा" (हरु भार)।

Can you separate the pot from its cause—the clay? Can you separate the waves from their cause—the water? Can you, placing the waves outside the water, regard them as something self-existent—as something way?

- (b) The effects are, in reality, the manifestations of their cause,—the stages through which the causal reality expresses its nature. It is the cause which without forfeiting its own identity differentiates itself in these forms. It is the cause which holds these forms, sustains them. It is like the identity of the thread which holds the manifold flowers together and forms a piece of garland.* Then how is it possible to abolish these successive changes or to separate them from their cause which holds them?
- (c) The cause does not, in assuming these forms, lose itself in them. The movements of my hand, the walking, the uttering of words—all these are my states; they are mine, they belong to me. If you separate these from me, they lose their substance, they die; for, it is the cause alone which binds its effects. One can, without difficulty, recognise the identity of the cause in its different changing states or manifestations. A cow, when lying in repose and ruminating, is called a cow; but when it gets up and walks, will it now be called a horse, and not the same identical cow †?

^{* &#}x27;'निय चर्वनिदं प्रीतं, स्वी निषागणा दव'' (गी०)।

^{† &#}x27;'न हि लोके गौलिष्ठन् गच्छन् वा गौभं वित श्रयानस्तु श्रयादिजात्यन्तरम् इत्यादि" (इ॰ भा॰, 2. 1, 20),

The cause is thus the same throughout all its changing differentiations and does not lose its identity and become something different from its own self.

Throughout all these changes, the cause remained as it was in itself. Thus Brahma exists apart from relationships, as well as in and through relations. It transcends the universe of Māyā, but in its transcendence it does not throw away Māyā;—Māyā being but no other than Brahma (itself), revealing and hiding itself. When Ez (pot) disappears it hides itself in clay; for, it was nothing but clay; when it appears as a pot, it is nothing but clay; for, it hides its nature as clay in Ez (pot) | Sankara thus expresses the idea—

''दिनिनि दाक्विकारे, दाक् तिरोभवति ; सोऽपि तत्रैव । जगित तथा परमात्मा, परमात्मन्यपि जगित् तिरोधत्ते''॥ (स्वात्मनिक्षण, 94.)

["The wood lies hidden in the form of the elephant, (when it is) made of wood, and the form of the elephant when disappearing also hides itself in the wood. So the Supreme Self lies hidden in the universe (when manifested) and the universe (when disappearing) lies hidden in the Self".]

Brahman or the underlying Reality is not thus in any way affected or changed by the changing nāma-rūpas. It is the universe in which the Reality is expressing its nature, so that you need not deny the reality or the existence of the universe. There is, therefore, no opposition (चिरोध) between the world and its causal source. * It is in this way that in

Vide : Ananda-giri quoted at p. 193.

Sankara-Vedānta the परिणास has been retained, while emphasising the विवस्त. It is most erroneous to suppose, as has been done by many, that in order to retain the unity of Brahman, Sankarāchāryya has abolished the world as false.

Sankara's Adwaita Philosophy is founded upon this relation of the cause and its effects. From the discussion given above we arrive at the conclusion that one cause is present behind its different manifestations in the world; that the cause itself is gradually realising itself in the different forms of nāma-rūpa. It will be a mistake to think the effects produced from the cause as something different from it.

One Reality manifests itself in the multiplicity of nāma-rūpas, and the true nature of this Reality has not been reduced to these successive effects. It is the connecting link of all these differences, and its own nature realises itself in and through these differentiations. There is no need in Sankara's System to declare the unreality* of these differences, or to separate these from the underlying causal reality taking them as self-sufficient entities.

If the Māyā and its products are not Brahma itself, but something else, other than রয় (মন); (if they do not form part of Brahma) then the result would be violation of Adwaita-Vāda—a dualism would step in. Sankara avoids this dualism by pointing out non-difference (মনন্ত্ৰ) of effects

^{&#}x27;'सदात्मना विकाराणां सत्यलं, खतस्तु चनृतलमेव'' (का॰ भा॰)



from their cause. He has not abolished the objects of the world, he only looked upon them—as Brahma, as the expression of His nature. This was his पारमाधिक view; he looked upon the world from this higher stand-point. The following quotations will also support dur position—

''अनवगत-काञ्चनानां, भूषण-घीरेव सूषपे हैमे।

एवमविवेकभाजां, जगित तथा न तास्त्रिकी धिषणा॥''

(खात्म-निरूपण, 83.)

ornament as an ornament only (but not as gold); so too those who have no realisation of truth, do not perceive the world as Brahma, but as world only. "]

वहिंभि: विमिश्वरुक्तैः, व्यह्मिवेटं चराचरं विश्वं। श्रीकर-फेन-तरङ्गाः, सिन्धीरपराणि न खलु वस्तूनि ॥ (145)

["All this universe sentient and non-sentient is Brahma, is "I". Foam, wave and spray &c. are not, in reality, substances different (भूष, भूषर) from the ocean."]

''बाल्मैवैके' जगत् सब्बें, बाल्मनो 'ऽन्यत्' न किश्चन। खदो यहत् घटादीनि, स्वाल्मानं सर्वमीचते॥'' (बाल्मवोध, 48).

["As one sees pots &c. as mere clay; so all this universe (ডক') is only the Self, there is naught offer than Self."]

It is our deliberate opinion—and this opinion has been formed by a careful and scrutinising study of the Rig-Veda itself—that the relation between

the cause and its effect as expounded by Sankarachāryya, the true import of which we have given above, owes its origin to the Rig-Veda. The popular conception that the hymns of the Rig-Veda are addressed to the grand and remarkable natural forces which captured the imagination of the primitive Aryan settlers of India, in the shape of the Sun, the Moon, the Dawn, the Sky, etc., is altogether erroneous. We have, on the contrary, found ample material in the Rig-Veda which unmistakably proves that the theory of Non-dualism as interpreted by Sankara in his Vedanta System of philosophy runs throughout this stupendous work from the beginning to the end. This may sound strange to many ears, but would it not rather be regarded as remarkably strange that an intelligent race of people like the Hindus should exhibit such a lamentable lack of even common-sense in allowing the hymns and Mantras addressed to inert (লভু) non-intelligent natural phenomena to form an essential part of their religion! Even at the present day, their daily devotions and prayers to God are performed by a hymn of the Rig-Veda. If the Rig-Veda contains nothing but certain measured lines meant to be addressed to the fascinating objects of nature calculated to inspire awe and admiration, then its value and importance are considerably diminished. To our view, the importance of the Rig-Veda lies in the fact that it is the original store-house of the Indian Idealism which supplied the materials of Adwaita-Vada which subsequently gave rise to the admirable System of Vedanta.

We have found above that it is an important feature of the Vedantic causal theory that the effects produced by the cause can never remain separated from the cause and be regarded on their own account, to be independent and self-sufficient entities; and that the causal reality in assuming these forms, does not become something else (प्रन्य), losing its own nature. It is only the nature of the causal reality which finds gradual expression in and through these visible forms. * Now, this is also the position of the Rig-Veda itself. The Vedic Rishis worshipped this causal Reality which operates behind these visible forms, knowing full well that these visible forms by themselves have no value at all. For, they can never be separated from the underlying causal reality and considered on their own account, as if they are the only realities. The Vedic Rishis did not remain satisfied with these visible forms but behind the shifting scenes of nature they always tried to seek for and discovered a constant causal Reality which they worshipped. It is the quest of changeless which is in the midst of changes.

There are quite a number of arguments by which this position has been established in the Rig-Veda. We would, in this Lecture, content ourselves with presenting only one set of arguments collected from different places of the Rig-Veda. If, to the Vedic Rishis the gods were no more than so many visible

^{* &}quot;.....तया मनुष्यादिष्ये व हिरण्यगर्भ पर्यन्ते व जानै वर्षाद्याभिव्यक्तिरिप परेष परेष भूषसी भवति"। (वि॰ भा० १-३-३०).

Vide : also गी॰ भा॰, १५-१२.

objects as they appeared to the senses, we would not have found mention of the dual nature of each of the Vedic gods so clearly and distinctly, as has been done in the Rig-Veda. The Agni, the Suryya, the Aswins, the Soma, -in fact every Vedic god we find described as possessing a dual form, a dual nature of his own. As Brahman has been described in the Upanishads as प्राणस्य प्राण:, मनसी मन:, सूर्यस्य सूर्य: etc., so in the Rig-Veda, under the visible forms of the gods there is, in each case, an invisible form which constitutes the true nature of these gods. In the Vedic state of society, people were not wanting whose cultured minds were busy discovering the presence of an invisible causal power working behind nature which they contemplated and worshipped, taking the shifting phenomena of nature as mere external expressions of that hidden causal power. The very mention of the dual nature of the Vedic gods unmistakably bears witness to the fact that the actual visible forms of the gods were never recognised in the Rig-Veda as the only realities. are all different facets of one and the same shining light, different types of manifestation of one unity, different names for one Reality.

We would now quote here the hymns from which readers would find how the *dual nature* of the gods has been brought out in the Rig-Veda.

(1) Take the case of the Agni-

It is stated about Agni—the fire-god—that the visible, material form of Agni has within him another invisible, internal form, and this internal form—the particle of the material fire.

अभगानास्ति, i. e. the fire kindled on cremation ground for burning the dead body is thus addressed :—

''क्रव्यादमिय' प्रहिणोमि द्रं, यमराज्य' गच्छतु रिप्रवाष्टः। इहेवायमितरो जातवेदा, देविभ्यो हव्य' वहतु प्रजानन्"॥

["The material form of the fire, the form which is devouring, consuming the body of the dead, we do not want; let this form be removed from us. But here, within this visible fire, there is another fire, and this fire it is which knows everything born in the world. It is this fire which always conveys oblations to the gods."]

Take again the following Mantra:-

''विधेन ते परने जन्मन्नग्ने, विधेन स्तोर्वेरवरे सथस्ये। यसाद योनेकदारिया, यजे तन्।''

["The fire has two-fold birth-places—the place of its manifestation. The one is the superior place, and the other inferior or the gross place. We desire to worship, O Fire! that place—that source—that alfor—from which thou hast sprung".]

That the invisible form of the fire is nothing but its causal nature has been very well brought out by the term until. This invisible causal substance of the visible fire is also referred to in another hymn in this manner:—

"विद्या ते नाम परमं गुड़ा यत्। विद्या तम्त्रः यत पाजगय"॥

["The fire has got a most hidden name, and we have been able to learn of this hidden name of the fire. We know, too, the source—sa—from which thou hast sprung up, O Fire!"]

In another hymn we find this address:-

"Over and above this material body, the fire has a most auspicious body; carry by that body this dead man to the higher region of heaven (10-16-4)." Exactly similar prayer we find addressed to the Sun in the Isa-Upanishad: "Withdraw, O Sun! these Thy visible rays. I desire to see that auspicious form of thine which lies concealed within those rays."

(2) Suryya-

The Rig-Veda in similarly unmistakable terms refers to the underlying hidden causal substance existing behind the visible form of the Sun.

''हे ते चक्रो स्यों', ब्रह्माण ऋत्या विदु:। अथैकां चक्रां यद गुहा, तद्ध्यातय इत् विदुः"॥

["To the Sun belong two wheels (বন). One is gross, visible to all; but the other is hidden, invisible— মুহা।"]

["Who knows this invisible hidden বন্ধ of the Sun? Only to those who are of contemplative turn of mind, who meditate inwardly within, this মুত্ত বন্ধ reveals its essence; others cannot know this."]

This description leaves no doubt in our mind as to the real nature of this invisible wheel of the Sun. It is the causal substance which underlies the visible gross form of the Sun. The presence of this causal substance within the visible Sun has been brought out in another form in a hymn which the 50th Sukta contains in the first Mandal.

The Sun is thus described there-

"There are three states or forms of the Sun. The one state is termed as eq; the other is eq+at, and the last is eq+at. That Sun is called as "eq", whose beam falls upon this earth. The Sun which spreads its beams upwards in heaven is termed as "eat". Besides these two, there exists the "eat" Sun who never sets, never rises". This beautiful description gives us an idea of the visible gross form of the Sun, as well as its invisible causal form, and also the form which lies even beyond the causal state (which in the Upanishadic nomenclature may be called as qual state). Sankara in his commentary on the

Vedanta has explained that the light (ज्योति:) of the Sun which is sent up to heaven is no other than the being of Brahman—''श्व यदत: परो ज्योति: दोष्यते'', etc., etc., (वे॰ भा॰, १-१-२४). By the 'light' mentioned here in the Sruti we are to understand the Being of Brahman which is to be found underlying all the visible existences as their causal substance. *

The Rig-Veda, too, in describing the invisible subtle state of the Sun clearly refers to that underlying causal substance. In the Chhāndogya-Upanishad, the Solar Disc has been described as a beerhive and it is there stated that the real Sun does not rise or does not set—"न निकाच, नोदियाय।" This line is exactly similar in its idea to the Sun described in the Rig-Veda as the उत्तम Sun 'which never rises, never sets'.

These descriptions clearly bring out the fact that the Rig-Vedic Sun and the Fire also are not merely visible gross natural objects.

(3) We shall now consider how the सोम has been described in the Rig-Veda. This is stated about the Soma (सोम)—

''सीमं मन्यते पपिव चन्यत्, संपिषन्ति घोषघिं। सोमं यं ब्रह्माणी विदः, न तस्यात्राति कचन''॥

["When the people press the सोम and squeezing from it its juice drink it off, they think they have quaffed the सोम; but to those whose minds are inwardly turned, the fact stands clearly comprehended that nobody can ever drink of the true, real सोम।" "न ते समाति पार्थियः"—"No mortal man of the earth can drink Thee, Soma!"]

^{* &#}x27;'विकारे चनुगतं नगत्-कारणं ब्रह्म निर्दिष्टम्'' (वे० भा॰, 1. 1. 24-25).

You will see that as in the case of the Sun and the Fire here also we find the two-fold forms of the सोम :-- the one is its gross form which the people ordinarily press and drink; but "who is to drink the subtle invisible form of the, its hidden causal substance which the material form of win contains within it?" It is for this reason that elsewhere it has been stated of the win that the "eternally existent Soma has got two kinds of beams extending both ways :-

''उभयतः पवमानस्य (सोम्ख) रामयः, भ्रवस्य सतः परियन्ति केतवः"। And also-

> ''हिता व्य र्थन अस्तस्य धाम. खर्विदे अवनानि प्रथना"।

[i. e., "सोम which is the source of अस्त has its two parts covered by its rays," }

It is also stated that the "Soma has a place within it which lies hidden and invisible to the ordinary gaze of the people and it is in this hidden place where exist the thirty-three gods" and that "to this real place become centred all the prayers of the devotees"-

> "तव त्ये सीम पवमान निन्ये. विश्वे देवास स्त्रय एकादशास:।" "तत्र सत्यं पवमानस्य अस्त. यत विश्वे कारवः सत्रसन्।"।

If the सोम were merely the सोम plant, how could it be addressed as the "inexhaustible navel (नामि:) of the earth," as "the seed (?a:) from which all the objects have been produced"?

As we have seen above in the case of the Sun, the सोम also has been stated to have a "त्रीय" place

—"तुरीयं धाम महिषो विविता"।

(4) We now come to Indra.—

Indra has got two forms; one of these forms constitutes his gross, visible form and the other is the causal form behind the former into which it is inter-woven, and that is his invisible subtle form. These dual forms of Indra find expression in several ways—

"दूरे तज्ञाम (शरीरं) गुच्चं पराचै:।.....महत् तज्ञाम गुच्चं पुरस्यृक्, येन सूतं जनयो येन सन्यं। प्रजं जातं ज्योतिर्यदस्य प्रियमः।

["Indra possesses dual bodies. One of these bodies is most hidden; and this hidden body is very large and it extends over—touches—large spaces. By this body, Indra has brought into being the past and the future (objects) and created those bright objects he desired to create."] This body, you are requested to mark, has been called 'na sulfa: and 'gama' i.e., it is 'the most ancient light,' and 'exists in touch with all the objects of the world.' Can it be anything else than the causal substance which interweaves itself into the visible form? The poet of the Mandal V has clearly indicated this causal form when he declares that "he has come to learn the most hidden place (na) of Indra"—

"अवावचर्चं पदमस्य सस्त्, क्यं निधातु रत्वाय मिक्कन्। अपृक्ताम्यान्तत ते मे बाहुः, इन्द्रं नरो वुवधाना अग्रेम"।

["Among the performers of the sacrifices, only those are able to know this hidden পুৰ of Indra who are ৰুৱধাৰা:, i.e., those who could see into the depth of things."]

Unless we take the invisible causal form of Indra into our consideration, the description that "Indra has created the heaven and the sky (बाबा-प्राथनो", that "Indra has planted milk into the bosom of the cow"—becomes inconsistent and insignificant. Such descriptions lose their value and become

useless when only the gross, visible, phenomenal form of Indra is taken.

As we have seen while considering the form of the Sun, the Fire and the Soma that each of these Vedic gods possesses a तुरीय form; in the case of Indra also, a तुरीय पद, besides the two Padas already stated, is mentioned—

"उभे नि पासि जन्मनी। तुरीयादित्य इवनं त इन्द्रियमातस्थावस्रतं दिवि।"

And this तुरीयपद has been described as असृत पद।

(5) In the description of Visnu, we find a statement about a प्रम प्र। Visnu has been described to "contain three Padas, viz., the one extending over the earth, the other over the sky and the third the heaven. But nobody, it has been stated, can ever see the hidden प्र of Visnu—which is मस्त—undying, and which is filled up with honey—मध्युषे"—

''वौषि पदा विचक्रमे विशा गींपा ऋदाभाः

तिंद्रांसी विषणायो जाखवांसः समिन्धने. विष्णीर्थत परमं पदम्"।

["Only those who are wake ful - ever alive to the real nature of things—who are thoughtful—only such people can see the परम पर of Visnu."]

(6) Of the any—the Wind-god—also, we find a similar description of its two-fold forms. The one is its way—gross, visible form and the other its deep-laid subtle invisible form which the former contains behind it.—

हाविमी वाती ;—वात चा सिन्धीरा परावत: । दक्षं ते अस्य चावातु, परान्धो बातु यद्रपः" ।

["The wind is two-fold: one form blows from the sea; but the other comes from a place very far off (परावत:), i.e., a place

lying beyond (the visible world). The first form gives us strength; but the other has the power to drive out sin."] What has been described as the killer of sin can never be the gross बाबु; it must be the causal reality existing behind all the visible objects. This subtle form of the बाबु is known as मानिएया in the Rg-Veda. Now, the मानिएया is the source of all sorts of activities. It is from this source that the visible बायु—vibratory motion—has sprung. In the 168th Sukta, in Mandal I, we also find two-fold strength of Maruts—"दिवा म्य: !" "From which region the Marut is coming?"—it has been asked. The reply given is,—"Is it coming from the inferior (चवर, i.e. म्य क्) region? Or is it blowing from a region lying beyond the visible places?"—

This enquiry shows us clearly the visible and invisible forms of the Maruts. It is with reference to this invisible underlying any, that such statements become consistent as these—"It is within the lap of the any that all the gods perform their respective functions." It is clearly the causal reality which is present behind the visible motions or activities which has been referred to by these descriptions. It is of this any we find it stated that "it is the Maruts who "have extended the objects of the earth and the shining objects of the sky"—

''आ ये विसा पार्धिवानि पप्रयत् रोचना दिवि''।

The term faque in connection with the Maruts indicates its three states—the visible, the causal, and the art state. That all of these Maruts have only one source from which they have all sprung has been beautifully described by a metaphor.—"As the spokes are all centred and fixed in the navel of the wheel, so they are all come from one identical source"—

"रवानां ये त्ररा: सनाभय: ।" यददो वात ते गरहे त्रसतस्य निधिर्दित:"—

This treasure house of una must be the causal substance which sustains the gross visible form and which is its source.

(7) Two kinds of Sky (आकाश) we find described in the Rg-Veda. As in the Upanishads the भूताकाश and the प्रम खोम—both of these are mentioned, of which the latter is the undifferentiated condition of the Prāna-Sakti. The भूताकाश is the visible differentiated vibrations which fill the आकाश। This प्रम खोम lying behind the भूताकाश is also known as पुराणं खं in the Upanishads, while the भूताकाश is also known as वायुरं खं। In the Rg-Veda also, similarly two terms have been employed. The one is खो:,—it is nothing but the भूताकाश। The other is the प्रम खोम। In this प्रम खोम the first manifestation of मातरिखा or Prāna-Sakti appears.

We need not quote further passages. These would amply show that each and every god mentioned in the Rg-Veda has, in addition to his visible form, an invisible causal form which underlies the former. To exhibit this two-fold form in general terms, all the gods have been collectively also described or defined as family

''दिजन्मानो ये स्रतशापः सत्याः'।

(8) The same fact irresistibly comes to our mind, when we follow the description of Varuna (वस्य). It is said of him—

"यासां (अपां) राजा वक्षो याति मध्ये, सत्यादते अवपश्चन् जनानां"।



["There travels, within the flowing water, Varuna who watches the truth and untruth—the merit and demerit—of all the beings in the world."]

This seer of truth and untruth which is present within the water cannot but be the causal uni existing within all. Take again such description as this—

"Varuna knows two kinds of प्र—one visible (दर्भनीय) and the other invisible (प्राचीन) Pada." This प्राचीन प्र must be the causal substance lying behind its visible प्र or form. And this hidden प्र is otherwise referred to when the Vedic Rishi declared that "Varuna has revealed the secret of a hidden Pada to a worthy intelligent devotee"—

"विहान् पदस्य गुच्चान् चवीचत्, युगाय (योग्याय) विष्र उपराय शिचन्"।

The following stanza about Varuna becomes consistent only when we take the causal form of Varuna; otherwise it will be meaningless. It is the causal substance alone which works differently in different objects.—

"वनेषु व्यन्तरीचं ततान, वाजमर्व्वतृत्तु, पय उद्यिशातु । इत्यु क्रतु वरुणो, असु अग्निं, दिवि सूर्यमद्यात् सीममद्रौ।"

["It is Varuna who has placed strength in the horse, milk in the cow, fire in the water, sun in the sky, Soma in the mountain and Varuna has spread the firmament overhead."]

Sankarāchāryya has shown by arguments that the effects can never be separated from, and taken outside of, their causal substance, and that they must always be considered in relation with * their underlying cause which finds its own realisation † through them. In giving a clear idea of the invi-

^{* &#}x27;'तद-युक्तमखिल' वस्तु, व्यवहारश्चिदन्वितः, चौरै सर्पिरवार्पितम्'' (श्वाम-निरुपण)।
† '...श्विभृतं सत् 'लत्स्वते' त्रश्च" (सु० भा०)

sible but ever accompanying causal reality behind each of the visible gods, the Rg-Veda wants to show that the visible forms of the gods will always put the people in mind of the causal Reality which is ever presnt behind them, and severed from which the gods will at once become unessential and accurate to use the expression employed by Sankara. They are always to be taken in connection with their causal substance—which is none other than Brahman Itself—of which these gods are so many manifestations. How can the effect be conceived as different (पूजा) from the cause? I would again remind you of the illustration given by Sankara to support his position which was quoted in an early part of our Lectures (Vide: Lect. 1, P. 16).—

"अग्नेहि विस्फृलिङ्गः अग्निरेव"—

"The spark after it comes out of fire is nothing but fire in reality; it is not different from, other (प्रस्) than, the fire—its cause."

And also

"(विस्मु लिङ्गस्य) प्रागम्ने भ्रे पात् अम्ने त्रकत्वदर्भनात्"—

"Before the spark came out of fire, separated itself from the fire—its cause, it was identical with fire, was no other than fire itself."

The idea of the Rg-Veda is that Brahman is finding its expression through the visible objects—the Vedic gods—mentioned therein. The description of the the behind the visible was of these gods serves this great purpose. It would be totally unphilosophical to take the Vedic gods as separated from their causal

source and to treat them as so many self-sufficient, independent beings, which some interpreters of the Rg-Veda have sought to do. Sankara has shown such a procedure to be erroneous. The effects cannot, even for a moment, stand unrelated to their cause. Neither do they serve any other purpose than the realisation, through them, of the nature of the causal reality. It is in this way that the Rg-Vedic gods must be considered. Sankara has stated that one finite object does indeed negate or exclude another finite object, but none of these · objects can negate or exclude the idea of their cause which is the infinite existing behind them-"न हि काय नाम वसुतो ऽस्ति, यतः कारणवृद्धिविनिवने त'। For, the कार्य is nothing but the transformation (अवस्थानार) of the causal reality. How then can a and exclude the idea of its cause? The visible forms or effects have no real value of their own. As these are प्रार्थ, they serve the purpose of the realisation of the nature of the causal reality which exists and operates within them. The causal realities are therefore the ends; but as Brahman is the absolute end, it includes all other lower ends within. * Sankarāchārya has explained this relation between the causal reality and the effects produced out of it. This exactly is the relation which exists between the dual forms of the gods described in the Rg-Veda. Forgetting the intimate relation in which the hidden underlying causal reality always stands with the visibly gross

^{* &#}x27;'अनेके हि विलच्छा: सामाय-विशेषा:...वैधीमेकस्मिन् महासामान्ये पारंपर्यंगत्या अन्तर्भोव:'' (ह० भा०)।

forms of natural objects, it is wrong to look upon these as the only objects with which we have any concern in the world. This would be anasife view as stated by Sankara. But this is not at all the real view; it is the most unphilosophical view which obtains among the ordinary people. We must try to cultivate the real पारमार्थिक view and look upon the gods, i. e. the phenomenal objects as manifestations of the causal Reality,—as Brahman Itself sustains them and works within them, and without which and cut off from which they would altogether lose their importance, -would become unreal unessential. This grand truth the Rg-Veda has inculcated upon us, when it describes the subtle invisible form along with the visible gross form of its gods. Otherwise, such description becomes a meaningless jumble. Yet the modern interpreters of the Rg-Veda have not a word to say about the invisible causal form which accompanies those gods, so clearly described in the pages of the Rg-Veda in connection with each of its gods. We have not said anything about the 3 types of Devatās and three kinds of ass (yajnas) which find ample description in the Rg-Veda. Neither have we referred you to the use of the term Māyā exactly in the sense in which Sankara used in his Vedanta. All these are to be found scattered in the Rg-Veda. Sankara seems to have borrowed his main ideas from the Rg-Veda.



Conclusion :-

This is my last day and this day brings me to my labour's end. I am convinced of one fact : that you really love Sankara and that you take a loving interest in this great philosophy of your own ancient land. Your attendance, day after day, in this cold, chilly, wintry evenings gives ample evidence of that fact. But, I do not know if I have been able to please you-if my presentation of India's great philosopher has proved con-vincing to you. But I have laboured honestly. What I have said, I have tried to support and strengthen by ample quotations. For this purpose I have traversed, as you have seen, the whole field-neglecting nothing. Numerous texts from all his commentaries have been put before you to help you to come to your own conclusion. Sankara's theory is not a Pantheism. He has not abolished the things of the world, neither has he declared the finite sitas as so many unrealities. As the world is finite but moving towards the infinite goal, so we - stas - are also finite as well as infinite. Infinite possibilities lie hidden in us, and Sankara holds out to us the great promise that we shall one day be able to realise our aspirations, and to fulfil all our possibilities, and that all strife and sufferings will cease in Am. In Sankara-philosophy there is ample scope for कर्न –duties of man. We are all self-seeking beings: we must try to be unselfish; and so long as we are not disinterested in our actions and ideas, the AMMIN, Sankara tells us,

will not dawn-we must treat all as our own-not forgetting the great truth that the same नारायण (Nārāyana) is present in us all. We must make sincere efforts to remove suffering from our fellow slas, so far as in us lies, and unless that is done, how can we help them to realise the नारायणं within? All these promises Sankara's philosophy holds before us. It is not a philosophy of माया or इन्द्रजान. He has not woven a net of इन्द्रजान around us to enmesh us within it beyond hope of extrication. Neither it is a mere Theology. And by the way, our Rg-Veda-that great storehouse of Indian wisdom, from which we have derived • our all practical religions of every-day life, is not a book of hymns composed by primitive Indian tillers of soil, but it is a store-house of the great Māyā-Vāda too from which Sankara partly borrowed the main ideas of his philosophy. But the time has arrived to take farewell of you however painful it may be, and I do it by offering my good wishes to you all.

I take this opportunity to offer my respectful tribute to the blessed memory of the late Sreegopal Basu Mallick—the great founder of this Fellowship which has given an impetus to the culture and spread of the Vedantic truths.

[The End.]



WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR :-

Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy.

[Second Edition. Rs 4.

Adwaita-Vada.

[Second Edition, Rs 3.

The Outlines of Vedanta Philosophy.

[Second Edition, Re 1.

[These three works have been published by the Calcutta University.]

The Upanishader Upadesh-

-Volume I (Chhandogya and Brihadaranyaka)
[Third Edition. Rs 2-8.]

-Volume II (Katha and Mundaka)

[Third Edition, Rs 2-8.]

-Volume III (Isha, Kena, Prasna, Aitareya, Taittiriya and Mandukya) [Third Edition, Rs 2-8.]

[In each of these Volumes, complete translation with elaborate exposition of the commentaries of Sankara has been given. Each Volume has been translated into Hindi by Pandit Nandakishore Sukla of Oudh].

The Bhagavad-Gita

(A translation of main Theme).

Extracts from only a few of OPINIONS

On the author's

"Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy."

- I. Professor A. Berriedale Keith, D. Litt., D.C.L. University of Edinburgh:—"......Your book is a remarkably able and highly interesting contribution to the interpretation of Sankara. Its collection of passages alone would be of very high value, for the extent of Sankara's writings is so great as to render easy reference impossible without such aid, and I fully appreciate the labour which has been involved in the selection of the texts cited. Even greater value applies to your powerful exposition of the realistic element in Sankara. Your restatement of his position in terms of modern philosophical conception, shows a very great skill and will demand the most careful consideration from those who seek to apprehend the true force of the teachings of the Acharyya."
- 2. Professor Julius Jolly, Ph. D. University of Wurzburg, Bavaria :—"This work contains an excellent exposition,

I think, of the main principles of the Adwaita system and an equally excellent vindication of this against the reproaches raised by scholars wrongly interpreting its technical terms."

- 3. Sir George A. Grierson, K.C.I.E., Ph.D., D.Litt., LL. D., late Vice-President, Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland:—"......I have read a good deal of it and found it very interesting and instructive.....your book shows evidence of much original research and I hope that you will continue your studies of this and other important Systems of Indian Philosophy."
- 4. Dr. L. D. Barnett, Oriental Studies, London Institution (University of London):—".......Your book is a work of considerable merit."
- 5. Professor J. Wackernagel, Basil, Switzerland:—"......
 Introduction to Adwaita Philosophy is a valuable book............ I shall not fail to make it known and accessible to fellow-workers interested in Indian Philosophy, and hope it will be appreciated universally according to its merits."
- 7. Dr. M. E. Senart of Paris:—"Your deep justice to the old master—Sankara—and your remarkable command of the difficult literary materials cannot but meet the grateful acknowledgment of all interested in this line of research."
- 8. Prof. S. V. Lesney, Ph.D., University of Prague:—"...
 ...The teaching of your great countryman—Sankara—has been treated by you in a very happy way and to much profit of your readers."
- 9. Prof. E. Washburn Hopkins, Ph.D., LL.D., Yale University, America:—".....My final judgment is that you have made a most important contribution to our knowledge of Sankara's Philosophy....."

- 11. Prof. Richard Garbe, Ph. D., of the University of Tübingen:—"It is more than its title indicates: not only an able Introduction, but a very important contribution to the history of Indian Philosophy, especially Chapter III seems to me to be of particular importance, as according to it, the current notions about Sankar's conception of the world have to be corrected. I wish you all success which your learning and diligence deserve."
- 12. Prof. James H. Woods, Ph.D., of Harvard University:—
 "..........Your book has given me the greatest pleasure. It is coherently written and the arguments move forward with logical precision and at the same time keep close to the text of the Vedánta. I found the book extremely valuable and I hope it will be the first one of the series. Your work has impressed me so much that I am sending you an invitation......"
- 13. Dr. Sylvain Levi, Ph. D., of College De France, Paris:—"........Your book is of a lasting value. You have mastered Sankara's work as a real Pandit and you know to expose his doctrines perfectly as a modern scholar. Never did I realise before so fully the perfect unity of Sankara's teachings. Your book is a concordarcy, a Cyclopædia of Sankara's Philosophy. The quotations are well selected, thoroughly clear, conclusive; a glance over the notes at the foot of the pages shows they are a substantial reading, affording the AR of Sankara's thoughts......"
- 14. Prof. M. Bloomfield, Esq., of John Hopkins University:—"......Your book is, I am convinced, a most valuable contribution to our knowledge of India's high thought: your exposition of Sankara is that of a loving disciple but at the same time, critical as well as sympathetic. Your chapter on Máyá is especially illuminating, but I remember every page of the book as full of clarifying information. No Indologist can possibly read it without being grateful to you for your first-hand, trustworthy help in this difficult field."
- 15. Prof. Richard Schmidt. Ph. D., of Munster University:—".....Surely your book is an admirably suitable introduction to that most magnificent achievement of Indian thoughtYour book is not only a highly interesting contribution to the interpretation of Sankara's writings, but also in every way a new argument of the justness of the "ex orienti lux." I wish you best success."

- 17. Prof. H. Luders, of Berlin University:—".........I have read your excellent Introduction with the greatest interest and profit. Your profound knowledge of Sankara has enabled you to carve out new ways to the understanding of India's great philosopher. In my opinion your work is a mark in the exposition of Vedánta Philosophy, and anybody who will take up in future those problems will have to deal with your views. You have solved some of the riddles proposed by apparent contradictions in the text and I am sure we shall have to modify considerably the prevalent opinion on Sankara Philosophy."
- 18. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, July, 1926:—"The author is to be congratulated on having produced a very well-written and remarkably clear and able book dealing with a-very thorny and difficult subject—the non-dualistic philosophy of the great Vedantist—Sankara. Mr. Sastri has collected a large number of passages of great value and importance from the writings of Sankara and has expounded them with marked ability. His treatment of Sankara's philosophical position is done with great skill......."
- Adwaita Philosophy' no longer requires any advertisement through the press. The book has already made its mark as one of the richest contributions to modern research on the 'Adwaita Philosophy'.......In Prof. Sastri that philosophy has got a very lucid exponent......as a piece of original research the book has received unqualified admiration from Indian as well as European scholars."



&c. &c. &c.

